The Paradigm Shift of Human Rights in Addressing Emerging Issues: A Case Study of the Right to a Healthy Environment

Marzieh Tajmiri

PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of Isfahan

Introduction

The international human rights system is usually studied through official documents, treaties, reports, judicial decisions, and monitoring mechanisms; however, the formulation of many concepts begins before their formal recognition. A concept may initially emerge within academic literature, social movements, advocacy networks, or civil statements, and then, through the activities of non-governmental organizations, transnational networks, and policymaking processes, enter official documents and institutional frameworks. The transformation from environmental justice to climate justice represents an example of such a process; demands emerging from grassroots movements, scholarly research, and civil coalitions have gradually been reformulated within policy and international arenas.

In this regard, the “norm life cycle” theory explains this transformation through three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade following a tipping point, and ultimately internalization. Throughout this process, norm entrepreneurs, transnational networks, and organizational platforms work to mobilize support from states and facilitate international socialization. Nevertheless, this pathway is neither predetermined nor linear; institutionalization may occur before or after the diffusion of a norm, or it may encounter resistance and processes of reinterpretation. Therefore, for human rights institutions, this discussion carries a clear practical implication: merely monitoring events is insufficient. An institution that only responds after violations occur, reports are published, or resolutions are adopted will usually react too late to emerging transformations.

By contrast, monitoring conceptual transitions reveals which concepts are still in the process of formation, which have entered formal discourse, which possess the potential to become research projects or institutional mandates, and which issues may become central human rights concerns in the coming years.

“Conceptual transition” does not simply mean replacing one term with another; a change in terminology represents a genuine transition only when the scope of application of a concept, the actors carrying it, the framing of demands, the institutions addressed, and its political consequences also change. Conventional environmentalism often viewed nature and wildlife separately from social life; however, environmental justice connected the environment to people’s places of residence and work, as well as to the social consequences of environmental risks. Climate justice expanded this framework further by incorporating issues such as historical responsibility, unequal distribution of harm, climate compensation and debt, community participation and autonomy, corporate accountability, and intergenerational justice. Within this understanding, justice extends beyond distribution and includes recognition of groups, participation in decision-making, and the capabilities of individuals and communities to flourish.

From Monitoring Events to Monitoring Concepts

Conventional human rights monitoring focuses on documenting violations, cases, country situations, violence, detention, discrimination, and restrictions on freedoms. Such monitoring is essential, but it is insufficient for identifying future trajectories, because some transformations emerge first as conceptual questions and policy challenges before appearing as documented violations or judicial cases.

For example, the assessment of artificial intelligence systems through a human rights lens has now been transformed into principles, impact assessments, and oversight mechanisms within UNESCO’s Recommendation and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention (UNESCO, 2021: 15-26; Council of Europe, 2024: 2-6). Likewise, the needs and interests of future generations have entered the formal language of the United Nations through the Declaration on Future Generations, along with policy commitments and institutional mechanisms (United Nations General Assembly, 2024: 52–56).

Concept monitoring requires examining which terms are repeatedly used in reports of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteurs, which concepts have entered resolutions and non-binding instruments, how academic discourse or social movements have been transferred into formal processes, and which claims rely on emerging conceptual frameworks.

The United Nations General Assembly report A/79/176 on access to climate information provides a clear example: a recognized right, when situated within the climate context, expands to encompass emissions data, climate risks, mitigation and adaptation plans, financing, public participation, litigation, and disclosure of corporate impacts and lobbying activities (Morgera, 2024b: 3–6; 18–19).

Accordingly, a human rights institution should not view itself merely as an observer of crises; rather, it should become part of the chain through which concepts are produced and consolidated. Universities, civil society organizations, Special Rapporteurs, courts, treaty bodies, media organizations, and social movements can transform a marginal idea into a subject of debate and eventually into an institutional standard.

Institutionalization Mechanisms of Emerging Concepts

Emerging concepts do not follow a single pathway. Some move from academic discussions into policy reports and specialized forums; some emerge from the experiences of affected communities and social movements; and others become more clearly articulated through judicial decisions and advisory opinions.

