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Australia’s Offshore Processing of Asylum Seekers: Nauru and Papua New Guinea at the Centre of Human Rights Challenges

News Report

2026-09-24
Australia’s Offshore Processing of Asylum Seekers: Nauru and Papua New Guinea at the Centre of Human Rights Challenges

© Image: The Boston Globe

Introduction

Australia’s migration and asylum policy has, in recent decades, become one of the most contentious models of border management and human mobility. At the heart of this policy lies the government’s effort to prevent irregular maritime arrivals and to move parts of the processing, accommodation, and resettlement of individuals outside the country’s mainland territory. This approach has transformed migration from a purely administrative matter into an issue closely connected with sovereignty, security, international responsibility, and fundamental human rights.

Although transferring asylum seekers to third countries increases their geographical distance from Australia, it does not eliminate the human consequences of such transfers or the responsibilities arising from government decisions. The continuation of this policy under successive governments also demonstrates that offshore processing has become institutionalised within Australia’s legal and political framework. Support from the two major political parties, the close association of the policy with the discourse of border control, and the establishment of a network of bilateral agreements and private contracts have made fundamental reform difficult.

At the same time, human rights reports have consistently warned of the physical, psychological, livelihood-related, and social consequences of this system. Any assessment of Australia’s policy therefore requires simultaneous consideration of the logic of deterrence, the applicable legal mechanisms, relations with host countries, and the situation of those directly affected by the policy. Recent developments further indicate that the central dispute is no longer confined to the manner in which the policy is implemented; rather, the legitimacy and future of the system of migration externalisation itself have become central to the debate.

 

Incidents

In recent years, arrangements for transferring migrants and asylum seekers to third countries have become one of the principal areas of development in Australia’s migration policy. In this context, judicial and parliamentary proceedings concerning the transfer of individuals to Nauru have continued alongside the publication of numerous reports on the living conditions and medical care of asylum seekers, as well as on the situation of people who remain from the former detention and processing system on Manus Island, in Papua New Guinea. Since the large-scale resumption of offshore processing in 2012, and particularly following the implementation of new arrangements in 2013, human rights organisations have documented numerous cases of death, severe physical and psychological harm, self-harm, and medical crises among people transferred to Nauru and Papua New Guinea[1]. Some of these organisations have reported at least 14 deaths associated with this system since 2013. In addition to those who remain in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, approximately 750 people who were transferred from these two countries to Australia over the years—primarily to receive medical treatment—continue to live there without a clear pathway to permanent residence in Australia[2].

The remoteness of both Nauru and Manus Island limited access to medical care and mental health services. Numerous reports by non-governmental organisations and monitoring bodies have also documented poor living conditions, high levels of psychological distress, and widespread instances of self-harm and attempted suicide, including among children. Despite condemnation of these centres over reports of severe human suffering and violations of individual rights, they formed part of the “stop the boats” policy, which was implemented as a zero-tolerance approach to irregular maritime migration. The policy enjoyed political support among sections of the Australian electorate and, at the same time, was backed by both major parties in government and opposition[3].

  • Regional Processing of Asylum Seekers in Nauru

Under Australia’s regional processing policy, non-citizens who attempt to enter Australia by sea without a valid visa may, depending on the circumstances of their case, be returned to their country of origin or to another country to which they have a right of entry, or transferred to a regional processing country for assessment of their claim for international protection. Nauru is currently the principal country used by Australia for this purpose. Persons transferred under this mechanism are classified under Australian migration law as “Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals” (UMAs), and following their transfer, Nauru assumes responsibility for assessing their protection claims. Australia’s official policy continues to be based on the principle that people who attempt to enter the country by sea without a valid visa will not be settled in Australia[4].

  • Separate Nauru Agreement for the Reception of Members of the NZYQ Cohort

Alongside the regional processing system for asylum seekers, Australia and Nauru established a separate mechanism in 2025 known as the Third Country Reception Arrangement (TCRA). This arrangement applies to individuals who have no lawful right to remain in Australia but whose removal from the country faces practical or legal obstacles, including a number of people commonly referred to as the NZYQ cohort. The term derives from the High Court of Australia’s 2023 judgment in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37, in which the Court held that the continued immigration detention of a person for whom there was no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future was constitutionally impermissible[5].

