Introduction
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, although considered the end of one of the longest political eras in the Middle East, quickly made it clear that this development did not necessarily mean a successful transition toward stability, justice, and rule-based governance.
The new Syrian government assumed power in circumstances in which the country was burdened with a heavy legacy of civil war, institutional and structural collapse, deep ethnic and religious polarization, and the presence of non-state armed actors. In such a context, the power vacuum, the weakness of security and judicial institutions, and efforts to consolidate central authority led to the emergence of new tensions and, in some cases, widespread human rights violations.
Pressure on ethnic and religious minorities—especially the Alawites—ongoing clashes with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the inability of the new government to establish inclusive governance present a complex picture of Syria’s transitional period; a picture in which hopes for change are intertwined with the risk of renewed violence and instability.
Incidents
- Pressure on Ethnic and Religious Minorities
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the beginning of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rule in Syria, political prisoners from the Assad era—many of whom had been subjected to enforced disappearance and imprisonment without trial—were immediately released, and the new leader of the country promised that many of the country’s problems and challenges would be resolved.
However, the situation in Syria at the beginning of the new government was not favorable. In addition to internal unrest caused by the absence of a security force responsible for maintaining order, personal and factional reprisals against individuals and institutions of the previous government also began.
This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that many of al-Sharaa’s supporters were in fact armed members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This intensified sectarian violence due to the presence of diverse religions and religious minorities, including Druze, Shiites, Alawites, Christians, and others, placing religious minorities in a very difficult situation.
Among them, the Alawites, due to their ideological and doctrinal proximity to the former political system, came under greater pressure than other groups. In the post-Assad period, Alawites were subjected to organized or spontaneous harassment, killings, and enforced disappearances.
For example, Riham Hamouyeh, an Alawite teacher in the city of Homs, was killed in October 2025 after her home was attacked with a grenade in the presence of her young children[1].
Between 6 and 9 March 2025, armed clashes occurred in coastal regions, including Latakia, Hama, and Tartus, after armed groups and individuals loyal to the former president ambushed transitional government forces during a security operation. More than one thousand people were killed, most of whom belonged to the Alawite minority and were reportedly specifically targeted[2].
In this case, the scale of killings was so extensive that Hassan, a resident of one of the villages in the conflict zones, stated that he and several others buried around 120 bodies in four mass graves[3].
In another case, Abeer Suleiman, a 29-year-old Alawite woman, was kidnapped on 21 May 2025. The kidnappers demanded 15,000 USD from her family, threatening that she would never return if the amount was not paid[4].
In January 2026, the organization Human Rights Watch reported a case of unlawful mass killing in one of the southern provinces of Syria. These killings, which took place in Suwayda province, resulted in the deaths of 67 Druze individuals and 19 Bedouin individuals[5].
In another case, Amnesty International interviewed nine people, including five residents of the city of Baniyas, who reported that 32 of their relatives and neighbors—including 24 men, six women, and two children—were deliberately killed between 8 and 9 March 2025 by militias affiliated with the transitional government. Out of the 32 victims, 30 were killed in the Al-Qusur neighborhood of Baniyas[6].
- Conflict with the SDF Forces
Since the fall of the Assad government and the rise of the transitional government, relations between the central government of Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) entered a tense but decisive phase.
Initially, efforts were made to establish a ceasefire and gradually integrate the SDF into the political and security structures of the new government. However, this process was accompanied by distrust, clashes, and military pressure.
On 10 March 2025, a major agreement was signed between Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria, and Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the SDF. This agreement ended de facto Kurdish autonomy and consolidated the integration of SDF forces into the army and state institutions. As a confidence-building measure, prisoner exchanges were also carried out between the two sides. This was the first agreement between the Kurds and the Syrian central government since their declaration of self-administration in 2012[7].
However, despite this, disagreements persisted, and intermittent clashes between government forces and SDF forces continued with varying intensity. In addition to creating widespread insecurity for civilians—especially in Aleppo province—these clashes also led to large-scale displacement and the flight of civilians to safer areas in other parts of the country.
Mona Yacoubian, Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that Kurdish civilians in besieged areas fear raids and even what are described as crimes committed by government forces or allied groups. She also stated that Arab residents in areas previously controlled by the SDF have deep fear and hostility toward Kurds due to accusations of discrimination, intimidation, forced recruitment, and even torture in prisons[8].
Nevertheless, the Syrian government pledged to guarantee the fundamental rights of the Kurdish population and to recognize their distinct identity within the framework of national unity. However, the real challenge lies in the details, particularly regarding the form of decentralization and the drafting of a new or interim constitution.
