Specialized Interview with Sattar Azizi, Professor at Tarbiat Modares University: The Genealogy of the Right to Self-Determination in the Contemporary International Legal Order

The right to self-determination is one of the most fundamental yet contested principles of contemporary international law. At first glance, its meaning appears straightforward: peoples should be free to determine their political system, path of economic development, social structure, and cultural identity. Its real complexity, however, emerges when it is considered alongside other foundational principles of the international order. On the one hand, self-determination is closely linked to human rights, political participation, non-discrimination, equality among citizens, and the right of peoples to determine the form of government under which they live. On the other hand, it must be reconciled with principles such as the territorial integrity of states, the stability of borders, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the prohibition of the use of force. The central question, therefore, is how far the right to self-determination extends and at what point it may come into tension with the requirements of sovereignty, stability, and international order.

Within this framework, self-determination cannot be treated as a single, absolute right without legal limits. Its meaning and consequences may vary according to the historical context, political circumstances, and legal framework of each case. Self-determination in the context of decolonization is not the same as self-determination within an independent state, just as demands for political participation, non-discrimination, and internal autonomy cannot automatically be equated with claims to secession and independent statehood. Distinctions between internal and external self-determination, the negative and positive dimensions of the right, consensual and unilateral secession, and the concepts of a “legal right,” “legal permission,” and “political legitimacy” are therefore essential for avoiding theoretical ambiguity and political misuse.

Against this background, the present interview with Dr. Sattar Azizi, a faculty member in the Department of International Law at Tarbiat Modares University, examines the legal dimensions of the right to self-determination. By avoiding the conflation of legal analysis with purely political, ethical, or sociological judgments, the discussion seeks to clarify the scope, conditions, and consequences of this principle within the international legal order and to explore how a balance may be maintained between protecting the freedom and will of peoples and preserving territorial integrity and state stability. The interview addresses the transformation of self-determination from a political demand into a legal principle, its role in decolonization, its status under the UN Charter and in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the possibility of unilateral secession, the doctrine of remedial secession, the status of de facto entities, and the potential of internal self-determination. At its core, the discussion asks how this right can be interpreted so that it does not become a tool for secession, intervention, or territorial destabilization, while sovereignty and territorial integrity are likewise not invoked to perpetuate discrimination, political exclusion, or the denial of the genuine will of peoples.

Interview Details

• Interviewer: Marzieh Tajmiri | PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of Isfahan
• Interviewee: Dr. Sattar Azizi | Faculty Member, Department of International Law, Tarbiat Modares University
• Date of Interview: Wednesday, 17 June 2026
• Main Topics:

1. The Normative Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination
2. External Self-Determination and the Independence Claims of Sub-State Groups
3. The Relationship between Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity: The Kosovo Advisory Opinion
4. The Doctrine of Remedial Secession and the Threshold of Human Rights Violations
5. De Facto Entities and Human Rights Obligations
6. Distinguishing Legitimate Secession from Expansionist Intervention
7. Internal Self-Determination

Note: In order to preserve academic independence and diversity of perspectives, it should be emphasized that the opinions expressed in this interview reflect solely the personal views of the interviewee and do not necessarily imply endorsement or adoption of a position by the Human Rights Institute of the University of Isfahan.

Interview Summary

Topic 1: The Normative Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination

• Question: Where was the turning point at which the right to self-determination evolved from a political demand into a legally binding principle within international law?

In response to this question, Dr. Azizi emphasizes that, before answering, it is necessary to clarify that the right to self-determination has two primary dimensions: internal and external self-determination. Internal self-determination concerns the relationship between people and their own government. In other words, peoples should be able to participate in determining their political system, economic structure, social direction, and cultural policies. By contrast, the external dimension of self-determination concerns the right of a group of people to establish and create an independent state.

Furthermore, he emphasizes a key point: the right to self-determination should also be examined from two perspectives—its negative and positive dimensions. The negative dimension of this right refers to the prohibition of interference by foreign states in the internal and external affairs of a country. Accordingly, every state possesses an inalienable right to choose its own political, economic, social, and cultural system without interference from other states. In other words, states—and even international organizations, with reference to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter—do not have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. On the other hand, the right to self-determination also has a positive dimension. This means that people living within a country have the right to determine their political, social, and cultural affairs and to participate in decision-making processes concerning them.