In February 2025, Australia and Nauru initially entered into an agreement for the reception of three members of this group, who were issued 30-year Long Term Stay Visas by Nauru. Subsequently, on 29 August 2025, the two countries signed a broader Memorandum of Understanding on the Third Country Reception Arrangement. According to information provided by the Australian Department of Home Affairs to the Senate, Nauru is to receive AUD 408 million in the first year, of which AUD 388 million is to be placed in a joint trust fund and AUD 20 million allocated to initial costs. Thereafter, approximately AUD 70 million per year is envisaged over a 30-year period, bringing the nominal value of the total payments to approximately AUD 2.508 billion. This 30-year period refers to the timeframe of the financial arrangements and should not be understood to mean that every person transferred will necessarily remain in Nauru for 30 years. Nor are all members of the NZYQ cohort stateless; their citizenship status and the obstacles to their removal differ[6].

  • Living Conditions of Asylum Seekers Subject to Regional Processing in Nauru

Alongside those transferred under the Third Country Reception Arrangement (TCRA), another group of people currently in Nauru consists of asylum seekers transferred there under the regional processing system. According to The Guardian, some of these asylum seekers have taken up work outside formal employment arrangements, including at petrol stations and construction sites, to supplement their inadequate allowances. One asylum seeker, who asked not to be named, told The Guardian: “We cannot survive on the $230 per fortnight allowance. The money is not enough because everything is expensive here—rice, fish; we cannot buy any fruit here, and internet costs $100 per month. How is it possible to survive[7]?”

Although asylum seekers subject to regional processing receive a periodic allowance to cover part of their day-to-day expenses, reports indicate that, given the high cost of living in Nauru, the amount is insufficient for many of them. Some asylum seekers have reported skipping meals or reducing their food intake in order to manage their expenses. Worse still, food staples sometimes become scarce in Nauru. In August 2026, it was reported that neither rice nor flour had been available in Nauru for more than a month. When rice finally arrived, dozens of asylum seekers queued outside Eigigu Supermarket for more than ten hours to buy some[8]. In this connection, Ian Rintoul, spokesperson for the Refugee Action Coalition, stated: “The unbearable conditions on Naoero are part of a deliberate deterrence strategy by the Australian and Naoero governments trying to drive asylum seekers to return home. Labor is spending hundreds of millions to undermine fundamental human rights, while asylum seekers go hungry[9].”

Maryam, an Iranian asylum seeker who had endured the consequences of Australia’s offshore detention policy for more than a decade, appeared before an Australian Senate inquiry on 5 May 2026 to give evidence. She was first transferred to Nauru in 2013 and was subsequently brought to Australia in 2015 to receive medical treatment. Maryam’s appearance at the hearing provided a rare opportunity to hear directly from someone personally affected by the policy.

At the same time as her testimony, written submissions from a number of people in Nauru were also published, describing violence, theft, threats, hunger, and a lack of effective police protection. Some reported that their allowances were insufficient to buy food, forcing them to skip meals and go to bed hungry. The testimonies also referred to inadequate medical care, difficulties in obtaining medication, recurrent power outages, and food spoilage[10].

  • Transfer of Asylum Seekers to Papua New Guinea

In September 2012, Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) providing for the transfer of asylum seekers from Australia to Papua New Guinea for the processing of their claims. The process commenced in November 2012. In July 2013, the two countries entered into the Regional Resettlement Arrangement (RRA), an overarching framework providing for the processing of asylum claims and the permanent resettlement of refugees in Papua New Guinea. The arrangement was supported by a second Memorandum of Understanding, signed in August 2013. All costs associated with the Regional Resettlement Arrangement were borne by Australia.

Under these arrangements, individuals who arrived by sea without authorisation and were intercepted at sea by Australian authorities were transferred for detention to the Manus Regional Processing Centre. The centre was located in Manus Province, Papua New Guinea, and was closed in 2017[11]. The closure of the Manus Regional Processing Centre, however, did not immediately bring the regional processing arrangements between Australia and Papua New Guinea to an end. Those arrangements formally ceased on 31 December 2021, and from 1 January 2022, responsibility for managing the individuals who remained in Papua New Guinea was transferred to the government of that country.

