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Yemen on the Brink of a Humanitarian Catastrophe Caused by Internal and External Conflicts: Civilians at the Heart of a Multilayered Crisis

News Report

2026-09-27
Yemen on the Brink of a Humanitarian Catastrophe Caused by Internal and External Conflicts: Civilians at the Heart of a Multilayered Crisis

© Image: CNN

Introduction

Over the past decade, Yemen has become one of the most complex and protracted centres of conflict in the Middle East. What began as a struggle over political power has evolved beyond the domestic sphere, taking on regional and international dimensions as regional actors became involved and major international shipping and trade routes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait were affected. The weakening of formal state institutions, the proliferation of numerous and fragmented armed groups, the intervention of external actors, and the failure of regional and international political initiatives have all constrained prospects for achieving sustainable and lasting peace. Under these circumstances, civilians have borne the greatest share of the direct and indirect consequences of this protracted war, with their security, livelihoods, and access to basic necessities severely affected. At the same time, the fragmentation of political and military power, the weakness of the rule of law, and restrictions on the activities of international humanitarian organizations have made the effective protection of the civilian population increasingly difficult. Against this backdrop, the present report reviews the circumstances that gave rise to the Yemeni Civil War, examines its principal humanitarian and human rights consequences, and considers the challenges arising from the multiplicity of armed groups, domestic responses, and measures taken by the international community in response to the continuing crisis.

 

Incidents

The Yemeni Civil War has its roots in the political crisis that followed the 2011 protests and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation[1]. The transfer of power to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi failed to address corruption, poverty, weak state institutions, and disagreements over the distribution of power and resources and the country’s proposed federal structure. The failure of the National Dialogue Conference to accommodate the demands of Ansar Allah and southern groups, together with the weakening of the central government and the temporary alliance between Ansar Allah and forces loyal to Saleh, paved the way for the capture of Sana’a in September 2014. The advance of Ansar Allah towards the south and the departure of the Hadi government first from Sana’a and subsequently from Aden led, in March 2015, to military intervention by the Saudi-led coalition. After approximately seven years of widespread hostilities, a six-month UN-brokered truce took effect in April 2022. Although the truce formally expired in October of that year, the substantial reduction in hostilities along the main front lines largely persisted in subsequent years[2]. However, deep and significant divisions between Ansar Allah, the Aden-based government, and other armed groups transformed the domestic conflict into a regional and multilayered war that has continued with considerable intensity into 2026. The war has had profound consequences for Yemen’s civilian population, causing displacement, hunger, and extensive suffering among Yemen’s civilian population.

  • Human Suffering and Civilian Casualties

Since the outbreak of the conflict and civil war, Yemeni civilians have repeatedly fallen victim to air strikes, missile attacks, ground fighting, and unexploded ordnance. According to data from the Yemen Data Project, from the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in March 2015 through the end of March 2022, coalition air strikes killed at least 8,983 civilians and injured 10,243 others. These figures relate solely to civilian casualties resulting from coalition air strikes and do not represent the total number of civilian casualties in the war in Yemen[3].

Following Ansar Allah’s entry into direct confrontation with Israel and its attacks on vessels and related targets—which the group stated were carried out in support of Palestinians in Gaza and in response to Israeli military operations—civilian casualties in Yemen increased as a result of retaliatory Israeli attacks as well as military operations conducted by the United States. In one reported instance, Reuters stated on 12 September 2025 that Israeli strikes had killed approximately 46 people[4].

Subsequently, the renewed fighting among government forces in Aden, Ansar Allah, and other armed groups in Yemen, which intensified during August and September 2026, once again increased civilian casualties and human suffering, with differing casualty figures reported from the various fronts. For example, The Guardian reported on 5 September 2026 that more than 60 people had been killed during intensified fighting in south-western Yemen, including 26 government troops, 31 members of Ansar Allah, and six civilians who were killed when a missile struck a bus in Taiz[5].

The World Health Organization (WHO) also announced on 23 September 2026 that 3,672 casualties had been reported as a result of the escalation in hostilities between 6 August and 18 September, comprising 674 deaths and 2,998 injuries. Between 13 and 18 September alone, 680 new deaths and injuries were recorded[6]. It should be noted that, given the continuing hostilities, obtaining consolidated and independently documented figures for the current fighting appears difficult.

  • Migration and Displacement

Before the most recent escalation in hostilities, the United Nations’ 2026 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) had estimated the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Yemen at approximately 5.2 million. Meanwhile, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Area Assessment — Round 41, conducted in March and April 2026 across 12 governorates, recorded more than 3.1 million internally displaced persons in the areas covered by the assessment. The latter figure therefore represents an estimate for areas monitored by the IOM and should not be regarded as the total internally displaced population of Yemen[7].