In the field of climate change, the report A/HRC/10/61 of the United Nations Human Rights Council was among the first detailed United Nations studies that expanded the climate discussion from its scientific and economic dimensions to the direct, indirect, and gradual impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights (OHCHR, 2009: 3, 5, 29).

Special Rapporteurs play an intermediary role in this process; they bring together human rights findings, judicial practice, specialized knowledge, and the experiences of rights holders within a coherent framework. For example, the report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and climate change to the United Nations Human Rights Council, document A/HRC/56/46, addresses obligations and gaps concerning emissions reduction, climate technologies, carbon credits, adaptation, just transition, financing, and loss and damage. Such reports do not create new legally binding obligations; however, they can formulate existing obligations, clarify policy priorities, and establish grounds for legal and institutional follow-up (Morgera, 2024b: 2–4, 15–21).

Courts and quasi-judicial bodies also transform concepts such as the right to a healthy environment, due diligence, prevention of climate harm, and intergenerational justice into tools for interpreting obligations and determining responsibility. The introduction of a concept into litigation does not necessarily signify its final acceptance; however, the growing number of cases demonstrates the importance of this pathway.

The global report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has tracked 3,099 climate litigation cases as of 30 June 2025 across 55 national jurisdictions and before 24 international or regional bodies; this growth demonstrates that climate litigation is no longer a marginal phenomenon (UNEP, 2025: 5, 11, 47–48, 54).

To assess the degree of institutionalization, several levels must be distinguished: repetition of a term in discourse, its inclusion in expert reports, recognition in non-binding instruments, transformation into an operational program or mechanism, use in judicial reasoning, and ultimately consolidation into a binding obligation. A concept may become widespread in official language while the rights holder, duty bearer, standard of violation, or remedy remains unclear. Conversely, a concept may produce legal effects without a single formal designation through the interpretation of existing obligations. Therefore, monitoring concepts must focus not only on the expansion of terminology but also on actual changes in rules, practices, budgets, and decision-making structures.

Case Study: From Environmental Protection to Environmental Rights

To understand climate justice, it is necessary to return to the earlier stages of environmental law. In the first stage of international institutionalization, the dominant approach focused on resource protection, pollution control, and cooperation among states.

The 1972 Stockholm Declaration transformed the environment into a global issue within the structure of the United Nations and linked the protection of air, water, land, and ecosystems with development, health, state responsibilities, and international cooperation. This instrument was not entirely devoid of human rights language and recognized a suitable environment as necessary for fundamental rights, dignity, and well-being; however, its dominant language remained one of protection and resource management (United Nations, 1973: 3–5).

The 1992 Rio Declaration introduced principles such as prevention of transboundary harm, precaution, and environmental impact assessment alongside access rights. Principle 10 also emphasized access to information, participation in decision-making, and effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings (United Nations, 1992: 3-6).

The Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters), adopted within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), transformed these three pillars into detailed treaty obligations. The Escazú Agreement (Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean) went further by requiring states, in addition to guaranteeing access rights, to provide a safe environment for environmental defenders (UNECE, 1998: 1, 4–9).

However, a purely protective or distributive approach remained limited. The environmental justice movement demonstrated that the environment is not merely wilderness; rather, it is the place where people live and work, and environmental risks are interconnected with poverty, race, the status of Indigenous communities, inequality, and exclusion from decision-making processes.

Environmental justice moved beyond the distribution of pollution and incorporated recognition, participation, and the capabilities of individuals and communities. Climate justice further developed this trajectory by incorporating historical responsibility, the North–South divide, compensation and climate debt, accountability of fossil fuel corporations, the rights of women and Indigenous peoples, and intergenerational justice (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014: 360–361; 365–369).

The Right to a Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable Environment: A Necessary but Insufficient Achievement

The recognition of the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment represents one of the significant developments in contemporary human rights. The Human Rights Council, through Resolution 48/13 adopted in 2021, and the General Assembly, through Resolution 76/300 adopted in 2022, recognized this right and linked it with other rights, international cooperation, capacity-building, and the implementation of environmental agreements.

This development consolidated the relationship between the environment and human rights within the official language of the United Nations and provided a normative reference point for evaluating rights-based policies.