It appears that the greatest threat to the Damascus–SDF agreement lies in internal divisions. If a radical faction within the SDF rejects the integration process and decides to resume independent armed activity, or if Assad loyalists support sabotage through aligned PKK-related elements, all parties could be dragged into a renewed conflict that would jeopardize the fragile achievements so far[9].
This is an event that has already begun to occur, and no definitive end to the conflict can currently be foreseen.
Despite the signing of a comprehensive agreement between the two sides on 30 January 2026, after three weeks of renewed clashes between the new government forces and Kurdish forces, significant ambiguity and uncertainty remain regarding the success of such agreements.
As part of this agreement, reconciliation centers have been established in key cities and regions of conflict, including Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa, allowing individuals to surrender their weapons and return to normal life without prosecution. However, Muhammad al-Riyani, spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior, stated that anyone who does not surrender their weapons within the specified time will be prosecuted.
Nevertheless, some individuals fear retaliation from the central government and therefore avoid going to these centers and handing over their weapons[10], which may disrupt or delay the peace process.
Finally, it should be noted that the Kurds and the new Syrian government were in conflict for nearly 14 months, primarily because the Kurds controlled one-quarter of Syria’s territory as well as key oil fields in the northeastern part of the country[11].
Challenges and Responses
- Challenges of Governance and Inclusive Rule
The transitional government in Syria, after a decade of bloody conflict and civil war, succeeded in overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s government and taking power. However, the most important challenge facing this new government is the lack of strong foundations for domestic governance and the establishment of inclusive authority over the entire country.
The new Syrian government is faced with a collapsed country lacking social, political, economic, and geographical cohesion, making governance extremely difficult and in some cases nearly impossible.
Kurdish autonomy in the north and northeast, Druze attempts at autonomy in the south, Israeli efforts to remove security threats through widespread bombing of Syria, Alawite protests against what they consider discriminatory conditions, and other developments all clearly demonstrate that establishing full sovereignty over the country will be extremely difficult for the new government.
In terms of internal governance challenges, one of the most serious problems is the collapsed economy, which has severely affected industry, currency, fuel, and electricity. Syria cannot recover from the devastating effects of civil war without assistance. Beyond sustained humanitarian aid, the country will require major international assistance for reconstruction, investment, and the lifting of remaining U.S. and United Nations sanctions[12].
In addition, remnants of ISIS terrorists and their families remain in the country, further complicating security management. These individuals are mostly held in camps controlled by Kurdish forces, such as Al-Hawl refugee camp, in highly restricted and controlled conditions[13], but they still pose a serious internal security threat.
- Domestic Reactions
In November 2025, Syrian Alawites organized protests in response to what they described as discrimination against them. A monitoring body reported that security forces opened fire on the protesters, leaving at least one person injured. This was despite the fact that government officials, according to state media, stated that security forces were protecting demonstrators.
These protests came after several waves of sectarian clashes in Syria that had taken place since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The demonstrations occurred in areas including the coastal cities of Latakia and Tartus, as well as Homs in central Syria, two days after the killing of a Bedouin couple. This incident was followed by attacks carried out by some Bedouins against a predominantly Alawite neighborhood in Homs, the third largest city in Syria, which led to further clashes.
Prior to the start of these protests, the spiritual leader of the Syrian Alawites had called, in a video message, for peaceful demonstrations by his supporters[14].
In December, protests were again organized by Alawites after a group called “Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah” carried out a bombing attack on the Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque and claimed responsibility for it on its Telegram channel. These protests were also reportedly organized by the spiritual leader of the Syrian Alawites, who resides outside the country[15].
- International Reactions
The organization Human Rights Watch published a report in September 2025 titled “Are you Alawi?Identity-Based Killings During Syria’s Transition.” The report states that in early March 2025, following deadly attacks by groups described as loyalists of the former government against government forces in the Syrian coastal region, a wave of violence against Alawite communities began in Tartus, Latakia, and Hama.
According to the report, forces affiliated with the Ministry of Defense and Interior, along with allied groups and armed volunteers, conducted so-called security clearance operations in Alawite neighborhoods and villages. During house-to-house raids, religious identity was used as a basis for targeting individuals.
The report—based on more than 100 interviews, verified videos, and satellite imagery—documents extrajudicial executions, looting, deliberate destruction of property, and mistreatment of detainees. It states that between 7 and at least 10 March, more than 30 locations were targeted, and at least 1,400 people were killed. In some cases, entire families were wiped out.
Although direct orders from higher authorities were not proven, the operations are described as centrally coordinated and carried out under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense. Given official awareness through circulated videos and public statements, the issue of “command responsibility” is raised.
The report concludes that without serious security-sector reform, vetting of forces, effective prosecution of perpetrators, and compensation mechanisms for victims, the risk of continued cycles of impunity and sectarian violence in Syria remains extremely high[16].
