The post-World War II international legal order was built on the fundamental premise that the unilateral resort to military force by states should no longer remain a matter of political discretion, but instead constitute an exceptional course of action constrained by legal rules. The prohibition on the use of force under the United Nations Charter, the rules of international humanitarian law, the law of state responsibility, and the establishment of institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have all formed part of a broader effort to restrain warfare and establish mechanisms of accountability for serious violations of international law. Yet developments over recent decades have revealed a persistent gap between the existence of legal rules and their effective enforcement—a gap that becomes particularly pronounced in conflicts involving major powers.
Contemporary conflicts have also made both the nature of warfare and the concept of harm increasingly complex. The consequences of military operations are no longer confined to direct casualties or physical destruction. Attacks on energy infrastructure, health systems, supply networks, and other critical facilities can generate cascading and long-term effects for civilian populations. At the same time, the expansion of cyber warfare, the growing significance of dual-use targets, and the increasing use of threatening rhetoric by senior political officials have raised new questions about the capacity of existing international legal frameworks to respond to evolving forms of warfare and violence.
Within this framework, Rebecca Shoot, an international lawyer and Co-Convener of the Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court (WICC), examines these questions in light of the military attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran. The discussion addresses the limits of self-defense and the concept of an imminent attack, the indirect and structural effects of warfare, parliamentary oversight, double standards in the application of international law, the jurisdictional limitations of the International Criminal Court, the role of civil society, and the legal implications of threats made by political officials. Underlying these issues is a fundamental question: when political power and institutional constraints hinder the effective enforcement of legal rules, what avenues remain for preserving the rule of law and securing accountability?
Interview Details
- Interviewer: Mahdi Baeidi Nejad | PhD Student in International Relations, University of Isfahan
- Interviewee: Rebecca Shoot | International Lawyer; Co-Convener of the Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court (WICC)
- Date of Interview: Monday, 20 April 2026
- Main Topics:
- The Prohibition on the Use of Force and the Limits of Self-Defense under the UN Charter
- Expanding the Concept of Harm in International Humanitarian Law
- The Role of Parliaments in Overseeing Decisions on War and the Use of Force
- Double Standards and Their Impact on the Legitimacy of International Law
- Obstacles to Legal Accountability for the Military Actions of Powerful States
- Jurisdictional Limitations of the International Criminal Court in the Situation of Iran
- The Role of Society and Domestic Pressure in Strengthening the Enforcement of International Law
- The Legal Implications of Threats and Political Rhetoric
- Legal Responsibility Arising from Threats Even in the Absence of Military Action
Note: In order to preserve academic independence and diversity of perspectives, it should be emphasized that the opinions expressed in this interview reflect solely the personal views of the interviewee and do not necessarily imply endorsement or adoption of a position by the Human Rights Institute of the University of Isfahan.
Interview Summary
Topic 1: The Prohibition on the Use of Force and the Limits of Self-Defense under the UN Charter
- Question: In light of the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, to what extent can the military attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran be regarded as violations of this principle? Moreover, to what extent are arguments based on concepts such as anticipatory self-defense, active deterrence, or countering potential threats compatible with the restrictive interpretation of the Charter’s exceptions, particularly Article 51?
In responding to this question, Rebecca Shoot identifies the appropriate starting point of the analysis as the distinction between the rules governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum)—that is, the law governing the resort to force—and other branches of the law of armed conflict. In her view, the foundational framework in this area is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which establishes a very broad and nearly absolute prohibition on the use of force. Under the predominant view in international law, this prohibition has the status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens) and constitutes one of the foundational principles of the international legal order. Accordingly, any use of force must fall squarely within the limited and specifically defined exceptions provided for under the Charter.
For Shoot, the most important exception in this respect is the right of self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter. Historically, however, this provision has itself been interpreted restrictively. The exercise of self-defense requires the satisfaction of conditions including necessity, proportionality, and, most importantly, the occurrence of an actual or imminent armed attack. Concepts such as anticipatory self-defense, the preventive use of force, or the employment of military force for purposes of deterrence therefore face serious legal constraints where they are based on remote, potential, or speculative threats. Even under more flexible interpretations of self-defense, the requirement of imminence remains subject to a high threshold.
