Mahsa Dini

M.A. in International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’i University

Introduction

At present, the norms, actors, and institutions involved in international development, like many other elements of global politics, have undergone transformations. One of the main reasons for these changes is the increasing presence, activity, and influence of a wide range of emerging donors and development partners.

The increased presence and activities of these emerging donors and development partners present significant opportunities and profound challenges for poverty reduction, economic development, social welfare, environmental sustainability, as well as for the formulation and realization of human rights within development policies and practices.

In reality, the era of international aid norms and institutions dominated by powerful states has not disappeared, but it is declining.

In this note, we seek to provide a framework through which the position of human rights can be examined in the agenda, policies, and practices of development cooperation among emerging Southern powers. This framework provides a basis for more informed and more precise analyses of human rights approaches in the growing field of South–South development cooperation and in the changing global development landscape.

South–South Cooperation: A New Model in International Development

South–South development cooperation is not equivalent to foreign aid or official development assistance (ODA). This point is central to many misunderstandings in the media regarding emerging powers and international development.

Most countries of the Global South refer to some elements of their development cooperation programs as aid, and this categorization usually includes flows and activities that are very similar to—but not necessarily identical with—those classified by the OECD-DAC as ODA. These programs include financial assistance, loans, technical assistance, debt relief, student scholarships, and humanitarian assistance (South-South Development Cooperation, 2010: 2).

Some others, such as India, participate in these aid and quasi-aid activities, but they completely reject this term and refer only to development cooperation.

Whether this term is used or not, in all cases the concept and practices of SSDC go beyond aid. Within this ambiguous and unclear categorization, aid and quasi-aid activities are often deliberately combined with commercial loans, financial instruments aimed at strengthening trade, investment, and the creation of diplomatic relations, and the strengthening of soft power.

These different definitions and the methods they include are usually not well understood and are repeatedly compared directly with mainstream foreign aid. This is especially the case when attempting to calculate the levels and share of South–South aid, as well as in political and moral judgments regarding the nature and purpose of SSDC (Bräutigam, 2009: 4).

The Role of New Actors in the International Cooperation and Development Arena

In recent years, we have witnessed a wave of analyses and interpretations in response to the increasing presence, role, and influence of emerging powers as development actors (Neumayer, 2003: 510). The rise of China has played an important role in initiating this growing interest in the international development community, and this interest has led to a broader understanding of the increasing number and growing activities of other emerging development partners.

On one side, some commentators take a hostile view of what they consider the harmful programs and effects of “rogue donors” [as they define them in the international system], such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. These countries are accused of using questionable aid to advance their national interests at the expense of poor people and poor countries, while weakening global liberal governance and the human rights of ordinary people (Naím, 2007: 14).

On the other side, emerging democratic powers such as Brazil, India, and South Africa are usually not subjected to the same level of severe condemnation, and within mainstream aid communities, the special expertise and additional resources provided by these emerging development partners are welcomed.

However, they also express concerns that the fragile achievements of the traditional donor community in good governance, aid effectiveness, and poverty reduction may be undermined, partly due to the proliferation of new actors and partly due to their lower levels of transparency and their different approaches to development, including in relation to human rights (Davies, 2008: 9).

In fact, for others, the collapse of the Western-dominated aid cartel is viewed more positively. Accordingly, emerging donors and development partners are expected to play an important role in rebalancing global power, providing recipient countries with more options in financing and aid delivery, and presenting alternative models and approaches to economic growth that may be more effective in improving productivity, security, and poverty reduction (Kondoh & Kobayashi, Shiga & Sato, 2010: 23).

Some development partners are recognized as innovators and global participants in social welfare programs (especially Brazil) and peacekeeping (India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, etc.). While their economic engines drive investment and trade in much of the Global South, most analysts acknowledge that questions remain about how the full range of South–South development cooperation activities affects poverty reduction, social justice, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and human rights in specific contexts and relationships.

However, the mainstream Western-dominated development community has gradually matured in its views toward emerging development partners. In presenting viewpoints, terms, and expressions, derogatory concepts regarding emerging powers as development actors are now used less frequently, and conditions have shifted toward an environment of communication, engagement, and mutual learning.

Therefore, while China in particular still attracts more negative opinions in this area, other actors are increasingly being considered rather than being ignored, marginalized, or discredited.

However, even in this more positive environment, there remains a widespread view that human rights, regardless of the other challenges and opportunities they bring, are not a strong framework for action or outcome for emerging development partners, and may in fact be actively weakened.