According to The Guardian, following the renewed fighting among armed groups in Yemen in August and September 2026, a further 125,000 people were added to the country’s internally displaced population[8]. At the same time, thousands of people have fled by undertaking the dangerous sea crossing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait to Djibouti. In its latest figures, released on 18 September 2026, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) put their number at nearly 3,000[9].

Available reports indicate that even such flight is far from easy. According to the Associated Press, Yemen is experiencing a widespread fuel crisis, making it difficult to obtain sufficient fuel for boats transporting people to Djibouti[10]. Overall, these circumstances have left displaced persons and host communities facing shortages of shelter, food, safe water, health-care services, and protection assistance.

  • Food Crisis and Hunger

The continuation of the war, economic collapse, rising food prices, and restrictions affecting the entry and distribution of humanitarian assistance have placed Yemen among the world’s most severe hunger crises in recent years. In 2025, UNICEF reached more than eight million children, adolescents, and women with early-childhood, adolescent, and maternal nutrition services[11].

In addition, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) identified the world’s hunger hotspots for the period from June to November 2026, with Yemen listed alongside Sudan, South Sudan, Palestine, and other affected contexts[12]. United Nations estimates for 2026 indicated that 18.3 million people in Yemen were facing acute food insecurity at Crisis level or worse (IPC Phase 3+). Of these, approximately 5.5 million were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and around 41,000 were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)[13].

Children have been particularly severely affected. Acute malnutrition, reductions in humanitarian assistance, and disruption to commercial routes and food supply chains are threatening the lives of hundreds of thousands of children. Tom Fletcher, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, told the Security Council that the food-security crisis in the Arab world’s poorest country, which is embroiled in civil war, had been worsening since late 2023 and had continued on an upward trajectory[14].

 

Challenges and Responses

  • Multiplicity of Armed Groups and the Absence of Domestic Consensus

One of the principal obstacles to ending the war in Yemen is the multiplicity of armed groups and the absence of a single political and military authority. On one side, Ansar Allah, with a cohesive command structure, controls parts of the country as well as institutions based in Sana’a. On the other side, the opposing camp comprises the internationally recognized government, forces affiliated with members of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the National Resistance Forces, the Giants Brigades (al-Amaliqa), tribal formations, and southern movements, whose political and military objectives are not necessarily aligned. Groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have also taken advantage of the security vacuum and the weakness of the central government.

Disagreements over the future of the southern regions, control of ports and resources, the distribution of power, and relations with external actors have prevented the emergence of a national consensus. In one instance, Rashad Al-Alimi, Chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, stated that the government did not seek a new ceasefire with Ansar Allah because previous ceasefires had merely strengthened the group and provided it with an opportunity to rebuild its capabilities[15].

The large-scale withdrawal of approximately 30,000 government troops from the western coast in September 2026, accompanied by allegations of poor coordination and a lack of trust among allied forces, provided a further illustration of this fragmentation[16]. Consequently, the existence of multiple centres of power has not only facilitated the continuation of the war and violations of civilians’ rights, but has also made it more difficult to identify the actual parties to negotiations and to implement any comprehensive peace agreement.

  • Domestic Responses

On 24 August 2026, experts from the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies warned, in response to the escalation in hostilities, that Yemen was closer to a return to full-scale war than at any time since the April 2022 truce. In their assessment, the Yemeni government was seeking to contain attacks by Ansar Allah through the unification of command structures, preparations on the Marib and western-coast fronts, and the strengthening of its drone capabilities.

By contrast, Ansar Allah was using a controlled escalation of hostilities to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia, secure economic and political concessions, and strengthen its position in any future negotiations. The Sana’a Center experts stressed that the growing interconnection between domestic conflicts and regional rivalries had made a political resolution to the war increasingly difficult. They also warned that civilians were being overlooked in the parties’ military and political calculations and that a resumption of large-scale war, at a time when 22 million Yemenis required humanitarian assistance and 18.3 million people faced acute food insecurity, would have extremely severe humanitarian consequences[17].

  • International Responses

On 15 September 2026, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), responding to the escalation of hostilities along Yemen’s western coast, warned of the rapid expansion of internal displacement and the growing number of Yemeni refugees arriving in Djibouti. While expressing appreciation to the Government of Djibouti for keeping its borders open, UNHCR stressed that those fleeing Yemen were refugees in need of international protection and should be admitted and protected.

