Atefeh Shahsavari
PhD Student in Political sociology, Razi University
Introduction
By the end of 2025, Venezuela was experiencing its deepest political crisis since the beginning of Chavismo. Nicolás Maduro’s removal from power on January 3, 2026, through a United States military operation, marked one of the most important turning points in Venezuela’s contemporary history. During this operation, described by various names such as “Operation Absolute Resolve,” U.S. forces arrested Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and transferred them to the United States to stand trial on charges of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. Immediately after this development, Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s former vice president, was sworn in as interim president. The government largely continued to operate on the basis of the previous administrative, military, and judicial structures, while the United States assumed practical control over a substantial part of Venezuela’s oil industry, began gradually easing sanctions, and announced a three-phase plan consisting of “immediate stabilization,” “economic reconstruction,” and “political transition.” However, no clear timetable has been provided for the third phase. By February 2026, Rodríguez’s interim government had passed reforms to the Hydrocarbons Law, opening the oil sector to private and foreign investment, released hundreds of political prisoners, and begun the process of adopting a broader amnesty law. Despite these steps, deep structural challenges remain, making the reconstruction of democratic institutions, long-term political stability, and domestic legitimacy extremely difficult.
The Collapse of Venezuelan Democracy
Venezuela can be regarded as a prominent example of how democracies change in the twenty-first century. This collapse occurred not through a military coup, but through the election of a charismatic and authoritarian leader, Hugo Chávez, in 1998. Chávez, who had attempted a coup in 1992, pledged to respond to social grievances arising from political corruption and to destroy the existing political system. He fulfilled his promises, but he did not replace the old system with a democratic government; rather, he replaced it with an authoritarian political order strengthened by one of the largest oil revenues in the country’s history. Gradually, Venezuela’s democracy turned into competitive authoritarianism. Chávez’s death in 2013 deepened the crisis. His vice president, Nicolás Maduro, assumed the presidency through a disputed election. By 2018, Venezuela had become a non-competitive authoritarian political system facing a complex social and economic crisis; a crisis in which failed economic policies had brought the country to the brink of collapse. Political institutions had been severely weakened and captured, and a significant portion of real power had fallen into the hands of organized networks. With the support of the Norwegian government, the opposition attempted to negotiate an electoral solution in the 2024 presidential election. According to the vote count, the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, won by a very large margin. Maduro, however, refused to accept defeat and, using the Constitutional Chamber, which was under political influence, declared himself the elected president and suppressed widespread protests (Hernández, 2026: 3).
The Risk of the Continuation of Authoritarian Structures and Ruling Elites
In reality, the former political system has not collapsed, and power remains largely in the hands of Maduro’s inner circle: Delcy Rodríguez, her brother Jorge Rodríguez, the president of the National Assembly, and a limited number of senior generals. Therefore, “a change in the leadership of the political system does not mean a change in the political system.” Although Maduro has been replaced by Rodríguez, most of the ruling structure has remained intact. Analyses indicate that the interim leadership is more interested in the survival of the current political system than in genuine democratization. To date, the United States has prioritized the country’s short-term stability by cooperating with elements of the political system in order to prevent chaos or the return of mass migration. This could entail the risk of the continuation of authoritarianism. Accordingly, the political system based on Chávez’s doctrines has not collapsed; only its head has changed. Rodríguez, while speaking of her cooperation with Washington, has also criticized foreign interference in her public speeches and stated that “enough is enough.” This duality reflects the delicate balance between U.S. pressure and domestic resistance. Whatever happens to Venezuela in the future will require a deliberate, phased strategy and sustained cooperation in order to prevent further instability and generate lasting change. Although political transition remains possible, the recent statements of the interim president show that this path is highly fragile. Any credible solution must listen to the voices of Venezuelans who have suffered the most from the crisis. Their views are essential for rebuilding governance, addressing security challenges, and achieving sustainable outcomes. Although Venezuela may ultimately move toward a democratic transition, whether organically or through an agreement that leaders under domestic and international pressure are forced to accept by holding elections, the most likely short-term scenario remains the continuation of a deeply rooted authoritarian system accompanied by persistent instability (Rand, 2026). So far, U.S. efforts in Venezuela aimed at arresting and removing Maduro have not led to any real progress in reconstructing the constitutional order. On the contrary, this effort has relied on the same abuses that allowed Maduro to remain in power in 2013. Articles 333 and 350 of the Constitution emphasize that the restoration of constitutional order requires the reaffirmation of popular sovereignty as the only legitimate source of presidential authority; an authority that must operate within a system of checks and balances (Hernández, 2026: 2).
Experiences of transition in other countries, such as Romania and Tunisia, show that when old elites assume power without fundamental purging, the usual result is “reconstructed authoritarianism.” Therefore, with regard to Venezuela, it can be argued that transforming the country’s current political situation into an opportunity for democratic transition, rather than a continuation of Maduro’s rule under new leadership, requires the implementation of four policies: restoring popular sovereignty, placing human rights at the center of reforms, gradually rebuilding the rule of law, and addressing the immediate danger arising from the state’s profound fragility. Ultimately, these four policies require the establishment of a constitutional transitional government.