Historically, Dr. Azizi explains that the right to self-determination initially existed more as a political principle than as a legal rule. Its origins can be traced to nationalist and anti-colonial movements of the eighteenth century. The independence of the United States and later the countries of Latin America represented practical examples of the realization of this idea. However, international law at that time accepted these developments primarily on the basis of established facts rather than recognition of an independent legal right. For example, many Latin American countries were recognized by Spain and other European powers years after declaring independence. Even the United States government, in its official statements, considered effective success in exercising sovereignty as the main criterion for recognition, rather than merely a claimed right to self-determination.

Dr. Azizi believes that after World War I, the concept of self-determination gained significant importance through Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. The collapse of empires such as Austria-Hungary, along with the fall of the Tsarist Empire in Russia and the Wilhelmine Empire in Germany, and the emergence of certain territorial changes, brought the question of national self-determination to the forefront of international relations. However, despite its political importance, the principle of self-determination was not established as a legally binding rule in the Treaty of Versailles. According to Dr. Azizi, the victory of the Bolsheviks and the communist revolution—which emphasized the right of nations to self-determination—was another important factor that contributed to the prominence of this principle in international relations. Even in the Aaland Islands case, the Commission of Jurists of the League of Nations stated that, despite its political significance, the principle of self-determination was not yet part of positive international law.

With the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945, the right to self-determination entered the formal language of international law. This principle was referred to in Article 1(2) and Article 55 of the Charter. However, Dr. Azizi argues that, initially, the dominant interpretation of this right was primarily negative in nature. The emphasis was placed on the obligation of states not to interfere in the internal and external affairs of other states.

During the drafting of the UN Charter, it was stated that the right to self-determination did not necessarily imply:

• a right of colonies to independence;
• a right of minorities to secession;
• a right to choose democratic forms of government;
• or a right of ethnic groups to establish separate states.

Dr. Azizi emphasizes that the true turning point in the development of this principle was the practice of the United Nations General Assembly, particularly the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This resolution identified colonialism as a violation of the UN Charter and a denial of fundamental human rights. Contrary to the initial interpretation of the Charter, it recognized the right of peoples in non-self-governing territories to independence. From this point onward, self-determination in colonial contexts evolved from a political slogan into a legal obligation.

Finally, according to Dr. Azizi, references to erga omnes obligations before the International Court of Justice, which initially emerged from the Barcelona Traction case, were developed in relation to the granting of independence to non-self-governing territories. The International Court of Justice also recognized self-determination as a general principle of international law in the Namibia Advisory Opinion and later in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (paragraph 54). In the East Timor case (paragraph 37), the Court stated that the principle of self-determination possesses a “universally applicable character” and constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law.

Topic 2: External Self-Determination and the Independence Claims of Sub-State Groups

• Question: In non-colonial situations, can ethnic, linguistic, religious, or national groups invoke the right to self-determination in order to seek independence and establish an independent state?

In response to this question, Dr. Azizi explains that it is first necessary to make a fundamental distinction between colonial and non-colonial situations. In colonial contexts, peoples of non-self-governing territories possess the right to external self-determination and may determine their political future, including whether to become independent, join another state, or adopt another political arrangement. This right has an established position in contemporary international law.

However, the situation is different in non-colonial contexts. Ethnic, linguistic, religious, or national groups living within an independent state do not possess a general and primary right to secede under positive international law. The mere existence of a distinct identity, or even the desire of the majority of a group’s members, does not by itself create a legal right to establish an independent state.

According to him, a distinction must be made between two types of separation:

1. Consensual secession (separation);
2. Unilateral secession.

Consensual secession, referred to as “separation,” occurs when the central government agrees to the separation of part of its territory. In such cases, from the perspective of international law, separation does not raise significant legal difficulties because the consent of the parent state exists. Examples such as:

• Singapore’s separation from Malaysia;
• Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia;
• South Sudan’s separation from Sudan;

can be analyzed within the framework of consensual or agreed separation arrangements.

