Introduction
In recent years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as one of the most prominent examples illustrating the relationship between oil-based economic development, technology-driven governance, and restrictions on political freedoms in human rights analyses. Despite the country’s international image as a model of modernity and stability, numerous reports indicate the emergence of a systematic pattern of restricting civic space and suppressing political dissent. In this context, Securitization Theory provides an analytical framework for understanding how governments, by redefining political and civil issues as security threats, create the conditions necessary for the implementation of extraordinary measures.
Accordingly, in the UAE, counterterrorism legislation and national security discourse have been employed not merely to address violence, but in certain instances to confront peaceful political and civic activities. Cases such as the so-called UAE94 and UAE84 proceedings, as well as the inclusion of individuals and organizations on terrorist lists, illustrate a process in which the distinction between “political opposition” and “security threat” has increasingly become blurred and, in some instances, effectively disappeared. Within such a context, analyzing the human rights situation in the UAE requires an understanding of the mechanisms through which law and security simultaneously serve the advancement of political authority. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of securitization, this report seeks to examine the various dimensions of this approach and its implications for fundamental rights and freedoms.
Securitization Theory
Securitization Theory is one of the key concepts in political science and international relations, developed by the Copenhagen School. Securitization provides an innovative tool for understanding the effects of human rights activism on intergroup relations: a securitizing act identifies an existential threat to a referent object and mobilizes all available means necessary to prevent that threat. Securitization reinforces the hostile conflictual divide between the self and the other and therefore contributes to the escalation of violence.
The theory argues that security is not merely an objective reality but rather the outcome of a discursive process through which political actors construct a particular issue as a “security threat.” Within this framework, by presenting an issue as a threat, political actors are able to justify extraordinary measures that fall outside the normal procedures of politics. In this process, three external elements—war, terrorism, and narcotics—are commonly invoked to justify securitization. However, more important than these elements themselves, some scholars emphasize the significance of the audience and the target community of securitizing discourse. Thinkers such as Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver argue that the success of securitization depends upon the acceptance of the securitizing discourse by its audience.
Although the theory was originally developed to analyze state behavior in the international arena, it can also be applied to domestic politics. In this regard, securitization can become a mechanism for legitimizing restrictions on rights and freedoms. It is important to note, however, that the social contract within states implies that governments have a responsibility to act when their populations or national security are objectively exposed to existential threats and, where justified, may securitize certain issues. Nevertheless, in other circumstances, the costs associated with securitization for the securitizing actor may outweigh such obligations.
In general, the central premise of the theory is that no issue is inherently security-related; rather, issues are socially constructed as security concerns. In other words, an issue is not necessarily a threat in itself; rather, political leaders, security actors, and policymakers may construct it as a security threat in their own perceptions as well as in domestic and international public opinion. This aspect of securitization theory is rooted in Constructivist Theory in International Relations, which maintains that international politics is shaped not only by material forces but also by intersubjective forces. Consequently, securitization theory borrows from constructivism its emphasis on language, norms, and identity as drivers of political behavior.
Accordingly, political and security actors, by labeling an issue as a security threat, first characterize it as an existential danger that threatens the survival of the state, nation, and country. Second, by declaring the existence of such a threat, they justify the adoption of extraordinary measures and the suspension or disregard of ordinary legal and political procedures.
Generally speaking, three categories of actors participate in the securitization process:
- The securitizing actor, who identifies and publicizes a security threat that allegedly endangers the survival of the state, nation, or country and introduces this perception into public consciousness;
- The functional actor, who may not play a direct role in securitizing an issue but can either accelerate or impede the securitization process;
- The audience actor, who must be persuaded that an issue which was previously not considered a significant security concern has now become a security matter that must be confronted or neutralized.
Traditionally, this concept was understood within a military framework, as a matter relating to a state’s capacity to defend itself against external threats to its survival. However, a new generation of scholars emerged and sought to broaden the concept to encompass a much wider range of issues, including human rights, poverty, environmental concerns, and other non-traditional security matters. As a result, the theory moved beyond its exclusive focus on international relations and became increasingly applicable to domestic politics as well.
Post-Copenhagen scholars assigned a more prominent role to the third category of actors—the audience—relative to the other actors involved in the securitization process. They argue that audience actors play a decisive role in determining the success or failure of securitization efforts initiated by securitizing and functional actors. As Barry Buzan notes, the success of securitization is not determined by the actor who labels an issue as a security threat; rather, it depends upon the audience of the security speech act: do these audiences accept the issue as an existential threat to a shared value? Accordingly, security is ultimately grounded neither in objective reality nor in subjective perception alone, but in intersubjective understanding.
Audience actors encompass a broad range of individuals with diverse perspectives. Consequently, their cognitive perceptions and mental constructions of a securitized issue differ substantially from one another, and the means through which they may be influenced also vary significantly. In this regard, Mark Salter identifies four categories of audience actors:
- Elite audiences
- Public audiences
- Technocratic audiences
- Scientific audiences
Each of these groups becomes relevant depending on the circumstances and the opportunities available to the securitizing actor. The process of persuading—or at least neutralizing the opposition of—these audiences is typically pursued through mechanisms such as invoking collective identity, emphasizing the consequences of inaction, presenting securitization as the only viable policy option, and utilizing both state-controlled and mass media.