On this basis, Shoot argues that reliance on long-term or potential threats cannot, in itself, provide a sufficient basis for the use of force within the framework of the Charter. In her view, if the concept of self-defense were expanded to encompass uncertain and indeterminate future threats, the boundary between the prohibition on the use of force and the exception of self-defense would, in practice, be significantly weakened.
She then connects this discussion to the crime of aggression. According to Shoot, preventing aggressive war was one of the principal reasons behind the establishment of the United Nations system, and at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials a war of aggression was characterized as the “supreme international crime.” Nevertheless, within the post-war legal order, the crime of aggression has encountered serious difficulties in terms of prosecution and the enforcement of responsibility.
Although the crime of aggression now falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Shoot emphasizes that, in terms of the Court’s jurisdictional structure, it occupies a more restricted position than genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This situation is the product of political compromises among states. As a result, the crime of aggression has thus far played only a limited role in international criminal practice.
Overall, while acknowledging that disagreements remain concerning the scope of self-defense in responding to contemporary threats, Shoot maintains that the predominant legal position continues to favor a narrow and restrictive interpretation of Article 51. The expansion of concepts such as anticipatory self-defense and responses to speculative threats cannot, in her view, be readily reconciled with the Charter’s restrictive framework.
Topic 2: Expanding the Concept of Harm in International Humanitarian Law
- Question: In contemporary armed conflicts, military attacks may cause not only direct casualties and destruction but also extensive and long-term damage to critical infrastructure, health systems, energy supplies, and civilians’ access to essential needs. Is the traditional framework of international humanitarian law sufficient to assess these effects, or should the structural, cumulative, and long-term consequences of attacks receive more serious consideration in legal assessments?
In responding to this question, Shoot first emphasizes the need to distinguish between the law governing the resort to force and the law governing conduct during hostilities, namely international humanitarian law. Whereas the law governing the resort to force concerns the legality of initiating war and using force, the law governing conduct during hostilities, or international humanitarian law, regulates the conduct of hostilities and the behavior of the parties once an armed conflict has begun.
In her view, the assessment of the effects of contemporary conflicts should begin with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law: distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and humanity. Shoot argues that the principal difficulty does not lie in the acceptance of these principles, since they are widely accepted by the international community. Rather, the central issue concerns how these principles are interpreted and operationalized in contemporary warfare.
Traditional assessments have often focused on immediate and visible harm, including the death and injury of civilians and the direct destruction of buildings and facilities. Modern warfare, however, can generate consequences extending far beyond the immediate location and moment of an attack. Shoot refers in this context to recent scholarship emphasizing the reverberating, cascading, and systemic effects of attacks. From her perspective, an attack on petrochemical facilities, energy networks, or other critical infrastructure may ostensibly be directed against an industrial or even dual-use target, while its subsequent consequences may affect supply chains, health-care services, access to energy, the economy, and civilians’ basic needs.
From this perspective, the central issue is the foreseeability of such consequences. If an attack on an energy facility can foreseeably result in hospital failures, disruption of water supplies, or the deprivation of essential services, those effects cannot simply be disregarded in the legal assessment. Shoot argues that the principle of proportionality should take anticipated civilian harm into account in a broader sense and should not be confined solely to the number of direct casualties occurring at the moment of attack.
At the same time, she stresses the need to distinguish between a violation of international humanitarian law and a war crime. Not every violation of international humanitarian law necessarily constitutes a war crime, because establishing individual criminal responsibility requires additional elements, including knowledge, intent, and the requisite mental element. As the formulation she cites puts it, not all violations of international humanitarian law are war crimes, but every war crime is also a violation of international humanitarian law.
Shoot further emphasizes that the evolution of military technologies, including cyber operations, has created a continuing need for international law to adapt. She points to efforts by the International Criminal Court to develop approaches to cyber crimes and cyber warfare and argues that international institutions are attempting to keep pace with the transformation of modern warfare, even though the evolution of the means of warfare continues to outstrip the pace at which legal mechanisms can be reformed and effectively implemented.
Topic 3: The Role of Parliaments in Overseeing Decisions on War and the Use of Force
- Question: From a legal perspective, to what extent can parliaments and legislative bodies oversee government decisions concerning the use of force, demand transparency, and constrain military adventurism? In this regard, how do you assess the experience of the United States and the gap between Congress’s legal authority and its practical effectiveness?
According to Rebecca Shoot, answering this question requires a distinction between formal legal authority and practical institutional effectiveness. Parliaments may possess extensive powers under their constitutions and domestic law to oversee decisions concerning war, but this does not necessarily mean that they are capable of exercising those powers effectively under actual political conditions.