However, the general recognition of this right does not provide detailed answers regarding the distribution of historical responsibility, the role of affected groups, forms of remedy, or the prevention of inequalities arising from the green transition. The resolutions address disproportionate vulnerability, gender equality, the needs of developing countries, corporate responsibility, and procedural rights; yet they do not establish precise standards for responsibility, remedy, or a just transition.

Climate justice does not replace this right; rather, by adding historical responsibility, the distribution of harm, compensation, participation, financing, and community capabilities, it makes the right more operational and accountable (United Nations, 2021: 2; United Nations General Assembly, 2022: 2–3).

It is also necessary to distinguish between normative recognition and the creation of treaty-based obligations. The aforementioned resolutions do not, by themselves, establish a new treaty obligation; however, they may reflect existing obligations and, together with national legislation, regional instruments, state practice, and judicial decisions, influence the interpretation of rights.

In its 2025 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice considered Resolution 76/300 as an indication of the recognition of this right and described it as a right necessary for the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, without explicitly declaring in the same section the existence of an independent and customary rule (ICJ, 2025: 114).

Ultimately, the effectiveness of this right depends on guaranteeing access to information, public participation, justice, and effective remedies.

Climate Justice: Changing the Central Question

Climate justice becomes particularly significant when the climate crisis is no longer understood merely as a matter of rising temperatures or a technical challenge of emissions reduction. Climate impacts are not distributed equally, and vulnerability is connected with poverty, developmental constraints, marginalization, and historical patterns of injustice, including colonial legacies.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Regions of Africa, South Asia, Central and South America, small island states, and the Arctic, as well as smallholder farmers, fishing communities, Indigenous peoples, and low-income groups, face heightened risks. Age, gender, disability, ethnicity, location, and income also intensify vulnerability (IPCC, 2022: 9, 12, 29).

Climate justice changes the central policy question: not only how emissions should be reduced, but also among whom costs and benefits should be distributed and how climate actions affect the rights, livelihoods, and territories of different groups.

In adaptation efforts, it is also necessary to examine which communities have access to financial, institutional, and technological resources and which groups face adaptation limits and losses beyond their capacity to respond.

Climate technologies—from geoengineering and carbon credits to the extraction of critical minerals and large-scale renewable energy projects—are not inherently just. Without human rights safeguards, they may lead to land grabbing, displacement, livelihood destruction, and exclusion of communities from decision-making processes (Morgera, 2024b: 6–10, 15–17).

This framework emphasizes lived experiences, the voices of communities, meaningful participation, access to resources, and the integration of scientific knowledge with Indigenous and local knowledge systems (IPCC, 2022: 29–30).

The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris Agreement) represents a turning point in the explicit incorporation of human rights language into a global climate treaty.

Its preamble calls upon states to respect their existing obligations concerning health, Indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities, vulnerable persons, and the right to development, while also taking into account gender equality, intergenerational justice, just transition, participation, and access to information.

These references do not independently create new enforceable obligations; however, they provide an important interpretive basis for assessing climate actions (United Nations, 2015: 10–14).

Loss and Damage: Moving from Mere Assistance Toward Equitable Remedy

Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “loss and damage” refers to the adverse impacts of climate change that occur despite mitigation and adaptation efforts. These impacts range from loss of life and health to the loss of territories, ecosystems, livelihoods, culture, heritage, and even sovereignty. Sea-level rise, displacement, migration, relocation, and resilient reconstruction also fall within this domain (Morgera, 2024b: 20; UNFCCC, 2023a: 6–7).

Article 8 of the Paris Agreement also emphasizes the importance of averting, minimizing, and addressing losses and damages associated with extreme weather events, slow-onset events, and both economic and non-economic losses (United Nations, 2015: 12).

The decisions adopted at the twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) and the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA4) established new funding arrangements and a fund for vulnerable developing countries facing climate-related losses and damages. At the twenty-eighth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28), the governing instrument, the Board structure, and the placement of the Fund within the financial mechanisms of the Convention and the Paris Agreement were determined (UNFCCC, 2022: 12; UNFCCC, 2023a).

This development transformed loss and damage from a political demand into a formal institutional mechanism.