The Australian Department of Home Affairs has also stated that, following the termination of the regional arrangements, individuals remaining in Papua New Guinea are no longer considered part of Australia’s active regional processing caseload, and the Australian government no longer regularly reports data on their circumstances. Nevertheless, the situation of individuals who were transferred to Manus Island under Australia’s policy and who continue to remain in Papua New Guinea has remained the subject of sustained criticism by refugee rights organisations[12].

In one such case, Hatam Yekta, a 36-year-old refugee from Iran who was first transferred to Manus Island in 2013, was in critical condition at Paradise Hospital in Port Moresby in June 2026. His physical and mental health had deteriorated severely. According to reports, Hatam had been hospitalised at Paradise Hospital for nearly four months. One doctor at the hospital reportedly told another refugee that Hatam might have only a few months left to live[13].

He was ultimately returned to Iran in August 2026. Hatam’s condition and the images published of his physical state once again drew the attention of refugee advocacy organisations to the situation of people who, after being transferred by Australia to Manus Island, had remained in Papua New Guinea for years. According to the Refugee Action Coalition, as of August 2026, 23 refugees and asylum seekers who had been transferred to Manus Island under Australia’s policy remained in Papua New Guinea. The organisation also reported that six of them were suffering from serious illnesses and required urgent transfer to receive medical care[14].

 

Challenges and Responses

  • Institutionalisation of Offshore Processing and the Lack of Any Prospect for Its End

One of the fundamental challenges is that the transfer of asylum seekers to third countries has evolved from a temporary and exceptional measure into an enduring feature of Australia’s migration system. Since 2012, this policy has been implemented by successive Labor and conservative Coalition governments and has also acquired a statutory basis under provisions of the Migration Act 1958[15], which allow for the designation of regional processing countries and the compulsory transfer of unauthorised maritime arrivals to those countries.

The enactment of new legislation concerning third-country reception arrangements and the conclusion of a long-term agreement with Nauru indicate that, rather than being curtailed, the scope of this policy is expanding. As noted at the outset of this report, the Australian Government continues to maintain in its official position that arriving by sea without a valid visa will not result in settlement in Australia.

Support from both major political parties has increased the political cost of retreating from the “stop the boats” policy and reduced the prospects for fundamental reform, as both parties, despite differences in strategy, have sought to contain the political debate over migration. The current political and policy landscape is clearly characterised by coordinated efforts by governments to deter and remove unwanted asylum seekers, accompanied by an evident convergence in policy approaches and narratives[16].

Even the final report of the Australian Senate inquiry, released in July 2026, focused primarily on reforming contractual arrangements, improving financial transparency, and strengthening oversight rather than recommending an end to offshore processing. A call to dismantle the system appeared only in the dissenting report of the Australian Greens. Accordingly, despite widespread human rights criticism, under the current political and legal circumstances there is no significant indication of either a government decision or a parliamentary consensus to bring this practice to an end.

  • Domestic Responses

In its final report, released on 2 July 2026, the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee expressed concern about the transparency and integrity of offshore processing and resettlement arrangements. The Committee stated that many of the concerns raised during the inquiry related to inadequate due diligence in contracting, the value for money provided to taxpayers, and weaknesses in independent oversight. The report emphasised that people subject to these policies should be treated with human dignity and provided with appropriate medical care and decent living conditions.

The Committee warned that the government’s extensive withholding of information, including through claims of public interest immunity, had undermined public confidence and created conditions in which abuse and corruption could occur. It also criticised the expansion and extension of contracts without public disclosure or parliamentary scrutiny, particularly the increase in the value of the MTC Australia contract to more than sixteen times its original amount. The Committee called on the Department of Home Affairs to make information concerning offshore contracts more publicly accessible, subject to commercial confidentiality considerations. It also recommended strengthening mechanisms for assessing contractual integrity and risk, as well as regular and independent audits by the Auditor-General for Australia. The dissenting report of the Australian Greens, however, considered these recommendations insufficient and called for an end to third-country resettlement arrangements and offshore processing in Nauru and Papua New Guinea[17].

The Asylum Seeker Resource Centre (ASRC) also described the Australian Senate inquiry into offshore processing and resettlement arrangements as inadequate in a media release issued on 2 July 2026. The organisation stated that, despite receiving new testimony from whistleblowers and survivors of offshore detention, the Senate inquiry had failed to deliver the truth, accountability, and practical action required. According to the ASRC, the report’s recommendations focused largely on increasing transparency and improving contract management and did not adequately address harms including deaths, self-harm, deteriorating mental health, family separation, and medical neglect.

