Zahra Yazdanmehr
Bachelor’s Student in Law, Shiraz University
Introduction
The development of communication infrastructure and the emergence of digital platforms have transformed the nature of information exchange, civic discourse, and political participation in contemporary societies. Over the past two decades, cyberspace has become the primary arena for the formation of the digital public sphere, where citizens can engage in discussions and exchange views on matters of public interest, beyond traditional forms of control. However, the governance of this space and the legal frameworks established by governments play a decisive role in either fostering or undermining its potential as a forum for communication.
In Iran, cyberspace policymaking in recent years has focused on localizing infrastructure, strengthening domestic platforms and messaging services, and redirecting communication traffic to the National Information Network (NIN). This policy, reflected in decisions adopted by various state institutions, has introduced new legal and technical obligations for domestic platforms and applications. These obligations can be examined through various analytical frameworks, including the concept of the public sphere.
Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations of the Public Sphere
In political philosophy and the sociology of law, the concept of the public sphere is primarily associated with the theories of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas conceptualizes the public sphere as an arena situated between the private domain and the state, in which individuals freely engage in discussions concerning public affairs through critical reasoning, thereby shaping public opinion. The fundamental conditions for a functioning public sphere include equal access, freedom from state coercion, and the free exchange of information and opinions (Regilme, 2026). In the age of emerging technologies, the concept of the digital public sphere has developed to describe the reconfiguration of spaces for public discourse across networked environments, social media, and messaging platforms. Digital platforms, whether international or domestic, are not merely technical intermediaries in this sphere. Rather, their communication architectures, content moderation rules, and data-routing practices directly influence the quality of public discourse and the prospects for pluralism (Ritzi, 2023).
Drawing clear conceptual distinctions among the key terms in this field is essential, as using them interchangeably can create ambiguity. Regulation refers to the establishment of legal and technical rules, frameworks, and standards by competent authorities to govern markets and communication practices. Monitoring, by contrast, involves the active observation, collection of data, and tracking of users’ and platforms’ activities by regulatory or security authorities. Restriction denotes the imposition of measures that narrow the scope of access to services or the publication of content. Filtering is a technical mechanism for blocking access, either wholly or partially, to websites, services, or domestic and foreign platforms pursuant to administrative or judicial orders. Content filtering or content moderation, meanwhile, encompasses the assessment, ranking, or application of administrative and algorithmic standards to published content to ensure compliance with applicable laws or platform rules (Gorwa et al., 2020).
Furthermore, it is particularly important to distinguish content removal, understood as a direct action by a platform to block or remove specific material or a user account, from self-censorship. The latter is a behavioral and psychological response to perceived risk, whereby individuals refrain from expressing legitimate opinions or sharing lawful information out of fear of legal proceedings, judicial action, or social repercussions (Ong, 2021). The confidentiality of communications refers to the protection afforded to exchanged information and the prohibition of interference or interception without explicit judicial authorization. Finally, the erosion of the public sphere describes a structural process in which the manipulation or obstruction of communication channels reduces the diversity of viewpoints, weakens opportunities for criticism, undermines users’ trust, and causes spaces for rational discourse to deteriorate into isolated or polarized environments.
The Legal Framework Governing Domestic Platforms in Iran
The policies governing cyberspace in any society reflect, on the one hand, its normative orientations and epistemological frameworks and, on the other, its infrastructural, institutional, and enforcement capacities (Fathollahi et al., 2024). In this context, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran establishes the general foundations of rights and freedoms. Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of publications and the press, except where they are detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or public rights, with the details of these exceptions to be specified by law. Article 25 further prohibits the investigation, recording, and disclosure of telephone conversations, the disclosure of telecommunications [which, as a matter of legal interpretation, also encompasses internet communications], and censorship, except as provided by law.
Alongside these constitutional provisions, the Computer Crimes Law, enacted in 2009, constitutes one of the principal legal foundations for criminalization and the determination of liability in cyberspace. Article 21 requires internet access service providers to filter criminal content in accordance with legal requirements and the list established by the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content. Article 22 provides for the establishment and composition of this committee, while Article 23 specifies the obligations of hosting service providers to prevent continued access to criminal content upon receiving an order from the committee or the judicial authority handling the case (Hashemzadegan & Gholami, 2022). Meanwhile, Iran’s legislative and policymaking framework for cyberspace has undergone structural transformations over the past decade. In 2012, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace was established by decree of the Supreme Leader as the country’s highest authority for cyberspace policymaking, decision-making, and coordination. Under the founding directive and subsequent legal interpretations, the council’s resolutions are considered binding on all branches of government and state institutions, while the National Cyberspace Center serves as its executive arm. Furthermore, in May 2026, Masoud Pezeshkian, the President of Iran, established the Special Headquarters for the Organization and Steering of Cyberspace, which currently operates as a parallel institution alongside the Supreme Council of Cyberspace.