She regards the United States as a clear illustration of this gap. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress holds the power to declare war, while the President serves as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This allocation of authority is further structured by the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Under the Resolution, the President is required to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. forces into hostilities, and in the absence of congressional authorization, military operations generally may not continue beyond 60 days.
Shoot nevertheless stresses that the relatively clear U.S. legal framework has not always translated into effective congressional control over military decision-making in practice. In recent years, multiple resolutions have been introduced seeking to restrict or terminate U.S. military operations in different regions, but many have failed. In her assessment, this demonstrates that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight is heavily influenced by partisan composition, political alignment, the timing of decisions, and the ability to secure the necessary majority.
Alongside national parliaments, Shoot also highlights the significance of transnational parliamentary networks. Drawing on her own experience with Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, she argues that such bodies can play an important role despite lacking direct enforcement power.
In her view, international parliamentary networks perform at least three functions. First, they can support legislators and political groups opposed to war at the domestic level. Second, they can provide a degree of political cover and support for parliamentarians who may face pressure or retaliation for opposing their governments. Third, they can help establish longer-term pathways to accountability, particularly following changes in governments or political structures.
Shoot therefore concludes that parliaments and parliamentary networks should not be regarded as merely symbolic actors. They possess genuine capacity to constrain executive power, although the effectiveness of that capacity depends on the degree of political independence and the broader institutional conditions in which they operate.
Topic 4: Double Standards and Their Impact on the Legitimacy of International Law
- Question: To what extent has the differential application of international legal rules in comparable crises undermined the coherence, credibility, and legitimacy of the international legal system and the global human rights discourse? Can international responses to the military attacks against Iran and Lebanon be regarded as examples of the selective application of international norms?
Rebecca Shoot views the problem of double standards primarily as a gap between the universality of legal rules and their selective application. In her view, the central problem is not that international law lacks generally applicable rules; the prohibition on the use of force under the United Nations Charter is clearly formulated as a universal norm. The problem arises when comparable violations are treated differently depending on the identity of the state responsible, political relationships, or existing structures of power.
She identifies the 2003 Iraq War as an important example in this regard. Many international lawyers and states considered the invasion of Iraq inconsistent with the UN Charter, yet the action ultimately resulted in no meaningful international accountability, either at the level of state responsibility or individual criminal responsibility. In Shoot’s view, experiences of this kind have shaped the way societies and states perceive the neutrality of the international system.
Another issue she emphasizes is the use of the veto in the UN Security Council. Shoot argues that where a permanent member of the Security Council is itself a party to an armed conflict, or where a situation involves violations of jus cogens norms or essential treaty obligations, or conduct contrary to the fundamental purposes of the Charter, the legitimacy of exercising the veto raises serious legal questions. In this context, she refers to an initiative grounded in the scholarship of Professor Jennifer Trahan that seeks to encourage states to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal limits governing the use of the veto. From Shoot’s perspective, even if the complete abolition of the veto is politically difficult, it should not be assumed that its exercise is free from all legal constraints.
From her perspective, the debate over double standards also extends to the International Criminal Court. Shoot refers to early criticisms concerning an alleged “bias against Africa,” while noting that many of the Court’s first African cases were initiated through self-referrals by the states concerned. Nevertheless, she argues that the situations in Palestine and Afghanistan, as well as the intense political reactions to actions taken by the Court, demonstrate that the independence of international judicial institutions remains vulnerable to pressure from powerful states.
In Shoot’s assessment, threats and sanctions directed at judges, prosecutors, UN special rapporteurs, human rights organizations, and activists involved in international cases can have a far-reaching chilling effect on the legal and civil society communities. The problem of double standards, therefore, is not confined to the outcome of a particular case; it can undermine the credibility of the international legal order as a whole.
Topic 5: Obstacles to Legal Accountability for the Military Actions of Powerful States
- Question: Although international law clearly prohibits certain forms of conduct, the enforcement of these rules depends on jurisdiction, institutional capacity, and political will. In your view, what are the principal obstacles to achieving effective legal accountability where military operations or alleged violations are attributed to powerful states?