However, paragraph 51 of Decision 1/CP.21 adopted at the twenty-first Conference of the Parties to the Convention explicitly states that Article 8 does not constitute a basis for liability or compensation. Similarly, the arrangements established through COP28 decisions are based on cooperation and do not create liability or compensation mechanisms. Therefore, the Fund, by itself, does not establish a compensation regime based on responsibility, and the pursuit of restorative justice must also rely on other foundations, including human rights law, international responsibility, and domestic legal frameworks.

From a human rights perspective, the quality of the Fund’s design is as important as its existence: which countries and communities have access, whether cultural and non-economic losses are recognized, whether women, Indigenous peoples, and local communities participate in decision-making, and whether resources are provided as grants or increase debt burdens.

The governing instrument of the Fund anticipates support for economic and non-economic losses, recovery, reconstruction, and slow-onset events; however, it also allows for concessional loans. Special Rapporteur Elisa Morgera further emphasizes in report A/HRC/56/46 the connection between loss and damage and the right to an effective remedy, as well as the importance of prioritizing grants in order to prevent the escalation of debt (UNFCCC, 2023a: 7, 10, 12–13; Morgera, 2024b: 20–21).

Just Transition: The Social Test of Climate Policy

A just transition connects the right to a healthy environment with the social and economic consequences of climate policies. Transitioning toward a low-emission economy is necessary; however, the distribution of costs, benefits, and decision-making power determines whether this transition is genuinely rights-based.

If emissions reduction policies result in widespread unemployment, weakened labour rights, land grabbing, exclusion of communities, increased gender inequality, concentration of corporate power, or restrictions on environmental defenders, they cannot be considered just—even if they technically reduce emissions.

The Paris Agreement emphasizes a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work opportunities. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme has incorporated energy, socio-economic dimensions, labour rights, social protection, social dialogue, and inclusive participation into formal climate negotiations (UNFCCC, 2023b: 30–31).

The components of such a transition include protecting workers and communities dependent on fossil fuel industries, reskilling, social security, participation of trade unions, respect for Indigenous peoples’ rights, gender and human rights impact assessments, and access to remedies.

The extraction of materials required for low-carbon technologies may also create “green sacrifice zones” and reproduce historical injustices (Morgera, 2024b: 7, 15–17).

Moving away from a fossil fuel-based economy is not merely an energy issue; it is connected with the rights to life, health, water, food, housing, work, and culture, as well as with corporate influence over policymaking and the protection of defenders (Morgera, 2025: 2–4, 15, 19).

For legal precision, it is necessary to distinguish between the duties of states and the responsibilities of corporations. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) are based on three pillars: the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and access to effective remedies for victims.

Corporate responsibility represents a global standard of expected conduct; however, in terms of legal source and enforcement mechanisms, it is not equivalent to the human rights obligations of states (OHCHR, 2011: 3, 13, 27; OHCHR, 2012: 1–2).

Courts and the Judicialization of Climate Governance

Judicialization is one of the indicators of the institutionalization of climate-related concepts; however, it is neither the final nor an essential stage of every conceptual transition. Courts may accept a claim, limit its scope, or reject it on procedural or evidentiary grounds. Their significance lies in translating climate concepts into the language of positive obligations, due diligence, rights violations, proof of harm, causation, and legal responsibility.

For example, in the case concerning the complaint brought by the Association of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection, the applicants argued that the insufficiency of the government’s climate mitigation measures endangered their fundamental rights, particularly their right to respect for private and family life. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that Article 8 encompasses the right to effective protection by the state against serious adverse effects of climate change on life, health, and quality of life, and that states must establish an effective legislative and administrative framework to reduce climate-related risks.

The Court found a violation of Article 8 due to Switzerland’s shortcomings in its regulatory framework, including the absence of quantified limits on emissions or a carbon budget and the failure to take timely action. However, the applicants (the association itself) did not satisfy the victim status requirement, and the substantive examination was based on the complaint brought by the individual applicants (ECtHR, 2024, 196–199, 203–206, 211; UNEP, 2025, 18–19, 23).

The 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) also recognized anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as a form of marine pollution. The Tribunal relied on the best available science, the precautionary principle, and the standard of due diligence in determining obligations, and clarified that compliance with the Paris Agreement does not replace independent obligations under the Convention (ITLOS, 2024, 59–66, 75–88).