Another significant regulatory instrument is the Policies and Measures for Regulating Social Messaging Services, together with the resolutions concerning the development of the National Information Network. These resolutions establish a range of obligations relating to domestic hosting, data storage and processing, compliance with operational requirements, and cooperation with regulatory authorities. In addition, regulations concerning valid digital identity and service-specific requirements provide for the identification and authentication of users in particular circumstances. Nevertheless, the scope and manner of implementing these obligations depend on the type of service and the regulations applicable to it. Furthermore, the Law on Publication and Free Access to Information, adopted by the Islamic Consultative Assembly on January 25, 2009, and subsequently approved by the Expediency Discernment Council in 2009, recognizes the right of Iranian individuals to access public information within the applicable legal framework. However, broad exceptions relating to national security, privacy, and state secrets substantially restrict its application in the context of digital platforms. At the same time, the extensive authority of institutions operating across the branches of government, such as the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, to issue binding regulations has, at times, overshadowed the traditional distribution of powers between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the judiciary. This has generated uncertainty regarding the scope of implementation and reduced legal predictability for technology-sector actors and users.
Domestic Platforms and Rights Associated with Fundamental Freedoms
With regard to freedom of expression and opinion, although the Constitution establishes freedom as a general principle, the existence of broadly interpretable criminal offenses, such as the dissemination of false information with the intent to disturb public opinion, propaganda activities against the state, and other offenses, can impose restrictions on freedom of expression in online environments. When these provisions are enforced on domestic platforms, platform operators, fearing criminal or civil liability or the suspension of their operations, may resort to stringent and preventive controls over user-generated content. Such a situation reduces the fundamental right to freedom of expression to a privilege subject to administrative control.
The right of access to information and freedom of communication have also been affected by localization policies and the application of preferential internet traffic arrangements. Under the regulatory framework of the National Information Network, access to international websites and platforms has consistently been accompanied by filtering, bandwidth reductions, and higher charges for international internet traffic (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019). By contrast, the use of domestic platforms is encouraged through preferential internet tariffs and infrastructural support. This policy of traffic differentiation and the establishment of a two-tier system of internet access raise legal concerns regarding citizens’ right to freely and equally access international information flows without discrimination.
Some of the most serious challenges have also emerged in relation to the right to privacy and the confidentiality of communications. Regulations governing valid digital identity emphasize the identifiability of users, an approach comparable to standards adopted elsewhere in the world. At the same time, despite the existence of scattered protective provisions, the absence of a comprehensive personal data protection framework subject to independent oversight may weaken safeguards for users’ privacy. Access to traffic data and user information is provided for under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but remains subject to judicial orders and statutory conditions, while the monitoring of communication content is subject to specific restrictions. Moreover, a requirement to store identity information in encrypted form does not amount to a requirement to implement end-to-end encryption for messages. Uncertainty surrounding the implementation of these safeguards and the level of technical protection provided by domestic messaging services may heighten users’ concerns about the confidentiality of their communications (Norouz Pour, 2025).
Finally, the right to participate in public affairs is closely connected to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and the formation of civic associations, including in online environments. In Iran, policies governing the organization of digital platforms and mandatory registration requirements for certain channels with large audiences have created opportunities for administrative oversight of some communication activities. Where such oversight involves disproportionate restrictions or interference lacking effective legal safeguards, it may constrain inclusive dialogue, public participation, and the development of independent networks.
The International Human Rights Law Framework Governing Digital Space
International human rights law provides binding standards for assessing digital governance and state conduct in this field. One of the central legal foundations for freedom of expression and access to information is Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Iran ratified without reservations on June 24, 1975. Paragraph 1 of this article guarantees the right to hold opinions without interference, while paragraph 2 recognizes the right to freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, whether orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of one’s choice (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1966). In its General Comment No. 34, adopted in 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Committee explicitly affirmed that Article 19 of the Covenant encompasses all forms of electronic and internet-based media and communication (UN Human Rights Committee, 2011).