In cooperation with the Djiboutian government, UNHCR began registering, transferring, and accommodating new arrivals and providing them with food, water, health care, and protection services. However, the capacity of refugee camps, schools, and public services in Djibouti was approaching its limits, while more than 10,000 additional arrivals were considered possible. UNHCR also expanded its emergency operations inside Yemen to provide shelter, relief items, and cash assistance. To meet the urgent needs of displaced families inside Yemen, the agency appealed for at least US$14 million in international funding and warned that, without urgent support, humanitarian needs would exceed existing response capacity[18].

On 13 July 2026, Indrika Ratwatte, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, also warned the United Nations Security Council of the deepening humanitarian crisis in Yemen. He stated that more than 18 million people in the country were facing hunger and that Yemen had the world’s largest population living at Emergency levels of acute food insecurity or worse. Ratwatte also reported that 450 health facilities, including 76 hospitals, had closed over the course of one year because of resource shortages. He stressed that cuts in humanitarian funding had restricted treatment for malnourished children and the provision of essential services to women and girls.

The UN official called on the parties to the conflict and influential actors to exercise restraint and prevent Yemen from being drawn further into regional instability. He also urged donor countries to continue providing sustained and flexible funding. Ratwatte further called on the Security Council to keep the Yemen crisis high on the international agenda and to work towards the immediate and unconditional release of 73 detained United Nations personnel[19].

Subsequently, on 10 September 2026, the United Nations Security Council convened an emergency meeting in response to reported attacks by Ansar Allah against Saudi Arabia and the capture of the strategic port of Mokha on the Red Sea coast. The United Nations expressed concern about the widening hostilities and their consequences for civilians, while also condemning the seizure of eight UN vehicles from a humanitarian hub and calling for their immediate return.

The meeting emphasized that continued military operations could further aggravate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, restrict humanitarian access, and endanger the security of maritime navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The United Nations called on all parties to exercise restraint, protect civilians and humanitarian personnel, and resolve their differences through dialogue and a UN-led political process[20].

On 15 September 2026, the United Nations Security Council met again in response to the escalating violence in Yemen. UN officials warned that the expansion of hostilities had disrupted the delivery of humanitarian assistance and triggered a new wave of displacement both within Yemen and towards Djibouti. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), at least 125,000 people had been displaced inside Yemen since the beginning of September.

Council members stressed the need for immediate de-escalation, restraint by the parties to the conflict, protection of civilians, and compliance with international humanitarian law. The United Nations also called for rapid and unhindered humanitarian access to affected areas and urged the Yemeni parties and regional actors to refrain from measures that could draw the country still further into the regional crisis. The meeting once again underscored the need for the parties to return to a UN-led political process[21].

 

Conclusion

Developments in Yemen demonstrate that the country’s humanitarian crisis is not merely a collateral consequence of military operations, but has become a structural component of the conflict itself. Economic collapse, disruptions to the distribution of food and fuel, the weakening of health-care services, and difficulties in accessing humanitarian assistance have sustained civilian vulnerability even during periods of relative decline in hostilities. A ceasefire that is not accompanied by the restoration of public institutions, guarantees for the uninterrupted flow of humanitarian assistance, and mechanisms for protecting civilian rights can therefore do little more than temporarily reduce the intensity of violence. At the same time, the fragmentation of centres of power and the existence of different groups with their own external supporters and independent interests have weakened accountability and reduced the prospects for implementing a nationwide agreement. Within such a structure, any limited agreement among a small number of principal actors risks overlooking other armed forces or local demands, thereby creating conditions for the recurrence of conflict.

International responses, despite their important role in delivering humanitarian assistance and drawing attention to the deterioration of conditions, have largely remained reactive and crisis-driven. Calls for restraint, funding, and civilian protection can have a lasting effect only when accompanied by coordinated pressure on all parties, monitoring of compliance with international humanitarian law, and efforts to hold those responsible for violations accountable. Overall, resolving the crisis in Yemen requires an inclusive process that incorporates not only military actors but also representatives of civil society, women, local groups, and affected communities. Otherwise, negotiations may be reduced to a division of power among armed actors without addressing the underlying drivers of instability or the demands of the civilian population. Moving from temporary crisis management towards sustainable peace therefore requires linking a political settlement with the reconstruction of national institutions, legal accountability, and the provision of human security for Yemeni citizens.