However, unilateral secession arises when a part of a state’s population seeks independence and the creation of a new state without the consent of the central government. This is where the issue becomes considerably more complex. According to Dr. Azizi, within philosophical and political theories—such as nationalist theories of secession or choice theories of secession—there are arguments supporting a primary right to secede. However, these theories do not have an established position within positive international law.

Contemporary international law remains state-centered, and the preservation of stable borders and territorial integrity of states holds significant importance. If every ethnic, linguistic, or religious group could declare independence solely on the basis of majority support among its members, many multi-ethnic states would face serious risks of fragmentation and instability. For this reason, Dr. Azizi explains that the United Nations and many regional organizations, particularly after the period of decolonization, have approached sub-state secessionist movements with caution.

Examples such as:

• Katanga;
• Biafra;
• and Cabinda;

demonstrate that the international community has generally not supported unilateral secession by sub-state groups. Even the Organization of African Unity (OAU), following the independence of African states, emphasized the preservation of existing borders and the territorial integrity of newly independent states.

Nevertheless, Dr. Azizi argues that secession cannot be denied as a continuing political and social reality. The dissolution of Yugoslavia, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, and the declaration of independence by Kosovo from Serbia are examples that have complicated the legal debate. These cases demonstrate that international law does not always provide a simple and uniform answer regarding unilateral secession.

Topic 3: The Relationship between Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity: The Kosovo Advisory Opinion

• Question: What is the relationship between the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity, and why did the Kosovo case fail to provide a clear answer regarding unilateral secession?

In response to this question, Dr. Azizi first explains that the principle of territorial integrity is one of the foundations of the contemporary international legal order. This principle refers to respect for the territorial unity of states and the prohibition of the division or seizure of their territories through force, foreign intervention, or coercion. However, in contrast, the right to self-determination emphasizes the right of peoples to determine their political status and their own path of development.

The fundamental challenge arises when a group within a state invokes self-determination in order to seek separation from that state. In this context, Dr. Azizi identifies three main approaches:

First approach: A perspective that limits unilateral secession exclusively to situations of colonialism, foreign occupation, or alien domination, and does not recognize such a right for sub-state groups within independent states.

Second approach: The theory of the silence of international law, which argues that there is neither a general right to secede nor an absolute prohibition against secession. Accordingly, if a new situation effectively emerges, international law must address that reality.

Third approach: The doctrine of remedial secession, which considers secession permissible only in exceptional circumstances and where there has been widespread violation of fundamental rights and the absence of any internal remedy.

According to Dr. Azizi, in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice had an opportunity to clarify the relationship between self-determination, territorial integrity, and unilateral secession. However, instead of examining whether the people of Kosovo possessed a right to secede, the Court limited itself to answering a narrower question: Was the issuance of the declaration of independence, by itself, a violation of international law?

The Court concluded that international law contains no general rule prohibiting declarations of independence. Furthermore, in paragraph 80 of its Advisory Opinion, the Court stated that the principle of territorial integrity applies primarily in relations between states. According to Dr. Azizi, this statement is highly significant because it means that territorial integrity primarily prevents other states from interfering, fragmenting, or taking territory from another state. It does not necessarily mean that every internal group within a state is directly addressed by this principle.

However, he argues that the Court avoided answering the central questions:

• Did Kosovo possess a positive right to secession?
• Did external self-determination in non-colonial contexts apply to the people of Kosovo?
• Did Kosovo’s separation constitute an example of remedial secession?

According to Dr. Azizi, this silence resulted both from the political sensitivity of the issue and from the absence of clear consensus in customary international law. The Kosovo case was of vital importance to many states because countries with ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity feared that recognition of a general rule on secession could legitimize internal separatist movements. For this reason, he believes that the Court adopted a cautious approach and preferred to comment only on the legality of the declaration of independence rather than addressing the substance of secession itself.