The Refugee Council of Australia, Refugee Advice and Casework Service, and Human Rights Law Centre likewise characterised the Committee’s recommendations in the same statement as weak and limited. These organisations called for people held offshore to be brought to Australia, for those without viable resettlement options to be provided with an expedited pathway to permanent residence, and for the offshore processing system to be brought to an end. They also called for the termination of contracts underpinning the system and the establishment of a Royal Commission into Immigration Detention, with powers to compel governments, contractors, and corporations to produce documents and give evidence[18].

On 20 July 2026, the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre again strongly criticised the Albanese Government over the conditions faced by asylum seekers transferred to Nauru. Drawing on interviews with 78 of the approximately 91 asylum seekers living in Nauru, the organisation reported that 99 per cent were unable to obtain sufficient food with the allowance they received. It further reported that 68 per cent of those interviewed rarely or never had access to fresh fruit, vegetables, and meat, while 82 per cent lacked easy access to safe, free drinking water.

According to the ASRC, some asylum seekers had been forced to skip meals, reduce portion sizes, or consume discarded and expired food. The organisation contrasted these conditions with the nearly AUD 1 billion spent on offshore detention and processing during the previous financial year. Jana Favero, Deputy CEO of the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, called for clarification as to how this funding had been spent and for private companies operating within the system to be held accountable. She stressed that the Australian Government had failed in its duty of care and had violated the fundamental rights of people it had transferred to Nauru. The statement described food deprivation as further evidence of the physical and psychological consequences of offshore processing and of the need to bring the policy to an end[19].

In a submission to the Australian Senate inquiry on 13 February 2026, Jesuit Social Services likewise expressed deep concern about offshore processing and resettlement arrangements. Drawing on Catholic Social Teaching, the organisation maintained that welcoming strangers and safeguarding the dignity of every person, irrespective of their legal status, were essential principles. It called on the government to use its parliamentary majority to reset Australia’s approach to refugees and asylum seekers on a fair and humane basis.

Its first demand was to end offshore detention and processing and promptly transfer the remaining individuals to Australia. The organisation also called for an end to the prolonged uncertainty faced by asylum seekers through the creation of fair and timely pathways to permanent residence. Other demands included guaranteeing the right to work and study and ensuring access to public services, including healthcare, housing, and financial support. Jesuit Social Services further considered it necessary to increase the capacity of Australia’s Humanitarian Program and expand the existing Community Support Program, which covers most expenses and helps new arrivals integrate into society. Overall, the submission characterised the policy of outsourcing responsibility for asylum seekers as inconsistent with human dignity and called for its replacement with an approach based on settlement in Australia, social support, and secure residency[20].

  • International Responses

At the international level, Australia’s responsibility towards individuals transferred to Nauru under its offshore processing policy has also been considered by United Nations treaty bodies. In its Views concerning a number of these individuals, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, taking into account Australia’s role in their transfer and the significant control and influence it exercised over the operation of the Nauru Regional Processing Centre, rejected Australia’s argument that the individuals’ detention there fell outside its jurisdiction under the Covenant. In some of these cases, the Committee found the individuals’ detention at the Nauru Regional Processing Centre to be arbitrary and in violation of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These Views underscore that transferring individuals to a third country is not, in itself, sufficient to relieve the transferring state of its international responsibility; the degree of power or effective control exercised by that state over the situation of the individuals concerned must also be examined[21].

On 1 March 2026, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a statement entitled “Australia: Offshore Detention Cruel, Costly,” in which it described Australia’s offshore processing policy as violating the rights of asylum seekers and as economically inefficient. The organisation stated that, rather than fulfilling its international obligations towards migrants and refugees, the Australian Government had spent billions of dollars shifting its responsibilities to less-resourced countries. Annabel Hennessy, Australia researcher at Human Rights Watch, emphasised that the policy had caused irreparable harm to asylum seekers and had contributed to the global erosion of refugee rights.