The Weakness of Democratic Institutions and the Need for Structural Reforms
Following Maduro’s arrest, Venezuela faces profound challenges in the field of democratic institutions. Maduro had consolidated power through loyal networks within the military, intelligence services, and informal paramilitary groups. Opposition parties faced arrest, exile, deprivation of rights, and systematic exclusion. Elections lacked legitimacy, media censorship intensified, and civil society groups operated under constant threat. The disputed 2024 presidential election sparked nationwide protests and was followed by extensive state repression (Delgado, 2026: 5). In this regard, the need for structural reforms in Venezuela is vital, because Maduro’s arrest has removed only the leader of the political system; it has not dismantled the non-competitive authoritarian system itself. Since key institutions such as the National Electoral Council, the judiciary, the Central Bank, and the security forces have been under the control of the political system for years, the process of institutional reconstruction must begin in parallel with the planned economic reconstruction. This process must give Venezuelan experts, civil society, and diverse political actors a voice and role in joint decision-making mechanisms and proceed with the assistance of international observers (McCoy, 2026: 3). It should be remembered that all institutions of power and all elected offices in Venezuela below the level of the presidency are in the hands of supporters of the political system (Parker, 2026: 1). Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen whether Venezuela is moving toward a genuine democratic transition or toward another kind of political system. Determining this is difficult. Change is underway, but it is unclear whether it will lead to a real democracy or to a hybrid political system with limited reforms. Transitions do not always end in full democracies; sometimes they produce flawed systems that involve only the replacement of elites. The first election will be decisive. In general, rebuilding these institutions requires genuine independence, the cleansing of corruption, and the creation of oversight mechanisms. Without judicial and security-sector reforms, holding free and fair elections, which according to the Constitution must be held within a short period after a vacancy of power, is practically impossible. Experiences of transition in other countries show that elections without institutional preconditions often lead to instability or a return to authoritarianism.
The Deep Economic Crisis and Dependence on Oil
Venezuela’s oil reserves are both its greatest asset and its most complex challenge. With 303 billion barrels, Venezuela possesses nearly 18 percent of the world’s proven reserves, surpassing even Saudi Arabia, which has 267 billion barrels. Venezuela’s economy has shrunk by more than 80 percent, chronic inflation persists, essential infrastructure, including electricity, water, and transportation, has collapsed, and millions of people have migrated. Although access to oil revenues and the easing of sanctions could create short-term stability, sustainable reconstruction requires massive foreign investment, economic diversification, and a fight against structural corruption. Foreign control over oil by the United States reduces domestic legitimacy and creates the risk of new tensions. Venezuelan oil is primarily heavy and sour, requiring specialized equipment and advanced refining capacity, much of which has deteriorated after years of insufficient investment. International oil companies were expelled or nationalized in the early 2000s, and producers remember that Venezuela confiscated foreign assets and drove them out of the country. Analysts argue that decades of investment and billions of dollars will be required for production to increase meaningfully. Infrastructure is collapsing, the skilled workforce has migrated, and the legal framework for foreign investment remains uncertain. Refineries, pipelines, and export terminals all require extensive reconstruction (European Business Magazine, 2026). Estimates indicate that restoring production requires more than $100 billion in investment and at least a decade of political stability, economic predictability, and legal certainty (Villar, 2026: 1).
Security and Military Challenges
Venezuela today remains a very high-risk environment. Informal armed groups, drug trafficking networks, and organized crime operate with relative impunity across large parts of the country. Without credible protection against these actors, neither sustainable economic recovery nor free and fair elections will be possible. When violence, intimidation, and sabotage remain unchecked, markets cannot function, capital cannot flow, and democratic processes cannot be trusted (Martens centre, 2026). At present, military power remains tied to figures such as Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López. This is a dispersed and ambiguous form of control that lacks transparency and is based on cooperation with paramilitary groups that control parts of the country’s territory, including illegal mining networks in the Amazon, the ELN guerrilla group, and networks involved in the trafficking of natural resources and drugs. According to some reports, the official armed forces have supported these illegal groups, which has generated revenue for the state, even though this system is subject to international sanctions. We are facing a closed political system in which it is difficult to accurately assess the resources under its control (Scotti, 2026: 1–3).
The overall outlook is that Maduro’s exit has opened a window for democratic transition, but the path ahead is narrow and dangerous. The current priority of economic stability and control over resources, if not accompanied by institutional reforms and genuine opposition participation, may lead to the continuation of authoritarianism or instability. Historical experiences show that successful transitions require coordinated internal pressure, through a united opposition, and external pressure, through conditional international support, together with real guarantees for former elites. Without these elements, democratic reconstruction may be delayed or even fail.
Conclusion
It can be said that Maduro’s exit has created an opportunity for the beginning of a new political system, but by itself it does not guarantee a transition to democracy. Major structural challenges, such as the persistence of authoritarian structures, the weakness of democratic institutions, an oil-dependent economic crisis, and security threats arising from military networks, have made the path of reconstruction complex and dangerous. Global experiences show that success in such transitions requires a balance between short-term stability, fundamental institutional reforms, genuine opposition participation, and conditional international support. Without implementing policies such as restoring popular sovereignty, prioritizing human rights, and rebuilding the rule of law, Venezuela may fall into the trap of reconstructed authoritarianism and lose the current opportunity. Ultimately, Venezuela’s future depends not only on the decisions of interim leaders and foreign powers, but also on the collective will of the Venezuelan people to demand sustainable change. If this opportunity is managed through deliberate strategies, it can lead to the end of the cycle of crisis and the beginning of a new era of stability; otherwise, persistent instability and human rights violations will continue.
References
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- Rand. (2026, February 3). Venezuela After Maduro: Q&A with RAND Experts. Rand. From: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/02/venezuela-after-maduro-qa-with-rand-experts.html
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