This reasoning demonstrates that existing legal rules can be applied to emerging scientific and legal concepts in addressing crises that were not articulated in contemporary terms when those rules were originally developed.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 2025 Advisory Opinion, similarly held that the climate regime does not prevent the application of other rules of international law and recognized the applicability of obligations concerning the prevention of significant harm, due diligence, cooperation, the law of the sea, and human rights alongside climate treaties.

The Court linked the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities with states’ historical and current contributions as well as differences in capacities, and it did not consider the general rules of state responsibility to have been excluded. Although this advisory opinion does not possess the binding force of a contentious judgment, it carries significant interpretive authority (ICJ, 2025, 52–58, 118–120).

In the same context, Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) recognized the right to a healthy climate as an element of the right to a healthy environment with both individual and collective dimensions. The Court protected the interests of present and future generations of humans and other species in preserving the climate system.

The Court emphasized intra-generational and intergenerational justice, as well as obligations including emissions reduction, protection of carbon sinks, regulation of activities, and impact assessments. Nevertheless, this interpretation is regional in scope, and its extension to other legal systems requires examination of the sources and structures of each legal order (IACtHR, 2025, 105, 109–110).

Procedural Rights, Information, and Environmental Defenders

Climate justice cannot be achieved without access to information, public participation, and access to justice. Climate-related information is not limited to scientific data; it also encompasses emissions, project risks, financial resources, carbon markets, the human rights impacts of technologies, the role of corporations, and the social costs of mitigation and adaptation measures.

The Special Rapporteur, in report A/79/176, links this right with freedom of expression, participation, science, education, and remedy (Morgera, 2024a, 4–8, 19–20; UNECE, 1998, arts. 4–8).

Environmental defenders are also an integral part of the architecture of climate justice. In this regard, the Escazú Agreement obliges states to guarantee a safe environment, prevent and investigate threats, and protect environmental defenders (ECLAC, 2018, art. 9).

International reports have also warned about violence, criminalization, and strategic lawsuits against public participation. Without protecting local communities, journalists, Indigenous leaders, and activists, public participation risks becoming merely a formal principle rather than a meaningful practice (Morgera, 2024a, 15–16, 21, 23; UNEP, 2025, 44–45).

Future Generations, Rights of Nature, and the Horizon of Planetary Justice

Climate justice does not represent the end of conceptual transformation. The rights of future generations, rights of nature, ecological justice, and planetary justice reveal the limitations of a purely anthropocentric framework. However, they do not possess the same legal status: some have emerged in expert reports or regional practices; some have been recognized in national legislation and judicial decisions; while others remain primarily theoretical and ethical frameworks.

The United Nations Human Rights Council report A/HRC/57/43 explains that future generations lack voting power, political influence, and the ability to directly challenge present-day decisions, even though current policies concerning climate, biodiversity, energy, technology, natural resources, and public debt may constrain their future choices.

The Special Rapporteur proposes incorporating intergenerational equity into project impact assessments, human rights evaluations, financial planning, and representation mechanisms (Deva, 2024, 2–3, 16–18). This interpretive proposal does not mean that legally binding and enforceable rights of future generations have been established across all legal systems.

The United Nations Declaration on Future Generations also recognizes the intergenerational effects of decisions and omissions made by the present generation and emphasizes solidarity, intergenerational equity, a healthy environment, long-term planning, and forward-looking policy assessments. However, its dominant language refers to the “needs and interests” of future generations rather than explicitly recognizing an independent set of enforceable rights (United Nations General Assembly, 2024, 52–56).

Rights of nature have also resulted, in certain national and local laws and judicial decisions, in the recognition of nature, rivers, or ecosystems as rights-bearing entities or legal persons.

Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 recognizes the right to a healthy environment as having both individual and collective dimensions and protects forests, rivers, and oceans independently of proving direct human harm. It also links the right to a healthy climate with the interests of future generations and other species (IACtHR, 2025, 95, 97–105, 109–110).

This innovation has the potential to advance planetary justice; however, it should not be transformed into a universal rule without examining its legal foundations. The validity of legal analysis requires distinguishing between conceptual innovation, expert recommendations, non-binding instruments, national practice, regional interpretation, and binding legal rules.

Critiques and Limitations of Conceptual Transitions in Human Rights

The study of conceptual transitions is essential; however, it involves several limitations.

