Rasool Mogooei
PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of Isfahan
Introduction
The report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, A/HRC/63/61, dated 18 September 2026, dedicates part of its findings concerning the consequences of the armed conflict that began on 28 February 2026 to the impact of military operations on civilians. Among the incidents examined, the attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab and the attack on the Lamerd Sports Hall are of particular significance, as both incidents resulted in civilian casualties and damage; however, the central legal issue arising from each incident is not identical. A proper understanding of the report requires, above all, recognizing this distinction.
The legal assessment of an attack does not end with the question of whether the munition struck the designated point. The legality of an attack is the product of a chain of decisions: information concerning the target must be collected and updated; its military or civilian status must be verified; the means and methods of attack must be appropriate to the operational environment; and the foreseeable effects of the attack on civilians must be assessed and, to the extent possible, minimized. From this perspective, the Minab case primarily concerns the reliability of intelligence and the accuracy of target identification, whereas the Lamerd case raises the issue of the choice of munition and the ability to limit its effects.
In this regard, the central question of this note is what relationship the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission establish between target identification, the quality of targeting intelligence, the selection of munitions, and legal responsibility in relation to these two attacks. The main argument is that the technical accuracy of a weapons system, by itself, is not the legal standard for determining the lawfulness of an attack; rather, responsibility may arise at any stage of the decision-making process, from reliance on outdated targeting intelligence to the selection of means of attack whose effects cannot be adequately controlled. Nevertheless, the findings of a fact-finding mission do not constitute a criminal conviction of identified individuals, and a distinction must be maintained between the establishment of a violation, the international responsibility of a State, and individual criminal responsibility.
Legal Framework for Assessing Attacks
To understand the two cases, it is first necessary to clarify their shared legal framework. The principle of distinction requires parties to an armed conflict to differentiate between civilians and combatants, as well as between civilian objects and military objectives. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and the obligation to take feasible precautions complement this principle. In paragraph 123 of its report, the Mission identifies the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law as the framework for its assessment. These principles have also been recognized as customary rules in the study of Customary International Humanitarian Law conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Within this framework, a military objective is a narrowly defined concept that depends on the circumstances prevailing at the time of attack. Under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, an object may be considered a military objective only if, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action and if its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Both conditions must be satisfied simultaneously. Therefore, mere proximity to a military facility or the previous military use of a building is not, by itself, sufficient to alter its legal status.
Furthermore, where doubt exists as to the status of an object normally dedicated to civilian purposes, the presumption must be in favor of maintaining its civilian character. Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol I provides that in cases of doubt as to whether an object normally used for civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed that it is not being so used (ICRC, 1977). This rule is particularly significant in relation to places such as schools, because mere prior military use, proximity to military installations, or allegations of previous use, without sufficient evidence, cannot by themselves alter their legal status.
This same criterion provides the point of connection between the two incidents. In Minab, the school operated in buildings that had previously formed part of a military facility; however, at the time of the attack, the premises had a separate perimeter, a dividing wall, a dedicated entrance, and access from a public street. Signs, children’s drawings, playground areas, and educational activities also indicated the school’s civilian function (McClure & Parent, 2026). With regard to the Lamerd Sports Hall, the report similarly emphasizes physical separation, evidence of children’s sporting activities, and the absence of information indicating military use. These indicators are significant for determining the legal status of the structures, because the assessment must focus on their actual function at the time of the attack, rather than merely their historical or geographical connection.
Two conclusions follow from this legal premise. First, the civilian character of a building is not removed merely because of its proximity to military facilities, and the military significance of surrounding buildings does not automatically extend to the entire complex. Second, the existence of a possible military objective in an area does not exempt the attacking party from assessing the effects of the selected means of attack on the civilian environment. The Minab case primarily relates to the first conclusion, while the Lamerd case primarily concerns the second. Accordingly, treating the legal basis of these two incidents as identical would conceal the important distinction between an error in target identification and an error in the selection of the means of attack.
Nevertheless, the educational or sporting function of a building does not amount to absolute immunity against any possible change in its status. If a structure is genuinely used for military action and meets the conditions of a military objective, its legal status may change. However, such a change must be established on the basis of reliable information and cannot be inferred merely from proximity to a military base or previous ownership. The obligations of the party controlling the area to protect civilians constitute a separate issue, and any possible violation of those obligations does not remove the attacking party’s duties regarding distinction and precautions.