According to figures from the Department of Home Affairs, Australia spent approximately AUD 560 million on offshore processing in Nauru during the 2024–2025 financial year. With approximately 100 people present in the country, the estimated annual cost reached AUD 5.6 million per person. This stands in stark contrast to the approximately AUD 3,962 annual cost of supporting an asylum seeker living in the Australian community on a bridging visa. Human Rights Watch identified community-based case management programs, accompanied by access to legal assistance, housing, and employment, as a less costly and more human-rights-compliant alternative. The organisation ultimately called on the Australian Government to end offshore detention and redirect public resources towards community-based support programs within the country[22].

Amnesty International Australia, in a submission made on 13 February 2026 to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, likewise called for the complete abolition of offshore processing centres and arrangements for the transfer and resettlement of individuals in third countries. The organisation emphasised that such policies violate fundamental human rights and are incompatible with Australia’s obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and other human rights treaties.

Drawing on its own research in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, Amnesty International recalled instances of violence by officials and private contractors, prolonged and indefinite detention, severe psychological harm, and deaths among asylum seekers, and assessed the treatment imposed in Nauru as amounting to torture. The organisation also called for urgent, durable, and human-rights-compliant solutions for individuals affected by the High Court’s decision in NZYQ and for those who continue to remain in Nauru and Papua New Guinea.

Amnesty International warned that transfers to third countries could lead to renewed unlawful detention and further violations of individual rights. It also stressed the need for an independent review of the offshore system, reparations for victims, and accountability for those responsible. In addition, the organisation called for full transparency regarding the costs of the policy and for financial resources to be redirected towards community-based alternatives, legal assistance, and sustainable pathways of protection for asylum seekers[23].

 

Conclusion

The experience of Australia demonstrates that offshore processing has evolved from an exceptional measure for addressing maritime arrivals into an enduring component of migration governance. The entrenchment of this policy in domestic law, support from the two major political parties, and the conclusion of long-term agreements with third countries have enabled it to continue irrespective of changes in government. Under such circumstances, the success of the policy is measured primarily by the reduction in boat arrivals, while its human, financial, and legal costs are pushed to the margins.

The transfer of individuals to remote islands has also resulted in greater isolation for asylum seekers, making it more difficult for observers to publicly scrutinise the consequences, exercise independent oversight, and determine responsibility. Accordingly, the fact that this practice has been given a legal basis within Australia’s domestic system does not necessarily mean that it is legitimate from a human rights perspective or compatible with the country’s international obligations. The gap between the policy’s domestic legal and political foundations, on the one hand, and the challenges it raises in relation to international obligations and human rights, on the other, is one of the most significant issues arising from its continuation.

In the current political landscape, there is no clear indication that the government is prepared, or that there is parliamentary agreement, to bring offshore processing to an end. This does not, however, mean that the policy is permanently resistant to change. Alongside operational and legal challenges, one of the principal obstacles to reform is the political cost of moving away from a deterrence-based approach and the longstanding emphasis placed by both major parties on controlling maritime arrivals.

As long as reforms remain confined to financial transparency, improved contracting, and better management of the centres, the system may become more orderly, but its harmful nature will remain unchanged. Meaningful change requires restoring responsibility for the protection of asylum seekers to the centre of policymaking and ensuring that effectiveness is not assessed solely in terms of border control. The development of community-based pathways, guarantees of independent oversight, and acceptance of responsibility for those transferred could provide a starting point for such change.

Ultimately, the credibility of Australia’s migration policy will depend on its ability to strike a genuine balance between border management, the rule of law, and the protection of human dignity.

 

References

[1] The Human Rights Law Centre. (n.d.). Timeline: Offshore detention. The Human Rights Law Centre. From: https://www.hrlc.org.au/explainers/timeline-offshore-detention/

[2] Refugee Council of Australia. (2026, May 5). Refugee Council calls for end to Offshore Processing amid evidence of harm and lack of accountability. Refugee Council of Australia. From: https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/refugee-council-calls-for-end-to-offshore-processing-amid-evidence-of-harm-and-lack-of-accountability/

[3] Mixed Migration Centre. (2025, November 20). How offshore asylum processing and migration management went global in 2025. Mixed Migration Centre. From: https://mixedmigration.org/publications/mmr/2025/offshore-asylum-processing-and-migration-management/

[4] Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. (n.d.). Regional processing and resettlement. Department of Home Affairs. From: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protection/regional-processing-and-resettlement