First, there is a risk of conflating different normative levels. Not every new term represents an independent legal concept, and not every emerging concept develops into a right, an obligation, or an implementation mechanism. A distinction must be made between an idea, an ethical or social demand, a non-binding norm, a public policy, a legal obligation, and an enforceable right.

The theory of norm localization also demonstrates that norms may encounter resistance, selective acceptance, and processes of reinterpretation within local orders, and that not all norms ultimately reach internalization (Acharya, 2004, 239–241, 251).

Second, concepts such as climate justice, just transition, and the rights of future generations may be morally powerful while remaining operationally ambiguous. Unless they are translated into standards, indicators, decision-making processes, and implementation mechanisms, they risk remaining at the level of symbolic language.

The central questions are: who benefits, who bears the costs, how decisions are made, and what resources and institutions exist to support affected groups.

Third, the language of justice itself may be appropriated or used selectively. The acceptance of the term “just transition” does not necessarily lead to redistribution of resources, meaningful participation, or accountability. States and corporations may present interpretations compatible with existing power structures.

Fourth, a gap exists between normative recognition and institutional and financial capacity. The establishment of a fund or formal program should not be equated with the realization of a concept; the volume of resources, financing conditions, access mechanisms, decision-making structures, and actual impacts must also be assessed.

Fifth, the green transition contains internal contradictions. A policy may be beneficial from a carbon-reduction perspective while imposing social and environmental costs on workers, low-income communities, or extraction regions. Describing a resource as “clean” may conceal the impacts of extraction, waste generation, and local harms, thereby reproducing injustice (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013, 132–134, 138).

Sixth, human rights tools cannot transform every dimension of the climate crisis into a justiciable claim. Litigation faces challenges related to causation, attribution of harm to a specific state or corporation, future harms, the extraterritorial application of rights, and admissibility requirements.

The existence of a right within a constitution or human rights instrument is also insufficient without access to courts, institutional capacity, and effective enforcement of judgments. In some circumstances, human rights arguments are more effective when combined with other areas of law (Peel & Osofsky, 2018, 45–46, 62–63).

Therefore, human rights should not be viewed as a substitute for climate science, political economy, industrial policy, financing, or geopolitical analysis. Its distinctive contribution lies in introducing dignity, equality, participation, vulnerability, and accountability into these domains. Achieving these values requires combining law with resources, institutions, expertise, and public policy.

Strategic Implications for Human Rights Institutions

Human rights institutions should incorporate foresight and horizon scanning into their planning alongside the monitoring of ongoing violations. The objective is to identify emerging trends, weak signals, and forms of language at an early stage that have not yet entered the mainstream but may become part of formal agendas in the future.

The OHCHR Management Plan for 2024–2027 emphasizes strategic foresight, trend analysis, innovation, and the use of data to identify emerging threats. Likewise, the Horizon Scan User Manual published by the United Nations Global Pulse initiative defines horizon scanning as a process of systematically collecting evidence in order to identify early signals and emerging issues (OHCHR, 2024, 4, 37, 55, 63–64; UN Global Pulse, 2023, 6, 11, 14).

A non-governmental organization can establish a small and specialized unit dedicated to monitoring concepts within United Nations documents, Special Rapporteur reports, academic literature, litigation, social movements, and international forums.

Non-state actors and knowledge institutions can move concepts from the margins into formal agendas through framing processes, information production, and the creation of new conceptual languages (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 897–900).

The outputs of such a unit may include annual reports on conceptual trends, databases, policy briefs, academic and civil society dialogues, participation in OHCHR calls for input, submissions to Special Rapporteurs, and educational packages.

A concept database should distinguish between a “weak signal,” an “emerging concept,” an “emerging issue,” a “concept incorporated into official language,” and a “concept with legal or judicial potential.” It should be updated based on criteria such as repetition, diversity of actors involved, inclusion in official documents, the existence of implementation mechanisms, and judicial use (UN Global Pulse, 2023, 11, 14).

The International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) notes that submissions provided to Special Procedures, when credible, documented, and timely, can provide the evidence and analytical frameworks necessary for communications, thematic reports, and processes of normative development. The collection of several similar cases can also contribute to identifying broader patterns; however, it should not be assumed that such submissions definitively determine the final language of reports (ISHR, 2021, 9, 18–20).