Minab and the Reliability of Targeting Intelligence
In the Minab case, the central question is not whether the missile struck the designated coordinates or deviated from its intended path. The Mission concluded that the school building itself was the intended point of impact and that its destruction was not merely collateral damage resulting from an attack against a nearby military facility. Therefore, rather than proving the lawfulness of the attack, the accuracy of the strike raises a more fundamental question: why was a building that displayed clear signs of educational use at the time of the attack still treated as having a military character in the targeting process? The answer to this question depends on the quality of the underlying data and the mechanisms used to verify it.
The obligation to take all feasible precautions is not limited to the moment of firing. Article 57 of Additional Protocol I encompasses the assessment of the nature of the target, the choice of means and methods of attack, the reduction of foreseeable harm, and the cancellation or suspension of an attack if it becomes apparent that the target has been incorrectly identified (ICRC, 1977). The term “feasible” refers to measures that are practically possible in the circumstances prevailing at the time, taking into account both humanitarian and military considerations. The intelligence and technological capabilities of the attacking party also influence the scope of these measures: advanced technology does not create an obligation to know the impossible, but it does expand the ability to review, compare, and update information within the legal assessment.
According to the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission, the attribution of the attack to the United States of America was not based on a single piece of evidence. The report considered, collectively, the identification of the Tomahawk missile, the operational area of the parties, publicly available information concerning the preliminary investigations conducted by the United States military, and statements made by the Commander of the United States Central Command. At the same time, the report notes that the Mission’s requests for information from the United States had remained unanswered by the time the document was finalized. This body of information constituted the basis for attribution under the evidentiary standard applied by the Mission; however, it should not be equated with acceptance of the report’s legal conclusions by the concerned State.
The central legal argument of the report concerns the apparent reliance on data that reflected the previous status of the building and failed to capture its subsequent educational use. In paragraph 124, the Mission considers updating information and acting on the basis of current intelligence as part of the obligation to take feasible precautions, and concludes that the obligation to verify the status of the target was not fulfilled. Under this reasoning, the alleged deficiency was not simply an error in recording coordinates. The coordinates may have been accurate, but the information that determined the meaning and significance of those coordinates for decision-makers may have lost its temporal validity.
This distinction makes the analytical dimensions of the case clearer. Targeting intelligence is not merely a geographical location; rather, it consists of a collection of information concerning the object’s function, users, validity period, and indicators that either support or contradict its classification. Therefore, an assessment of the legality of an attack must include the origin and history of the data, the time of its latest review, the existence of indicators inconsistent with the previous classification, the availability of new information, and the manner in which such information was transmitted to decision-makers. The report does not reconstruct every link in this chain, but its emphasis on the necessity of updating information demonstrates that legal responsibility may arise before the moment of attack, namely at the stage of information management and assessment.
The casualty figures must also be presented while preserving the distinction between different sources. The report cites the official figure of 156 fatalities, including 120 students, and, in contrast, independent information indicating 157 fatalities, including 123 children. These two sets of figures should not be combined into a single number through selective choice or numerical consolidation. Nevertheless, the Mission’s reasoning regarding a violation of the obligation to verify the target does not depend solely on the scale of casualties; rather, the principal basis of the analysis consists of evidence concerning the school’s function and the measures that could have reasonably been undertaken before the attack to verify that function.
Consequently, Minab illustrates the distinction between the accuracy of a weapons system and the accuracy of a decision. A munition may reach precisely the point at which it was programmed to strike, but if the classification of that point is based on outdated information or inadequate verification, technical accuracy cannot prevent a legal violation. Applying the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, the Mission examined this deficiency in relation to the attack against a civilian object and its characterization as a war crime. This standard is used for fact-finding purposes and is not equivalent to establishing the criminal guilt of a specific individual in criminal proceedings.
Lamerd and the Issue of Limiting the Effects of Munitions
The Lamerd case begins from a different point. Even assuming that a military objective existed within the area, the question remains whether the means and method selected for the attack could have limited their effects within that environment. The report refers to an airburst detonation of munitions above the sports complex and its surrounding area, damage to a school and residential buildings, and extensive effects of projectile fragments on surfaces. The figure of 22 fatalities, cited from local sources, relates to the series of attacks in that area and should not be interpreted as meaning that all victims were necessarily inside the sports hall.