Topic 4: The Doctrine of Remedial Secession and the Threshold of Human Rights Violations

• Question: What level of human rights violations could serve as a basis for remedial secession, and has this doctrine developed into a rule of international law?

According to Dr. Azizi, the doctrine of remedial secession is based on the idea that if a group is subjected to widespread and continuous deprivation of its fundamental rights, and no effective internal remedy exists, secession may be considered as a measure of last resort. Within this framework, mere political dissatisfaction, economic difficulties, or the desire of a majority for independence are not sufficient to justify secession.

He argues that two main elements are generally considered necessary for this theory to apply.

The first element: the prior condition

This requires the existence of:

• widespread human rights violations;
• systematic discrimination;
• continuous repression;
• denial of internal self-determination;
• or the absence of genuine opportunities for participation in political power or preservation of cultural and social identity.

The second element: the subsequent condition

It must be demonstrated that no alternative and effective solution exists. If possibilities such as:

• constitutional reform;
• autonomy arrangements;
• decentralization;
• political participation;
• guarantees of cultural rights;
• or peaceful transformation of the existing situation

remain available, remedial secession cannot be justified.

Regarding the level of human rights violations required, Dr. Azizi emphasizes the need to distinguish between severe violations and serious but lower-level systematic violations. Severe violations include:

• ethnic cleansing;
• genocide;
• mass killings;
• widespread forced displacement;
• or crimes against humanity.

In such situations, the discussion of remedial secession becomes more serious. However, he notes that some scholars argue that even when violations do not reach the level of genocide, the doctrine may still be considered if there is:

• structural discrimination;
• persistent exclusion from political participation;
• and denial of fundamental rights.

Nevertheless, Dr. Azizi emphasizes that remedial secession has not yet become a clear, definitive, and uncontested rule of international law. According to him, certain legal practices have addressed this issue cautiously.

For example, in the Aaland Islands case, the Commission of Jurists of the League of Nations stated that if the fundamental rights of a group are seriously violated and fair guarantees do not exist, separation might be considered as a last resort. Similarly, certain separate opinions by judges of the International Court of Justice have suggested that international law cannot remain indifferent to systematic repression and grave violations of human rights.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also addressed this issue cautiously in cases such as:

• Katanga;
• Southern Cameroons;
• and Cabinda.

The Commission has generally emphasized that in the absence of grave human rights violations and exclusion from political participation, secession cannot be justified. Instead, solutions such as:

• self-government;
• autonomy;
• federalism;
• confederation;
• or regional participation arrangements

should be prioritized.

Topic 5: De Facto Entities and Human Rights Obligations

• Question: Do de facto or unrecognized entities that exercise effective control over territory and population become subject to human rights obligations?

According to Dr. Azizi, de facto or unrecognized entities—such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Somaliland, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—may exercise practical control over parts of a territory and population, establish governmental institutions, and manage administrative, security, and political affairs in those areas. However, they have not been recognized by the international community as independent states.

The central question is:

If such entities are not parties to international treaties, can they nevertheless be required to comply with human rights obligations?

To answer this question, Dr. Azizi explains that attention must first be given to the mechanisms of human rights monitoring. These mechanisms generally operate through three main pathways.

First: Human Rights Treaty Bodies

The first pathway involves human rights treaty bodies. These institutions monitor the implementation of treaties to which states have become parties. Since de facto entities are generally not recognized as states and are not parties to international treaties, the direct application of treaty obligations to them is difficult.

Second: United Nations Charter-Based Mechanisms

The second pathway consists of mechanisms based on the United Nations Charter, including:

• the Human Rights Council;
• reporting mechanisms;
• and procedures for reviewing human rights situations.

These mechanisms are not limited only to states that are parties to specific treaties and can examine human rights situations in different territories. Therefore, Dr. Azizi argues that even if a de facto entity is not recognized, the human rights situation of people living in that territory may still be subject to examination by international bodies.

Third: Regional Human Rights Systems

The third pathway involves regional human rights systems. In certain regions, courts or commissions may examine the responsibility of states regarding territories over which they exercise effective control, or regarding individuals affected by disputed territorial situations. However, the application of such jurisdiction depends on the structure of each regional system and the legal circumstances of each case.