Within a three-year program, five areas can be prioritized:

1. Climate justice, loss and damage, and just transition
2. Rights of future generations
3. Human rights and artificial intelligence
4. Emerging technologies of warfare and maintaining human control
5. Rights of nature and planetary justice

These areas are not at the same stage of maturity. Climate justice and artificial intelligence have already entered formal documents and institutional mechanisms; the rights of future generations and autonomous weapons are undergoing institutional expansion; while rights of nature and planetary justice remain more visible within national and regional practices as well as emerging academic discourse.

These priorities are also consistent with official developments. The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence emphasizes dignity, equality, non-discrimination, transparency, accountability, privacy, remedies, and risk assessment (Council of Europe, 2024, 2, 4–6).

The position of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regarding autonomous weapon systems also highlights the risks of loss of human control, unpredictability, and difficulties of accountability, calling for a prohibition of unpredictable systems and restrictions on other categories of autonomous weapons (ICRC, 2025, 1–2, 22).

The “SyRI” case in the Netherlands concerning a risk-scoring system further demonstrated that algorithmic welfare systems can undermine transparency, privacy, judicial oversight, and non-discrimination, transforming “algorithmic accountability” into an essential concept within digital governance (Rachovitsa & Johann, 2022, 1–3, 6–8, 11–13).

For maintaining analytical credibility, each concept must be translated into operational indicators: normative status, rights holders, duty bearers, required information, procedural rights, risks, oversight mechanisms, and remedies.

In the field of climate justice, indicators may include access to information and participation, protection of defenders, recognition of economic and non-economic losses, compensation, labour rights, assessment of technological impacts, and corporate accountability.

The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, with their three pillars of state protection, corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and access to remedies, also provide a framework for assessing legislation, due diligence, supply chains, and the effectiveness of available remedies (OHCHR, 2011, Guiding Principles 1, 11 and 25).

Therefore, the success of such a unit should not be measured solely by the number of reports it produces. More important criteria include the early identification of transformations, the quality of evidence, engagement with affected communities, the integration of analyses into formal processes, the conversion of concepts into measurable indicators, and maintaining a distinction between ethical demands, non-binding norms, legal obligations, and enforceable rights.

Conclusion

The transition from environmental protection to climate justice demonstrates that the future of human rights is constructed not only through treaties and judicial decisions but also at the level of concepts. Emerging concepts initially transform the ways in which problems are understood; they then reshape institutional language and may eventually develop into resolutions, funds, mandates, indicators, litigation, or obligations. The life cycle of norms also explains this movement from emergence and norm entrepreneurship to diffusion and possible internalization, although this process is neither always linear nor inevitable.

The right to a healthy environment represents an important achievement; however, it is insufficient on its own to address the unequal realities of the climate crisis. Climate justice connects this right with historical responsibility, the distribution of costs and harms, remedy, participation, financing, just transition, and future generations. This study also demonstrates that every conceptual innovation must be assessed in terms of its legal status, practical enforceability, and the risks of symbolic or selective use.

For think tanks and human rights institutions, monitoring conceptual transitions provides a pathway to understanding the future before it becomes formally established. An institution that identifies these transformations in a timely manner, documents them, and converts them into practical indicators will not merely function as an analyst; it can also contribute to shaping the future discourse of human rights. The strategic mission of the coming years is to move beyond passive monitoring toward active monitoring, analysis, and participation in the construction of concepts.