Shoot identifies the non-universality of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction as the first fundamental obstacle. The Court operates on the basis of state consent and membership in the Rome Statute and ordinarily requires one of two jurisdictional links: either the alleged crime must have occurred on the territory of a State Party, or the alleged perpetrator must be a national of a State Party. A third avenue is referral by the United Nations Security Council. In Shoot’s view, however, this route encounters a serious political obstacle when a major power or a permanent member of the Security Council is involved in the conflict. To date, the Security Council has referred only two situations to the International Criminal Court: Darfur and Libya.
With regard to the Middle East, she notes that the United States, Israel, Iran, and Lebanon are not parties to the Rome Statute, which significantly limits the Court’s capacity to exercise direct jurisdiction. Shoot nevertheless points to the Myanmar situation as an example of circumstances in which the Court has relied on innovative but legally justified interpretations of its jurisdiction.
Although Myanmar is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, the Court was able to exercise jurisdiction over the relevant part of the crime of deportation because the crime was completed in part when the victims crossed into the territory of Bangladesh, a State Party to the Statute. In Shoot’s view, however, this example also illustrates the limits of the Court. Such a jurisdictional basis covers only certain crimes and does not necessarily encompass the full range of alleged crimes committed against the Rohingya.
Shoot further emphasizes that multiple pathways to accountability may exist. Alongside the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice can address questions of state responsibility; independent UN investigative mechanisms can assist in collecting and preserving evidence; and, in some situations, special tribunals may also be established.
Despite these avenues, however, enforcement remains a fundamental problem. Shoot refers to the cases of Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant, Vladimir Putin, and, before them, Omar al-Bashir to illustrate that the issuance of an arrest warrant by the Court does not necessarily lead to its enforcement. Some States Parties have, in practice, failed to comply with their obligations or have adopted ambiguous positions concerning their implementation.
In her view, this gap between the issuance of arrest warrants and their enforcement represents one of the most serious challenges facing the international criminal justice system. It demonstrates that judicial jurisdiction, without state cooperation, cannot by itself guarantee accountability.
Topic 6: Jurisdictional Limitations of the International Criminal Court in the Situation of Iran
- Question: Given that the United States, Israel, and Iran are not parties to the Rome Statute, what are the principal obstacles to the International Criminal Court exercising jurisdiction over military attacks against Iran? To what extent do the non-membership of the relevant states, limitations concerning territorial and personal jurisdiction, and the possible need for a Security Council referral restrict the Court’s ability to act?
In responding to this question, Shoot considers the prospect of a Security Council referral of the situation in Iran to the International Criminal Court to be highly limited under current political conditions. In her view, even if such a proposal were introduced, the possibility of a veto—or even the mere threat of a veto—could prevent it from advancing. For this reason, referring the matter to the Security Council may become more of a political move than a practical avenue for accountability.
She again emphasizes the importance of examining the legal limits of the veto and argues that, where a permanent member of the Security Council is itself a party to the conflict, that state’s participation in decision-making concerning the same situation can be examined from the perspective of the law of the UN Charter.
At present, however, there is no other clear basis for the ICC to exercise territorial jurisdiction over attacks against Iran. Shoot stresses that preserving the Court’s credibility requires it not to alter its jurisdictional rules or interpret them in an indefensible manner merely to achieve a desired outcome. Nationals of States Parties to the Rome Statute may be among the victims of the attacks, but in her view, that fact alone would not necessarily create broad jurisdiction over the situation as a whole. The present circumstances also differ from the Myanmar situation, where part of the relevant crime was completed on the territory of a State Party.
Shoot then considers a hypothetical scenario: even if a country such as Lebanon were to join the Rome Statute in the future, its new membership would not ordinarily activate the Court’s jurisdiction retroactively over crimes committed before accession. In addition, specific temporal rules govern the commencement of the Court’s jurisdiction. Future accession by a state, therefore, would not necessarily provide an immediate solution for past conduct.
For this reason, Shoot stresses the importance of resorting to other legal institutions, particularly the International Court of Justice. Unlike the International Criminal Court, which addresses the criminal responsibility of individuals, the International Court of Justice deals with the responsibility of states and has increasingly been used in recent years through both contentious proceedings and advisory opinions.
She regards proceedings concerning Palestine and climate change, as well as genocide cases, as indications of states’ increasing use of the Court’s capacities. Initiating such proceedings, however, also requires political will and courage on the part of states, particularly where bringing a case against a powerful state may expose them to political pressure or retaliatory measures.