Therefore, according to Dr. Azizi, the absence of political recognition should not result in the absence of human rights protection. The inhabitants of these territories must continue to enjoy their fundamental rights. Furthermore, in cases involving serious human rights violations or international crimes, the possibility of pursuing individual criminal responsibility also arises.

Dr. Azizi argues that, where jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, leaders, commanders, or officials of de facto entities may face prosecution for crimes such as:

• war crimes;
• crimes against humanity;
• or other international crimes.

Topic 6: Distinguishing Legitimate Secession from Expansionist Intervention

• Question: What tools does international law provide for distinguishing legitimate secession from expansionist intervention?

From Dr. Azizi’s perspective, distinguishing between legitimate secession and expansionist intervention represents one of the most important practical challenges of international law. In many cases, foreign states may claim to support self-determination, minority rights, or the prevention of human rights violations, while in practice pursuing their own geopolitical, expansionist, or strategic objectives. For this reason, international law is highly sensitive regarding foreign intervention in secessionist processes.

He explains that the fundamental principles in this area are the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, states must not use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Likewise, the principle of non-intervention requires states not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs, including disputes related to separatist movements.

Therefore, any separatist movement that is preceded by foreign military, financial, intelligence, or political intervention faces serious challenges regarding its legitimacy under international law. Dr. Azizi further emphasizes that even within the framework of the doctrine of remedial secession, unilateral intervention by foreign states cannot easily be justified.

The central criterion for distinguishing legitimate secession from expansionist intervention is that secession must result from:

• the genuine and free will of the people;
• without external coercion;
• without occupation;
• and without the use of force by a third state.

He also notes that several factors must be examined, including:

• whether widespread and systematic human rights violations exist;
• whether possibilities for internal solutions have been exhausted;
• and whether the claim of secession can be defended according to strict legal standards or merely serves as a cover for foreign intervention.

According to Dr. Azizi, the most appropriate way to reduce misuse is to entrust the assessment of such situations to collective international mechanisms, particularly the United Nations Security Council. Although he acknowledges that the Security Council itself is affected by political considerations, collective assessment remains more defensible than unilateral decisions by individual states.

If every state were allowed to support separatist movements according to its own judgment, the principles of:

• non-use of force;
• territorial integrity;
• and international stability

would be seriously weakened.

Topic 7: Internal Self-Determination

• Question: After the period of decolonization, what does the concept of internal self-determination mean, and what are its main indicators?

From Dr. Azizi’s perspective, internal self-determination means that the people of a country should be able to participate, within the framework of the existing state, in determining their political, economic, social, and cultural systems. Unlike external self-determination, which in colonial contexts may lead to independence and the creation of a new state, internal self-determination focuses on participation, representation, equality, and justice within the existing state structure.

According to him, the main indicators of internal self-determination can be identified as follows:

• The right of people to choose their form of government and constitutional structure;
• The right to equal participation in the administration of public affairs;
• The right to vote and to stand for public office;
• Equal access to public positions and employment;
• The right to freely engage in political activities;
• The right to establish and operate political parties;
• And equal enjoyment of cultural, social, and economic rights.

Dr. Azizi believes that this right is particularly important for multi-ethnic and multicultural societies. If different groups within a country feel that they have no meaningful role in political power, decision-making, resource distribution, or the preservation of their cultural identity, their demands may gradually shift from calls for internal reform toward demands for secession. Therefore, strengthening internal self-determination can serve as a mechanism for preventing identity-based and territorial crises.

However, from his perspective, the position of this right within customary international law has not yet reached the same level of consolidation as external self-determination in colonial contexts. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, particularly in the Nicaragua case, demonstrates that foreign states cannot intervene in the internal affairs of countries under the pretext of supporting democracy or human rights. The people of each country must determine their own political future without foreign interference.