 

References

[1] Al-Muslimi, F. (2015, September 7). Extremism Grows in Yemen’s Civil War. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Center. From: https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2015/09/extremism-grows-in-yemens-civil-war

[2] Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, August 3). Conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea. Council on Foreign Relations. From: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen

[3] The Yemen Data Project. (n.d.). Saudi Coalition Airwar 2015-2022. The Yemen Data Project. From: https://yemendataproject.org/data/

[4] Reuters. (2025, September 12). Death toll rises to 46 in Israeli raids on Yemen. Reuters. From: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/death-toll-rises-46-israeli-raids-yemen-2025-09-11/

[5] Christou, W. (2026, September 5). Civilians among at least 60 killed in Yemen as ground fighting escalates. The Guardian. From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/05/yemen-ground-fighting-escalates-houthi-rebels-government-forces

[6] Magdy, S. (2026, September 15). Saudi pipeline hit by drones will be out of service for weeks, further restricting oil flow. The Associated Press. From: https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-saudi-shipping-mandeb-8c18d82c109a8ea91347ce53c0096c53

[7] Le Poidevin, O. (2026, February 4). Vital aid flights to Houthi-held capital in Yemen to resume, says UN. Reuters. From: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vital-aid-flights-houthi-held-capital-yemen-resume-says-un-2026-02-04/

[8] Al-Sakkaf, N. (2026, September 17). ‘We left everything behind’: 125,000 people displaced as war reignites in Yemen. The Guardian. From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/17/displaced-people-yemen-war

[9] Le Poidevin, O. (2026, September 18). Yemen conflict displaces 112,000 people inside country, thousands flee to Djibouti, UN migration agency says. Reuters. From: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-conflict-displaces-112000-people-inside-country-thousands-flee-djibouti-un-2026-09-18/

[10] Musambi, E. (2026, September 15). Yemen fuel shortage hampers migrants trying to flee conflict for the safety of Djibouti. The Associated Press. From: https://apnews.com/article/djibouti-yemen-red-sea-houthis-0382bf63a25d98e87477bf7f13b9577a

[11] UNICEF. (2026, April 7). Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2, Yemen. UNICEF. From: https://www.unicef.org/media/179861/file/Yemen-Humanitarian-Situation-Report-No.2%28End%20of%20Year%29%2C31-December-2025.pdf.pdf

[12] World Food Programme. (2026, June 17). Hunger Hotspots: FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity – June to November 2026 outlook. World Food Programme. From: https://www.wfp.org/publications/hunger-hotspots-fao-wfp-early-warnings-acute-food-insecurity-june-november-2026

[13] Reuters. (2026, August 13). Yemen at highest risk of major conflict since 2022 truce, UN warns. Reuters. From: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-highest-risk-major-conflict-since-2022-truce-un-warns-2026-08-13/

[14] Lederer, E. (2025, July 10). More than 17 million people in Yemen are going hungry, including over 1 million children, UN says. The Associated Press. From: https://apnews.com/article/un-yemen-houthis-humanitarian-hunger-crisis-war-104a7b25d84a601e530fe7b8371a5b71

[15] Sio, M. (2026, August 12). Yemen’s presidential council chief rules out any new truce with Houthis, calls for lasting peace. Anadolu Ajansi. From: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-presidential-council-chief-rules-out-any-new-truce-with-houthis-calls-for-lasting-peace/4025786

[16] Wintour, P. (2026, September 18). Yemen’s anti-Houthi forces launch inquest into sudden military collapse. The Guardian. From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/18/yemen-anti-houthi-forces-inquest-military-collapse

[17] Radman, H., & Al-Iryani, A., & Shuja Al-Deen, M., & Uhlenhaut, L. (2026, August 24). Yemen’s Return to War: What is the Endgame? Reactions from Sana’a Center Experts. Sana’a Center. From: https://sanaacenter.org/publications/perspectives-and-analyses/28199

[18] UNHCR. (2026, September 15). Yemen: Escalating conflict drives new displacement and refugee arrivals in Djibouti. UNHCR. From: https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/press-releases/yemen-escalating-conflict-drives-new-displacement-and-refugee-arrivals-djibouti

[19] UN. (2026, July 13). Indrika Ratwatte (OCHA) on the situation in the Middle East (Yemen) – Security Council, 10193rd meeting. UN. From: https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1z/k1zqzci5l4

[20] UN News. (2026, September 10). Security Council LIVE: Fresh attacks prompt emergency meeting on Yemen. UN News. From: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/09/1168309

[21] UN News. (2026, September 14). Security Council LIVE: Rising violence triggers emergency meeting on Yemen. UN News. From: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/09/1168343

Tags: Armed groups in YemenBab al-Mandab StraitDisplacement in YemenFamineHouthi–Saudi conflictHRIUIhuman rightsHuman Rights in YemenHuman Rights InstituteHuman rights violationsInternational humanitarian lawRefugeeUnited NationsUniversity of IsfahanYemenYemen CrisisYemeni civil war

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