References

• Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. International Organization. 58 (2), 239–275. From: https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/7C6449C7612BC9AEE0C574C4CD9E7B63/S0020818304582024a.pdf
• Council of Europe. (2024). Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225). Council of Europe. From: https://rm.coe.int/1680afae3c
• Deva, S. (2024, July 24). Right to development of children and future generations: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to development (A/HRC/57/43). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/57/43
• Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2018). Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean. United Nations. From:  https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/7e888972-80c1-48ba-9d92-7712d6e6f1ab/content
• European Court of Human Rights. (2024, April 9). Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland (Application No. 53600/20) [Grand Chamber judgment]. European Court of Human Rights. From: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233206
• Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization. 52 (4), 887–917. From: https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/5333873.pdf
• Inter-American Court of Human Rights. (2025, May 9). Climate emergency and human rights (Advisory Opinion OC-32/25). Inter-American Court of Human Rights. From:  https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_32_en.pdf
• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: Summary for policymakers. IPCC. From: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf
• International Committee of the Red Cross. (2025). Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: Selected issues [Position paper]. ICRC. From:  https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/4896_002_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_-_IHL-ICRC.pdf
• International Court of Justice. (2025, July 23). Obligations of States in respect of climate change [Advisory opinion]. ICJ. From: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-00-en.pdf
• International Service for Human Rights. (2021). A practical guide to the UN special procedures (2nd ed.). ISHR. From: https://ishr.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Handbook-on-Engaging-with-the-UN-Special-Procedures_2nd-Edition-Web-3dec2021.pdf
• International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. (2024, May 21). Request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (Case No. 31) [Advisory opinion]. ITLOS. From: https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/Advisory_Opinion/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_orig.pdf
• Morgera, E. (2024, July 18). Access to information on climate change and human rights: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change (A/79/176). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/176
• Morgera, E. (2024, July 24). Scene-setting report: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change (A/HRC/56/46). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/56/46
• Morgera, E. (2025, May 15). The imperative of defossilizing our economies: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change (A/HRC/59/42). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/42
• Newell, P., & Mulvaney, D. (2013). The political economy of the “just transition.” The Geographical Journal. 179 (2), 132–140. From: https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/66-ICAS_CP_Newell_and_Mulvaney.pdf
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2009, January 15). Report on the relationship between climate change and human rights (A/HRC/10/61). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/10/61
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2011). Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework. United Nations. From: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2012). The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: An interpretive guide. United Nations. From: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024). UN Human Rights management plan 2024–2027. OHCHR. From: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/aboutus/OHCHR-OMP-2024-2027.pdf
• Peel, J., & Osofsky, H. M. (2018). A rights turn in climate change litigation. Transnational Environmental Law. 7 (1), 37–67. From: https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102517000292
• Rachovitsa, A., & Johann, N. (2022). The human rights implications of the use of AI in the digital welfare state: Lessons learned from the Dutch SyRI case. Human Rights Law Review. 22 (2), Article ngac010. From: https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac010
• Schlosberg, D., & Collins, L. B. (2014). From environmental to climate justice: Climate change and the discourse of environmental justice. WIREs Climate Change. 5 (3), 359–374. From: https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.275
• UN Global Pulse. (2022). Horizon scan user manual: A step-by-step guide. United Ntions. From: https://www.unglobalpulse.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/HorisonScanManual_ENG-1.pdf
• United Nations. (1973). Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972 (A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1). United Nations.  From: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/523249/files/A_CONF.48_14_Rev.1-EN.pdf
• United Nations. (1992). Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26, Vol. I). United Nations. From: https://sdgs.un.org/documents/aconf15126-vol-i-rio-declaration-19576
• United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (1998). Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). UNECE. From: https://unece.org/environment-policy/public-participation/aarhus-convention/text
• United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2021). Recommendation on the ethics of artificial intelligence. UNESCO. From: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000380455
• United Nations Environment Programme. (2025, October 3). Global climate litigation report: 2025 status review. UNEP. From: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-climate-litigation-report-2025-status-review
• United Nations. (2015, December 12). Paris Agreement. UNFCCC. From: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2015b). Decision 1/CP.21: Adoption of the Paris Agreement. UNFCCC. From:  https://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/decision1cp21.pdf
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2022). Decision 2/CP.27: Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage. UNFCCC. From: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2_CP.27.pdf
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2023a). Decision 1/CP.28: Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage. UNFCCC. From: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/1_CP.28.pdf
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2023b). Decision 3/CMA.5: United Arab Emirates just transition work programme. UNFCCC. From: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma5_auv_5_JTWP.pdf
• United Nations General Assembly. (2022, August 1). The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (A/RES/76/300). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/76/300
• United Nations General Assembly. (2024, September 22). The Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations (A/RES/79/1). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/79/1
• United Nations. (2021, October 18). The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (A/HRC/RES/48/13). United Nations. From: https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/RES/48/13