[5] High Court of Australia. (2023, November 28). NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37. High Court of Australia. From: https://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases-and-judgments/judgments/judgments-1998-current/nzyq-v-minister-immigration-citizenship-and-multicultural-affairs

[6] Parliament of Australia. (2026, July 2). Offshore processing and resettlement arrangements: Chapter 2 – Australia’s offshore processing and resettlement arrangements. Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee. From: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Offshoreprocessing2025/Report/Chapter_2_-_Australias_offshore_processing_and_resettlement_arrangements

[7] Doherty, B., & Basford Canales, S. (2025, December 4). ‘Day by day I lose weight’: asylum seekers on Nauru get $115 a week, but a bag of grapes costs $20. The Guardian. From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/04/nauru-australia-offshore-processing-asylum-seekers-conditions-hunger-declining-health

[8] Refugee Action Coalition. (2026, August 26). Twenty-five years after Tampa: Naoero engulfed by another humanitarian crisis. Refugee Action Coalition. From: https://refugeeaction.org.au/?p=16910

[9] Refugee Action Coalition. (2026, August 7). Nauru food crisis worsens after power blackouts. Refugee Action Coalition. From: https://refugeeaction.org.au/?p=16899

[10] ASRC. (2026, May 5). Senate Inquiry into offshore processing unearths damning testimony from people detained on Nauru. ASRC. From: https://asrc.org.au/2026/05/05/senate-inquiry-into-offshore-processing/

[11] Asylum insight. (2025, March 3). Papua New Guinea Arrangement. Asylum insight. From: https://www.asyluminsight.com/papua-new-guinea-arrangement

[12] Parliament of Australia. (2026, July 2). Offshore processing and resettlement arrangements: Chapter 2 – Australia’s offshore processing and resettlement arrangements. Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee. From: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Offshoreprocessing2025/Report/Chapter_2_-_Australias_offshore_processing_and_resettlement_arrangements

[13] Refugee Action Coalition. (2026, June 16). Urgent medevac needed for PNG refugee. Refugee Action Coalition. From: https://refugeeaction.org.au/?p=16888

[14] Refugee Action Coalition. (2026, August 25). Sick refugee Hatam Yekta returned to Iran, six more need urgent help. Refugee Action Coalition. From: https://refugeeaction.org.au/?p=16905

[15] The Australian Government. (2026, June 4). Migration Act 1958. The Australian Government. From: https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1958A00062/latest/text

[16] Margherita, M., & Tamara, T., & Philomena, M. (2023). Is Australia a Model for the UK? A Critical Assessment of Parallels of Cruelty in Refugee Externalization Policies. Journal of Refugee Studies, 36(2), 271–293. From: https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fead016

[17] Parliament of Australia. (2026, July 2). Offshore processing and resettlement arrangements. Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee. Parl info. From: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportsen/RB000760/toc_pdf/Offshoreprocessingandresettlementarrangements.pdf

[18] ASRC. (2026, July 2). MEDIA RELEASE: Offshore Inquiry adds to evidence of the harm caused by offshore detention, but leaves secrets buried. ASRC. From: https://asrc.org.au/2026/07/02/secrets-stay-buried/

[19] ASRC. (2026, July 20). MEDIA RELEASE: 99% of people seeking asylum Australia has transferred to Nauru are not able to access enough food. ASRC. From: https://asrc.org.au/2026/07/20/media-release-99-of-people-seeking-asylum-australia-has-transferred-to-nauru-are-not-able-to-access-enough-food/

[20] Jesuit Social Services. (2026, February 13). Submission to Inquiry into Offshore Processing. Jesuit Social Services. From: https://jss.org.au/policy-submissions/submission-to-inquiry-into-offshore-processing/

[21] United Nations Human Rights Committee. (2025, January 23). Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2749/2016, M.I. et al. v. Australia, CCPR/C/142/D/2749/2016. United Nations. From: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4073261

[22] HRW. (2026, March 1). Australia: Offshore Detention Cruel, Costly. HRW. From: https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/02/australia-offshore-detention-cruel-costly

[23] Amnesty International Australia. (2026, February 13). Submission to Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee inquiry into offshore processing and resettlement arrangements. Amnesty International Australia. From: https://www.amnesty.org.au/submission-offshore-processing-and-resettlement-arrangements/

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