Topic 7: The Role of Society and Domestic Pressure in Strengthening the Enforcement of International Law
- Question: Can it be argued that pressure emerging from within society—from citizens, civil society, and domestic institutions—has greater potential than external pressure to induce governments to comply with international law? How do you assess the role of domestic actors in strengthening accountability and the rule of law?
Rebecca Shoot considers domestic actors and civil society fundamental to the future of international law. In her view, public awareness of international legal rules is growing, and citizens in many societies are increasingly assessing the conduct of their governments in terms of its compliance with international law.
For Shoot, this responsibility is not limited to civilians or civil society activists. Members of the armed forces also bear responsibilities in relation to unlawful orders, and the mere fact that an order was issued by a superior cannot in all circumstances justify their conduct.
To illustrate the potential of people-driven action, Shoot refers to the process that led to the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on climate change. According to her, the process began not with major states or prominent lawyers, but with young people from Pacific Island states. Many of them had neither a legal background nor previous professional experience in political activism, yet through social mobilization they succeeded in transforming the issue into a global demand.
Ultimately, Pacific Island governments pursued that demand at the international level, leading to a process that culminated in a consensus request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. For Shoot, this experience demonstrates that social action can begin at the local level and ultimately influence the formal structures of international law.
She also identifies the ongoing negotiations toward a standalone treaty on crimes against humanity as another example of the evolution of the international legal system. Whereas war crimes are addressed within the framework of the Geneva Conventions and genocide is governed by the Genocide Convention, crimes against humanity still lack a standalone global convention.
Shoot explains that a multi-year negotiating process has begun in this area, with the drafts prepared by the International Law Commission serving as the principal basis for the discussions. Some states strongly oppose the process, and the negotiations are unlikely to be easy.
Her broader point, however, is that the development of international law does not take place solely in courts or within the buildings of the United Nations. Citizens, academics, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations, and social networks can also play a role in shaping legal rules and demanding their implementation.
Topic 8: The Legal Implications of Threats and Political Rhetoric
- Question: How should statements by political leaders concerning the targeting of civilian infrastructure or the large-scale destruction of a country be assessed under international law? To what extent can such statements acquire legal significance within the framework of the prohibition on the threat of force, international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and individual criminal responsibility?
In response, Rebecca Shoot returns once again to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and emphasizes that the provision prohibits not only the use of force, but also the threat of force. Accordingly, statements by a head of state or a senior political official concerning the targeting of essential civilian infrastructure or the destruction of a country’s civilization cannot necessarily be dismissed merely as political exaggeration or media rhetoric.
Where the threatened conduct would itself violate international law, the threat to carry out that conduct may also have legal significance under the Charter. In Shoot’s view, threats to attack electricity and water facilities, or other infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian population directly implicate the principles of distinction, proportionality, and humanity.
Such statements may also have evidentiary value in international criminal law. Even where a particular military operation cannot be directly linked to a prior statement, the broader body of statements made by officials may be relevant to assessing overall policy, intent, knowledge, and decision-making processes, and may weaken claims that harm to civilians was accidental or unintended.
Shoot nevertheless distinguishes between war crimes and genocide. In cases involving war crimes and crimes against humanity, political statements generally become significant alongside actual conduct in establishing the requisite mental element. In the case of genocide, however, the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group constitutes one of the central elements of the crime.
In her view, under certain specific circumstances, direct and public incitement to commit genocide may itself constitute an independent crime, and it does not necessarily require the subsequent commission of genocidal acts. Statements concerning the destruction of a population or civilization may therefore, depending on their precise content and surrounding circumstances, carry significance far beyond political rhetoric.
Shoot nonetheless stresses that the threshold for establishing genocide must remain very high, and not every extreme or hostile statement can automatically be placed within this legal framework. At the same time, rhetoric that explicitly invokes large-scale destruction cannot, in her view, simply be dismissed without legal scrutiny.
Topic 9: Legal Responsibility Arising from Threats Even in the Absence of Military Action
- Question: Can the mere articulation of a threat by senior officials have legal consequences even where no subsequent military action takes place? More specifically, can such statements be used as evidence to establish the mental element or criminal intent, or, in certain cases, serve as an independent basis for criminal responsibility before international judicial bodies?
In responding to this question, Rebecca Shoot emphasizes the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. In her view, international criminal law provides clear examples demonstrating that public statements, political rhetoric, and patterns of official speech may be used to infer intent.