Under this instrument, restrictions on freedom of expression in digital environments are permissible only under the conditions set out in Article 19(3). First, a restriction must be prescribed by a law that is clear, precise, foreseeable, and publicly accessible, since vague rules or the conferral of unrestricted administrative discretion fail to satisfy the requirement of legality. Second, the restriction must pursue only one of the legitimate aims expressly recognized by the Covenant: respect for the rights or reputations of others, or the protection of national security, public order, public health, or public morals. Third, the restrictive measure must be strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate aim and must be proportionate, representing the least intrusive option among effective measures capable of achieving that aim, so that the harm inflicted on the underlying right does not outweigh the anticipated benefit (Rodde, 2014).
It should also be emphasized that states’ obligations under international human rights law encompass three dimensions: the duties to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Reports by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including those issued by David Kaye in 2015 and 2018, have emphasized the importance of protecting encryption, enabling user anonymity, and safeguarding fundamental rights in the regulation of online content. These reports also warn against imposing vague or disproportionate obligations on internet intermediaries to monitor and remove user-generated content, as well as against subjecting such intermediaries to severe penalties. They further stress that state-imposed restrictions must comply with the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality (Douek, 2019).
Regulatory Mechanisms Governing Domestic Platforms and Their Effects on the Public Sphere
The institutional structure governing domestic platforms in Iran is characterized by a multiplicity of authorities, combined with centralized decision-making at the highest policy level. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace issues overarching policies; the National Cyberspace Center oversees their implementation; the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content and judicial authorities issue filtering and content removal orders; the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology provides the technical infrastructure necessary for enforcement; and the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA), alongside security agencies, monitors activities in cyberspace.
The enforcement mechanisms associated with this structure include basic identity verification, pre-publication and post-publication content filtering, data localization requirements, and intermediary liability. In this context, user registration through verified telephone numbers in certain services increases the extent to which user accounts can be linked to individuals’ real identities and may reduce their anonymity. Furthermore, the Computer Crimes Law establishes obligations for access service providers to filter criminal content and for hosting service providers to prevent continued access to such content. Nevertheless, it does not prescribe a specific, uniform technical method for fulfilling these obligations across all platforms.
Domestic data hosting and storage requirements must also be distinguished from statutory data retention obligations and the conditions governing access by competent authorities. This distinction is necessary because the disclosure of protected data and the monitoring of the content of nonpublic communications are subject to specific provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the absence of comprehensive intermediary liability protections for platforms in relation to third-party content leaves platform operators exposed to potential criminal prosecution, encouraging them to engage in overly cautious content removal and censorship.
The resulting transformation of the communication environment also directly affects user behavior. Citizens’ awareness of identity verification and data storage practices on monitored domestic platforms can create a perception of continuous surveillance. This perception encourages self-censorship, reducing the exchange of opinions and discouraging individuals from expressing critical views on domestic platforms. As a result, the flow of information is disrupted, while public participation in political and civic discussions becomes more cautious or passive.
The Role of Legal Frameworks in the Erosion of the Public Sphere
The erosion of the digital public sphere in Iran is neither a sudden nor an accidental consequence. Rather, it is a structural process that gradually materializes through legal and regulatory mechanisms. Existing regulatory frameworks, through the imposition of sometimes stringent content requirements and the continuous assessment of domestic platforms, create a relatively safe environment primarily for official, noncritical, or mildly critical discourse. To retain their operating licenses and benefit from government financial support and bandwidth resources, domestic platforms are compelled to align their content moderation policies with administrative obligations. This structure leads to the automated or manual removal of substantial numbers of critics and individuals representing minority viewpoints. When a range of perspectives is excluded from the digital public sphere, pluralism loses its substantive meaning, and public discourse is reduced to the reproduction of homogeneous viewpoints.
Restrictions on anonymity in certain online services, the absence of a comprehensive and independent personal data protection law, and the existence of broadly defined criminal offenses may heighten users’ concerns about identification and criminal prosecution. Although existing legislation establishes legal conditions and judicial procedures for accessing data and monitoring nonpublic communications, uncertainty surrounding the implementation of these safeguards and the transparency of data-access mechanisms may cause users to modify their communication behavior and engage in greater self-censorship. In such an environment, genuine public opinion cannot emerge; instead, an artificial representation of society is produced, as self-censorship constitutes a fundamental obstacle to the development of rational criticism.
It should be noted that a healthy public sphere depends on citizens’ trust in the platforms through which they communicate. For this reason, public confidence in domestic platforms has declined amid legal requirements to cooperate with government agencies and previous incidents of security breaches and vulnerabilities. This crisis of trust gives rise to a process of communicative migration, whereby citizens, rather than participating on domestic public platforms, turn to circumvention tools to access blocked foreign networks or move their discussions into smaller, private, and closed groups where administrative monitoring is more limited.