Nevertheless, Dr. Azizi notes that, in recent decades, the international community has become increasingly sensitive to questions of democratic legitimacy. In certain situations, including:

• coups d’état;
• refusal by governments to accept electoral outcomes;
• widespread repression of populations;
• or the clear denial of political participation,

international reactions have become more frequent.

From Dr. Azizi’s perspective, this trend demonstrates that internal self-determination has gained increasing normative importance. However, it has not yet fully developed into a clear customary rule of international law that can be uniformly applied and enforced.

Policy Recommendations

1. Clearly Distinguishing Between Internal and External Self-Determination: Legal and policy analyses should maintain a clear distinction between internal and external self-determination. External self-determination primarily applies in colonial contexts, while internal self-determination concerns political participation, social justice, and equal enjoyment of rights within an existing state. This distinction should be consistently reflected in official documents, diplomatic positions, human rights reports, and media analyses.
2. Avoiding the Extension of Colonial Self-Determination Rules to All Non-Colonial Situations: The rules developed in the context of decolonization should not be applied automatically to claims made by sub-state groups within independent states without considering their specific historical and legal circumstances. Every claim to secession should be evaluated according to the particular conditions of each case. Such assessment should consider:
   1. historical background;
   2. legal status of the territory;
   3. level of political participation;
   4. and the existence or absence of effective internal solutions.
3. Strengthening Internal Self-Determination as a Preventive Mechanism: Guaranteeing equal political participation, preventing discrimination, respecting cultural and linguistic rights, and ensuring fair access to public positions are among the most important tools for preventing separatist crises and strengthening national cohesion. States should develop measurable indicators for evaluating the level of participation, representation, and equal access of different groups to public resources and opportunities.
4. Establishing Dialogue and Internal Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms: Ethnic, linguistic, and regional demands should be addressed through dialogue, decentralization, administrative self-government, stronger local institutions, and guarantees of cultural rights. Creating independent mediation institutions and permanent dialogue mechanisms among central governments, local elites, and civil society representatives can prevent reform-oriented demands from escalating into territorial crises.
5. Preventing Foreign Intervention under the Cover of Self-Determination: Any military, financial, or political support by foreign states for separatist movements may violate the principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity. Support for self-determination should not become a cover for expansionist objectives or the alteration of political borders. In cases of uncertainty, the origins of foreign support, the extent of external control or direction, and possible links with the use of force or territorial occupation should be independently examined.

Conclusion

Overall, from Dr. Azizi’s perspective, the right to self-determination is a multilayered concept that cannot be reduced merely to independence or secession. In colonial contexts, particularly through the framework of external self-determination, this right possesses an established and binding status. The peoples of colonial territories have the right to determine their political status, and this right has become one of the important and fundamental principles of contemporary international law.

However, in non-colonial contexts, the issue becomes considerably more complex. Sub-state groups do not possess a general and primary right to secession merely because of their ethnic, linguistic, religious identity, or the desire of the majority of their members. International law has neither established a general authorization for unilateral secession nor created an absolute prohibition applicable to all cases. This has led to the emergence of theories such as the doctrine of international law’s silence and remedial secession.

From Dr. Azizi’s perspective, remedial secession can only be discussed under highly exceptional circumstances—namely, where:

• widespread human rights violations;
• structural discrimination;
• denial of political participation;
• and the absence of any internal remedy

have been established.

Even in such circumstances, foreign intervention cannot easily be justified, because the risk of states exploiting the language of self-determination for expansionist purposes remains significant.

Ultimately, according to Dr. Azizi, the most important legal and policy solution is strengthening internal self-determination. States that guarantee:

• equal political participation;
• cultural rights;
• social justice;
• non-discrimination;
• and genuine access to public positions,

possess greater internal legitimacy and are better able to protect their territorial integrity.

Therefore, defending territorial integrity can only be sustainable and legitimate when it is accompanied by:

• domestic justice;
• respect for human rights;
• and meaningful participation of all social groups.

In this sense, the challenge of self-determination in contemporary international law is not simply the question of whether states should preserve their borders or whether peoples should achieve independence. Rather, the deeper question is:

How can international law protect both the sovereignty of states and the genuine will of peoples?