In this way, Ted Piccone, based on an analysis of their voting records in the United Nations, states that: “Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey are inconsistent defenders of democracy and human rights in the international arena” (Piccone, 2011: 139).

There is no doubt that this observation is largely true in most cases in the specific field of South–South development cooperation policies and practices. Essentially, humanitarian and development fields are not separated from competing strategic interests, some of which may conflict with the human rights agenda.

In particular, while most Southern countries occasionally refer to human rights in statements and speeches related to development cooperation policies and programs, these issues are not prominently discussed in this context and are not presented as key objectives or principles.

Human rights considerations do not appear to have any significant influence on the allocation of development cooperation funding or other flows and relationships. For example, limited evidence regarding budget allocation suggests that geo-economic interests, regional interests, and historical ties are the dominant factors shaping South–South development cooperation (Davies, 2008: 21).

Analysis of the Interaction Between Domestic Strategies and International Policies

Southern donors and development partners have different domestic records regarding human rights. To what extent might efforts undertaken to promote human rights within their cooperation policies and programs shape their international development engagement in this area? Do domestic civil society organizations and ordinary people monitor and demand that their development cooperation be conducted in ways that recognize, value, and even promote human rights?

In reality, the position of emerging democratic powers in the multilateral system shows that domestic human rights advocacy groups are forming international networks and learning how to pressure their governments to change their behavior at the international level. Social media and news cycles are also important factors in this process. Therefore, with the deepening of democracy in these countries and the increasing importance of regional and international organizations, we are likely to see more public debate on these issues and, ultimately, more scrutiny and intervention at the domestic level in support of global human rights and democracy norms.

There is evidence of these trends. For example, the Brazilian organization Conectas has a human rights mission both domestically and internationally, as it seeks to strengthen regional and international human rights by holding countries of the Global South—especially Brazil and other emerging powers—accountable for foreign policy decisions that affect human rights. It also aims to promote the use of United Nations and regional human rights systems by NGOs from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in order to help these mechanisms achieve real impact on the ground (Conectas Human Rights, 2013).

In other words, with the democratization of Brazilian foreign policy (through increased participation of civil society) and with Brazil’s emergence as a key actor in global governance, engagement with international human rights has increased in Brazilian foreign policy. This shift has created the necessary political conditions for a more active role of Brazil in international human rights regimes on the one hand, and a more prominent role for human rights in Brazilian foreign policy on the other (Engstrom, 2012: 835).

There are also developments in transnational development NGOs. For example, some larger Indian NGOs are eager to closely observe and participate in India’s development cooperation role in Afghanistan (PRIA & RIS, 2013).

In general, this trend may be positive. However, up to now, the picture of South–South development cooperation has not been very encouraging. First, some governments are cautious about disclosing figures and details of their development cooperation programs due to potential negative reactions against foreign spending at a time when domestic poverty levels are high. For example, this appears to be the case in South Africa (Kruger, 2010: 201). This can hinder broader awareness and public debate, while limited transparency can create problems for civil society organizations (CSOs) seeking to monitor development cooperation.

Second, domestic audiences and actors may feel that national concerns are simply too large and urgent to justify space for external engagement. In this way, transnational actions may appear novel, intimidating, or resource-intensive. For example, in India there is also significant reluctance to expose “dirty laundry” in front of the global public. In other foreign policy areas, the Indian CSO sector has shown reluctance to criticize the nation abroad, although there are now signs of increasing awareness and engagement (Rajan, 2012: 311).

Third, the middle class is the most likely segment of society to engage in international development policy. This has different implications in different contexts. In India, many elites and middle-class members strongly support the country’s rising global position. The discourse of win-win economic growth is attractive both for business interests and patriotic sentiments, while poverty reduction at home and abroad is not always a central concern for them (Mawdsley & Roychoudhury, 2015: 101).

Finally, the human rights agenda in Southern states includes electoral pressures, the media, the judiciary, and civil society organizations. These institutions are often imperfect, and major human rights shortcomings and even abuses still exist in these states. However, each government also has achievements such as right-to-information and right-to-food legislation in India, sexual rights in South Africa, and others. Nevertheless, so far, these domestic drivers appear to have limited influence in promoting a stronger human rights agenda in international development policies.