An illustrative example can be found in the protests associated with the so-called Arab Spring in the Kingdom of Bahrain. During these events, media outlets such as Al Jazeera and Bahrain State Television engaged in sustained efforts to securitize the protests and to persuade both domestic and international public opinion of the necessity of taking decisive action against them.
Securitization and Civil and Political Liberties
In many political systems, securitization functions as a mechanism of power that fundamentally alters the relationship between the state and society. Under such conditions, the public sphere is transformed from a space of dialogue and political competition into an arena subject to security surveillance and control. Within this environment, civil and political activities—even when entirely peaceful in nature—may be redefined as threats, thereby enabling the use of extraordinary measures such as preventive detention, judicial restrictions, and extensive surveillance.
The consequence of this process is not merely the temporary restriction of freedoms; rather, it is the institutionalization of a security-oriented logic of governance in which fundamental rights become structurally vulnerable to suspension or restrictive interpretation. Within such a framework, law gradually departs from its role as a guarantor of rights and instead becomes an instrument for reinforcing the state’s security narrative. Over the long term, this development may contribute to the erosion of political legitimacy and the weakening of social capital.
It should be noted that securitization does not always proceed through direct repression or overt concentrations of power. In many cases, governments rely on discourses of “emergency,” “preventive necessity,” and “the protection of public order” to transfer matters that should ordinarily remain within the realms of normal politics, civil society, and fair judicial procedures into the sphere of exceptional decision-making. In such situations, the state positions itself as the primary authority responsible for identifying threats and, by invoking the logic of an acute security situation, creates conditions for restricting or suspending rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, political participation, and the right to a fair trial.
The specific form that the securitization of civil activities takes varies depending on both the issue being securitized and the actor carrying out the securitization. The securitization of infectious diseases, including COVID-19 and Ebola, demonstrates that securitization may involve measures such as quarantine, mandatory isolation, border closures, and compulsory vaccination. By contrast, the securitization of terrorism has been associated with expanded police powers, stop-and-search practices, detention without trial, the revocation of citizenship from foreign fighters, control orders, extensive surveillance, overseas drone strikes, and numerous other measures. Likewise, the securitization of a cyber threat may involve the temporary restriction of online spaces, offensive cyber operations, and even one-off military actions.
More broadly, there are five referent objects that are commonly portrayed as being under threat in processes of domestic securitization and the imposition of restrictions on civil activities. These include:
- The state, perceived as facing internal threats or collapse;
- Society and collective identity, perceived as being under threat;
- Financial stability, or threats arising from economic dependency;
- The ecological system and environment, perceived as being at risk;
- The political order, threatened by revolutionary groups or insurgent movements.
The significance of this observation lies in the fact that securitization is not merely a discursive tool; it can fundamentally restructure power relations and substantially weaken the position of citizens, judicial institutions, civil society organizations, and even the families of political opponents vis-à-vis the state.
Pakistan provides an illustrative case study in this regard. In recent years, the country has experienced democratic backsliding and the emergence of competitive authoritarianism, whereby the military exercises substantial influence over various aspects of national life without formally imposing military rule. A professor at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad has argued that public dissatisfaction with the military has increased outside Punjab in recent years, but that “even in regions such as Punjab, which have traditionally been under military influence, there is a growing perception that the military is exceeding its limits in the name of national security.”
Another example can be found in the United Kingdom’s Public Order Act 2023. This legislation effectively treats disruptive but peaceful protest as a serious offense and provides justification for potentially discriminatory police powers, including suspicionless stop-and-search practices. Anti-protest measures such as those contained in the Public Order Act may discourage groups that have traditionally lacked political power in the United Kingdom from participating in civic and social processes.
Securitization in the United Arab Emirates
In the United Arab Emirates, securitization has primarily operated through the linkage of political opposition, civic activism, and human rights advocacy with concepts such as terrorism, threats to public order, and disloyalty to the state. Within this framework, the 2014 Counterterrorism Law has become a key instrument for expanding the scope of the state’s security authority, enabling peaceful activities, political criticism, associational engagement, and even personal, familial, or organizational relationships with opposition figures to be redefined as security threats.
For example, Federal Decree-Law No. 34 of 2021 on Combating Rumors and Cybercrimes, which serves as the UAE’s principal cybercrime legislation, imposes stringent restrictions on online expression. Under this law, the dissemination of allegedly false information, defamation, or criticism of the government may result in penalties including imprisonment and substantial fines. In the digital sphere, recent reporting initiatives have effectively transformed every smartphone into a potential instrument of state surveillance and informant activity.
This trend has been reinforced by additional measures, including the Federal Decree-Law on Child Digital Safety, which entered into force on 1 January 2026. Although introduced as a protective measure aimed at safeguarding children, the legislation imposes mandatory monitoring and reporting obligations upon digital platforms and internet service providers. Such developments further consolidate and harden an environment in which civic space has already been classified as a highly restricted domain.