The independent organization Syria Direct, based in Amman, also published a report on the situation of Alawites in Syria. It states that following the outbreak of sectarian violence on the Syrian coast in March 2025, thousands of Alawites fled to Lebanon due to armed attacks, targeted killings, and widespread insecurity.
Local witnesses reported that armed individuals, after clashes between government forces and Assad loyalists, specifically targeted Alawites, and that entire families—including women and children—were killed.
Syrian human rights organizations, including the Syrian Network for Human Rights, have documented hundreds of extrajudicial killings.
In Lebanon, the main burden of hosting and supporting refugees has fallen on the local Alawite community and families, while official humanitarian assistance has been described as limited. At the same time, concerns have been raised about the spillover of sectarian tensions into Lebanon, particularly in sensitive areas such as Tripoli, although efforts by religious and local leaders have been made to maintain stability and coexistence[17].
In a report dated 21 January 2026, Amnesty International addressed the situation of ongoing clashes between Kurdish armed groups and the new Syrian government.
In this report, Kristine Beckerle, Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International, stated that Syrian authorities, in coordination with the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria, must implement human-rights-compliant screening processes in detention centers and camps now under their control.
She emphasized the need to identify individuals who should be investigated and prosecuted for crimes under international law or serious domestic offenses, to determine those who should be returned to their countries of origin for prosecution, and to release those who should not be detained.
She further stressed that domestic judicial proceedings must comply with international fair trial standards and must not involve the death penalty.
Beckerle added: “Several rounds of fighting in Syria have had devastating consequences for civilians. Amnesty International once again calls on all parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and to ensure that civilians do not pay the price for another political collapse in Syria[18].”
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported in December 2025 on the internal situation in Syria one year after the rise of the new government.
The report stated that the new government must intensify its efforts to halt human rights violations and achieve justice. Despite some governmental efforts, there continue to be alarming reports of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary killings, and kidnappings, mainly targeting members of specific communities and individuals accused of affiliation with the former regime.
Since the fall of the former regime, hundreds of people have been killed through gunfire, stabbing, stoning, shelling, and grenade attacks. These killings have been carried out by transitional government security forces, affiliated groups, remnants of the former government, local armed groups, and unidentified armed actors. Deaths caused by explosive remnants of war have also been documented.
In many cases, violence has disproportionately affected specific communities, including Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Bedouins, and has been further exacerbated by the spread of hate speech, both online and in public spaces.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called on authorities to take serious steps to address the root causes of these violations. Accountability, justice, peace, and security for all Syrian citizens are absolute prerequisites for a successful transition, and victims’ rights to remedies and reparations must be guaranteed[19].
The United Kingdom Home Office, in a report dated July 2025, examined the situation of Alawites in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
The report emphasizes that Alawites may face a risk of persecution or serious harm due to their real or perceived association with the Assad regime and their significant presence in security institutions.
However, it also notes that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has publicly pledged not to engage in retaliatory actions against Alawites and to prosecute perpetrators through legal channels.
Nevertheless, during the events of 6–9 March 2025, attacks against Alawites occurred in coastal cities and villages. Reports indicate the involvement of groups affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, although casualty figures vary and are difficult to verify. The Syrian Network for Human Rights is cited as a relatively reliable source estimating around 800 deaths.
The report further explains that threats are not limited to state or official forces; non-state actors, gangs, and unidentified perpetrators may also engage in killings, kidnappings, and forced displacement motivated by revenge, personal disputes, or alleged affiliation with the former regime. In some cases, these actors may even impersonate members of the new government forces to carry out arrests[20].
Conclusion
What emerges from the above developments is a structural crisis in Syria’s political transition process. This crisis is rooted not merely in the actions of the new government but in the profound collapse of the country’s political, social, and security order.
Despite some symbolic steps toward transitional justice and national reconciliation, the transitional government in Syria is effectively confronted with a multi-layered dilemma: on the one hand, the effort to consolidate authority and monopoly over legitimate use of force, and on the other, the necessity of respecting human rights, building trust, and avoiding collective punishment.
The pressure on Alawites and other minorities demonstrates that the absence of effective accountability and reform mechanisms in the security sector can transform identity-based violence into a substitute for justice.
At the same time, the conflict with the SDF and disputes over decentralization reveal that Syria’s core issue is not merely territorial control, but agreement on the future model of the state itself.
In such circumstances, continued insecurity, a collapsed economy, the presence of ISIS remnants, and external interventions increase the risk of Syria sliding into a renewed cycle of violence and instability.
From this perspective, the success of the new government will not be measured by the speed of power consolidation, but by its capacity to link security with justice and state authority with legal inclusivity—something that appears unattainable without effective international oversight, deep institutional reform, and genuine accountability mechanisms.
References
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