Growth-Oriented Development Models and the Neglect of Human Rights

At the beginning of the new millennium, many DAC donors and multilateral organizations began increasingly emphasizing social programs, decentralization, empowerment, and participatory governance in line with democratic governance. In 2008, the World Bank reported that the share of ODA allocated to social sectors in low-income countries increased from 27 percent in the early 1990s to an average of 41 percent between 2001 and 2014. At the same time, the combined share of ODA directed toward infrastructure and production decreased from 53 percent to 34 percent (World Bank, Aid Architecture, 2008). Japan continues to allocate a higher share of its official development assistance to physical infrastructure, including transport and storage, communications, and energy, although it is considered an exception within the DAC. Since the 1990s, Japan has also been under pressure to focus more on poverty and soft aid (Arase, 2005: 91). From some perspectives, this trend can be seen as progressive, responding to the criticism that growth does not always improve the lives of the majority or reduce poverty. At the same time, a different critique argues that mainstream development discourse has neglected the fundamental foundations of productivity and economic growth (Chang, 2011: 56).

In contrast, emerging development partners have tended to focus more on productive sectors of the economy through project financing, technical cooperation, commercial activities, and broader investment engagement. This includes building infrastructure such as road and rail networks; energy infrastructure including dams, power plants, refineries, and electricity transmission systems; and investment in manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. In this way, development partners can directly and immediately benefit from infrastructure and economic investments. Domestic firms in donor countries can also be contracted to provide technical expertise, materials, and even labor. Therefore, for most Southern partners, the construction sector has a strong comparative advantage in terms of cost efficiency; thus, it is logical that these donors prioritize infrastructure development as a key priority (Foster, Butterfield & Chen, 2008: 600).

Beyond these direct advantages, many emerging development partners are strongly interested in promoting regional integration, connectivity, partnerships, joint investments, and economic dynamism. Part of these interests is related to trade promotion, investment expansion, resource extraction, and market influence. In other cases, security and stability motivations are also present. For example, Thailand has a clear interest in reducing significant poverty in neighboring countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. By encouraging stronger economic growth in these countries, Thailand seeks to reduce risks of epidemics, political instability, and large-scale migration (Rampa & Bilal, 2011: 27).

Given this argument, renewed emphasis on economic growth, increased industrial productivity, wealth creation rather than poverty reduction, integration between foreign aid and other policy areas (such as trade, investment, and migration), and a growing and more visible role for the private sector are prioritized more than human rights concerns in these countries. As noted above, emerging donors and development partners tend to combine trade and investment with concessional financing, technical assistance, and other forms of aid. This model appears to be beneficial for many recipients. Contrary to earlier criticism, many OECD-DAC donors appear to assess this approach more positively; therefore, the key challenge in the future may be to harness the developmental benefits of this approach without intensifying competition among national interests in ways that could undermine welfare, environmental sustainability, and social and political justice.

How might this trend affect human rights? It can be argued that Southern development partners contribute to significant economic growth in many poorer countries and thereby increase the economic rights of millions of people. However, the overall impact on civil and political rights appears to be neutral at best and, at worst, weakening. Indeed, as we move forward, the place of human rights in aid discourse remains contested; winners and losers in industrialization and resource extraction processes are rarely considered. Human rights of poorer people—especially marginalized communities such as peasants, small farmers, fishermen, pastoralists, and workers in both formal and informal sectors—are rarely supported within this growth-oriented development strategy, and in some cases are actively undermined.

Conclusion

The concept of human rights is generally incorporated into South–South development cooperation policies in a weak, indirect, and partial manner. Exceptions exist; however, in most cases, human rights are not explicitly pursued, despite claims made in speeches and official declarations.

The reasons for this include the nature and methods of SSDC, its adherence to historical principles of non-interference and respect for sovereign decision-making associated with long-standing Third World policy traditions, limitations in the domestic review of development cooperation policies and programs, and a preference for growth and productivity over good governance, democracy, and social programs.

Through their development cooperation efforts, emerging powers contribute to the promotion of the economic rights of millions of people in low- and middle-income countries, which leads to job creation, investment, and growth. However, there are questions regarding whether they are generating structural changes in global inequalities.

Most of them also participate to some extent in welfare programs and, in some cases, offer innovative approaches to poverty reduction, peacebuilding, and other development goals. However, in most cases, these welfare programs are embedded within a broader growth agenda.

As a result, economic justice within countries is not on the agenda, while civil and political rights are not emphasized or prioritized as objectives of SSDC. Global development norms, governance, institutions, and financing are currently in a highly unstable and uncertain condition.

The future of the human rights agenda in international development appears more vulnerable than before. Therefore, a better understanding of SSDC is necessary for negotiating and advancing a credible and legitimate human rights agenda within any new development paradigm that may emerge in the coming years and beyond.

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