Within the sphere of civil and political activity, cases such as UAE94 and UAE84 demonstrate how the Emirati government has transferred opponents—including human rights defenders, activists, academics, lawyers, university professors, and even certain members of ruling families—from the realm of politics into the realm of security. In doing so, these individuals have been portrayed not merely as critical citizens but as elements threatening the political order itself. As a consequence of this securitized portrayal in public discourse, judicial proceedings in both cases were conducted largely in conditions of opacity and secrecy, with limited transparency, the absence of public hearings, and minimal media scrutiny.
Furthermore, the Emirati government has also incorporated migrant populations into its broader securitization framework. From the earliest years of the UAE as an independent state, the large-scale influx of migrant workers prompted governing elites to allocate considerable resources toward the securitization of national borders, both at territorial frontiers and within the country itself. This approach remains evident today. In June 2025, an Indian human rights defender working with an organization documenting labor rights violations affecting migrant workers in the Gulf region was reportedly subjected to arbitrary detention and ill-treatment while transiting through Dubai.
The outcome of this process has been the weakening of freedom of expression, freedom of association, political participation, and the right to a fair trial. The United Arab Emirates Civil Defence Organization, established in 1976, only five years after the country’s independence, plays an important role in implementing and enforcing many of these restrictions.
From the perspective of Securitization Theory, the Emirati government, acting as the securitizing actor discussed earlier in this report, has sought to persuade both domestic and international audiences that political opposition is not a normal component of public life but rather a threat to the country’s survival, stability, and security.
The government argues that such measures are necessary to preserve the UAE’s image as a safe and stable destination for tourism and investment and to prevent the spread of misinformation or hate speech. Officials further maintain that these policies are rooted in the country’s cultural values and legal traditions, which prioritize collective welfare and respect for authority.
Within this model, judicial institutions, state-controlled media, and security agencies function as functional actors, reinforcing the securitization process through the production of security narratives, the issuance of severe judicial sentences, mass trials, and the inclusion of individuals and companies on terrorist lists. At the center of many of these security policies stands the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun).
For several years, the UAE has designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and has applied securitization measures extensively against it. As part of its international efforts to persuade other states that the organization constitutes a security threat, the UAE has actively encouraged similar policies abroad. In one notable example, the UAE welcomed measures taken by the United States to classify Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in several Arab countries, including Jordan and Egypt, as terrorist entities, describing such actions as evidence of Washington’s “continuous and systematic efforts” to counter the activities of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates worldwide.
Nevertheless, the most significant consequence of this process is not merely the repression of a number of activists or political and civil groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, it is the emergence of a distinctive security order in which law is transformed from an instrument for the protection of rights into a mechanism for controlling civil society.
For this reason, the experience of the United Arab Emirates—a country in which the existence and quality of democracy have long been subject to substantial debate and ambiguity—may be understood as a case of authoritarian securitization, whereby national security functions as a justification for restricting fundamental freedoms and progressively eliminating the possibility of meaningful political opposition.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this report demonstrates that, in the United Arab Emirates, securitization has evolved beyond a temporary instrument for managing perceived threats and has become a durable logic of governance through which the boundary between security and politics has been fundamentally transformed. Within this framework, the state has relied upon legal, judicial, and technological capacities to institutionalize a process of threat construction in such a way that virtually any form of independent civic or political activity may potentially be subjected to securitizing labels and treatment.
This situation suggests that securitization in the UAE functions less as a response to objectively existing threats and more as a mechanism for the pre-emptive management of society and the regulation of political possibilities. Over time, such an approach gradually weakens the prospects for the emergence and development of an autonomous public sphere.
From a theoretical perspective, the Emirati experience lends support to one of the central propositions of Securitization Theory: namely, that threats are not merely objective realities but are produced through discursive interaction between the state and its audience. However, in authoritarian settings, this interaction differs from the idealized model envisioned by securitization theorists. Rather than relying primarily on genuine persuasion and public deliberation, it is shaped through structural control and the restriction of alternative sources of meaning and interpretation.
As a result, securitization within such a context can contribute to the consolidation of a form of political authority in which law, media, and technology operate in tandem to reproduce and sustain a security-oriented order. Consequently, the principal issue in the UAE is not merely the occurrence of isolated human rights violations. Rather, it is the institutionalization of a governance model in which security has become the dominant framework through which civic and political activities are defined, regulated, restricted, and directed.
In this sense, the Emirati case illustrates how securitization, when embedded within an authoritarian political structure, can extend far beyond the management of security concerns and become a comprehensive mechanism for organizing state-society relations. Under such conditions, the language of security increasingly serves not only to address perceived risks but also to shape the permissible boundaries of political participation, public expression, and civic engagement. The long-term implication is the consolidation of a political order in which the preservation of stability is prioritized over the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, thereby narrowing the space for pluralism, dissent, and democratic accountability.