She refers to the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In the Akayesu case and the well-known Media cases, the Tribunal held that direct and public incitement to commit genocide is itself an independent crime and does not necessarily depend on subsequent genocidal acts being carried out.
Shoot further emphasizes that in other international crimes, statements may also be used to establish intent or knowledge. In such circumstances, an official’s statements may not in themselves constitute a crime, but may become part of the broader evidentiary record when considered together with actual conduct, political decisions, and patterns of military operations.
From this perspective, public threats can perform two distinct legal functions. First, in relation to crimes such as war crimes or crimes against humanity, they may serve as evidence of the mental element associated with subsequent conduct. Second, in the specific case of direct and public incitement to genocide, and where the necessary legal elements are satisfied, the statements themselves may constitute independent criminal conduct.
On this basis, Shoot argues that statements disseminated through social media, speeches, and press conferences should not be regarded merely as transient political rhetoric. If judicial proceedings were to arise in the future, such materials and statements could form part of the evidentiary record used to assess the intent, policy, knowledge, and responsibility of officials.
In the concluding part of the discussion, Shoot moves beyond the question of individual criminal responsibility and addresses the broader political effects of violent rhetoric. In her view, threatening language is not merely offensive or irresponsible; it can contribute to escalation, normalize threats, and intensify hostile rhetoric among states. Under such conditions, even actors who might otherwise speak out against such conduct may remain silent out of fear of retaliation.
Referring to the full title of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, she recalls that states are not only required to punish genocide after it occurs, but also have an obligation to prevent it. From this perspective, silence in the face of dangerous patterns of threat and incitement, particularly where there is a risk of escalation, is a serious concern.
Shoot does not, however, regard responsibility for responding to such trends as resting solely with states. Citizens, legal professionals, human rights organizations, non-governmental organizations, and civil society must also make use of their capacities to defend the rule of law.
In this context, she refers to the activities of organizations such as Amnesty International and Peace Action, as well as the positions taken by UN special rapporteurs and human rights officials. In her view, the pressures and threats directed in recent years against international institutions, special rapporteurs, prosecutors, judges, and human rights advocates have simultaneously underscored the importance of supporting those very actors and institutions.
International crises demonstrate that, despite the weaknesses and deficiencies of the multilateral system, replacing it with an order lacking independent institutions and commonly accepted rules could entail substantially greater risks.
Shoot ultimately argues that the world is undergoing a form of realignment within the multilateral order. Small states, middle powers, and new coalitions are playing an increasingly significant role in international debates, and this development may create opportunities to challenge entrenched structures of power.
In her view, the existing international order is not immutable. It is a human-made system that can and should evolve in response to new needs and challenges. At the conclusion of the interview, Shoot also emphasizes the role of non-governmental and academic institutions, arguing that the continued work of organizations defending freedom of expression, freedom of association, and other fundamental freedoms in different parts of the world is important not only for their own societies, but can also inspire and give courage to other activists and civil society institutions.
Conclusion
This interview demonstrates that one of the fundamental challenges confronting contemporary international law is not the absence of legal rules, but rather the gap between the existence of those rules and the possibility of enforcing them effectively in the face of political and military power.
The prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the limitations governing self-defense under Article 51, the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, and the mechanisms of international criminal justice were all developed with the aim of restraining warfare and creating accountability for serious violations of international law.
The experience of contemporary armed conflicts, however, shows that expansive interpretations of concepts such as anticipatory self-defense, the use of threatening rhetoric, double standards in the application of legal rules, and the jurisdictional limitations of international institutions continue to create significant obstacles to the realization of the rule of law. From this perspective, the credibility of international law depends less on the formulation of new rules than on the ability of the international community to apply existing rules impartially and uniformly.
At the same time, the discussion makes clear that international accountability is not the exclusive domain of states and formal institutions. Although institutions such as the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and the Security Council occupy important positions within the global legal architecture, their political and jurisdictional limitations underscore the need for other actors to play a meaningful role.
Parliaments, civil society, human rights organizations, academics, and citizens can contribute to documenting violations, demanding compliance with the law, and generating pressure for the reform of existing structures. The future of the international legal order therefore depends not only on strengthening judicial institutions and reforming formal mechanisms, but also on preserving and developing a global culture of respect for law, accountability, and resistance to the normalization of the unlawful use of power.