This shift from open public spaces to a network of smaller, private environments contributes to the fragmentation of the public sphere. Furthermore, the existing regulatory framework weakens foreign competitors through filtering while granting technical monopolies and financial incentives to a limited number of domestic platforms, thereby concentrating communicative power in the hands of the state and its affiliated institutions. This structural concentration recreates a one-way relationship between the state and its citizens, bearing a particular structural resemblance to traditional one-way mass media, such as radio and television. Consequently, the internet’s potential to decentralize power and distribute media capabilities among citizens is effectively neutralized.
Legal and Comparative Assessment
At the regional level, the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) constitutes a significant regulatory framework for digital platforms, emphasizing transparency in recommender systems, platform accountability, and the protection of users’ fundamental rights. The Act provides for statements of reasons explaining content moderation decisions, internal complaint-handling mechanisms, and access to independent out-of-court dispute settlement bodies. Under this framework, content removal does not necessarily require a judicial order; it may follow an order issued by a competent judicial or administrative authority or be undertaken in accordance with a platform’s terms and conditions.
In Iran, alongside regulations intended to protect users’ privacy, content control, user identifiability, and domestic data hosting requirements remain important components of the regulatory framework governing domestic messaging platforms. Assessing the differences between these two frameworks requires an examination of their enforcement safeguards, the transparency of decision-making, and users’ access to effective mechanisms for challenging decisions and obtaining remedies.
Legal Reform Measures
To address the existing challenges and reform the legal framework governing platforms in Iran in a manner that safeguards the digital public sphere and citizens’ rights, reforming the legislative system and clarifying the definitions of criminal offenses constitute essential first steps. The Islamic Consultative Assembly should revise the Computer Crimes Law and other relevant criminal legislation to narrow vague and overly broad definitions of online offenses and establish precise criteria consistent with the three-part test under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, exclusive legislative authority should be restored to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, while regulations issued by administrative councils or institutions operating across the branches of government should be confined to executive and technical matters and remain within the framework of legislation enacted by the Assembly.
The adoption of a comprehensive law on personal data protection and privacy in cyberspace is another critical requirement. Such legislation should recognize fundamental principles, including the distinction between metadata and content, limitations on data collection, the requirement to obtain explicit consent, and the right to be forgotten. Responsibility for ensuring the enforcement of this law should be entrusted to an independent national data protection authority, institutionally separate from government agencies and empowered to oversee both the public and private sectors.
Under these circumstances, establishing the principle of intermediary liability immunity would be both necessary and beneficial for the development of domestic platforms. Domestic platforms should not be held primarily criminally or civilly liable for content published by third parties unless they refuse to remove criminal content after receiving an explicit, reasoned, and transparent order from a competent judicial authority. This legislative reform would alleviate the legal pressure on platform operators and reduce conservative censorship practices driven by the fear of prosecution.
Finally, the entire process of content filtering and blocking should be brought under judicial authority, replacing the existing administrative mechanisms. The power to order the blocking of accounts, channels, or services should rest exclusively with competent courts. Excluding administrative councils from final decision-making would constitute a necessary condition for upholding the rule of law and ensuring due process in the digital environment.
Conclusion
The current regulatory framework governing domestic platforms and messaging services in Iran exhibits various inconsistencies with international standards. Reliance on administrative control mechanisms, user identification requirements for certain services, data localization in the absence of comprehensive privacy protection legislation, and uncertainty surrounding platform intermediary liability have generated a structural chain of adverse consequences for citizens’ communication practices. These requirements intensify perceptions of continuous surveillance and the risk of criminal prosecution, contributing to the spread of self-censorship, declining trust in domestic platforms, and the fragmentation of the public sphere. The existing legal framework has considerable structural potential to erode the digital public sphere by transforming an environment for pluralistic discourse into a controlled space.
Nevertheless, the erosion of the digital public sphere is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Rather, it is a consequence of past and present governance models and legal structures. Overcoming this situation and rebuilding the public sphere require political will and fundamental legal reforms. Such reforms must be grounded in the consolidation of the rule of law, the decriminalization of legitimate expression, judicial guarantees for privacy, and the alignment of domestic regulations with international human rights obligations. Only through the realization of these legal requirements can domestic platforms become environments conducive to meaningful dialogue, civic participation, and sustainable digital development.
References
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