The identification of the munition and the attribution of the attack remain contested issues. According to the report, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) rejected responsibility for the attack against the sports complex and the adjacent school on 31 March 2026, and considered the type of munition visible in the images to be more consistent with the Iranian Hoveyzeh missile (CENTCOM, 2026). In contrast, the Mission concluded, based on the shape of the missile, the pattern of the explosion, and the impact effects, that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a munition identified by the Mission as a Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) had been used. On the basis of this identification, together with other operational information, the Mission attributed the attack to the United States of America.
The report explains that the precision-guided surface-to-surface missile used in the Lamerd attack produces an airburst detonation that disperses approximately 180,000 tungsten pellets over a wide area. Nevertheless, the report emphasizes that the precise damage radius of this type of missile has not been publicly disclosed and that the estimates relied upon by the Mission indicate radii of approximately 50 and 170 meters (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2026).
The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks does not only concern attacks that are not directed against a specific military objective. The use of a means or method of warfare whose effects, in the particular circumstances of an operation, cannot be sufficiently limited in accordance with the requirements of international humanitarian law so as to preserve the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects may raise the issue of an indiscriminate attack. For this reason, the technical precision or guidance system of a weapon does not, by itself, provide a complete answer to the legal question. Accuracy in reaching a designated point and the ability to control effects after detonation are two separate elements that must be assessed independently.
The Mission analyzed the Lamerd attack on precisely this basis in paragraphs 127 and 128 of its report (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2026). Its conclusion concerns the manner in which the munition was used in an environment containing civilians and civilian objects, rather than declaring the PrSM system inherently and absolutely prohibited. This qualification is important in understanding the scope of the conclusion: a weapon may be lawful in certain circumstances, while its use in a particular environment, considering the scale of its effects and the possibility of controlling them, may be assessed as unlawful.
This analysis should not be confused with the principle of proportionality. Proportionality requires a comparison between the expected incidental harm to civilians and the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. By contrast, the principal reasoning of the report concerning Lamerd focuses on whether the effects of the munition could, in the circumstances, have been adequately limited. Without sufficient information regarding the alleged military objective and the expected military advantage, reducing the case to a hypothetical calculation between civilian casualties and the value of the target would lack a reliable basis and could divert attention from the central issue: the selection of the means and method of attack.
Ultimately, Lamerd demonstrates that the assessment of the legality of an attack must go beyond the technical or promotional characteristics of a weapon. The term “precision” generally describes guidance capability, not necessarily the extent of explosive effects. If the effects of a munition cannot be controlled after reaching the intended point of impact in a civilian environment, guidance accuracy alone cannot satisfy the requirements of distinction and precautions. From this perspective, the decision regarding the type of munition is as much a component of legal assessment as the decision regarding the coordinates of the target.
From Violations of Rules to Legal Responsibility
After clarifying the distinction between Minab and Lamerd, it is necessary to differentiate between various levels of responsibility. A violation of a rule of international humanitarian law, the international responsibility of a State, individual criminal responsibility, and the characterization of conduct as a war crime are related concepts, but they involve different evidentiary requirements. At the level of State responsibility, the central issues are attribution of conduct and breach of an international obligation. At the criminal level, the conduct, role, and mental state of specific individuals must be established in accordance with the elements of the offence. Proof at one level does not automatically substitute for the requirements applicable at another level.
In this context, the distinction between mistake, negligence, and recklessness with respect to risk is of fundamental importance. The term “mistake” merely describes an incorrect perception of facts and does not, by itself, determine its cause or legal consequences. A mistake that occurs despite the performance of all feasible verification measures is not equivalent to a mistake resulting from the failure to undertake available measures. Therefore, the characterization of an incident as an “intelligence error” neither automatically excludes responsibility nor, by itself, suffices to establish a war crime.
The term “recklessness” should also not be translated without qualification simply as “carelessness” or “negligence”, because such terms may encompass both ordinary lack of diligence and the conscious acceptance of risk. In this note, the expression “recklessness with regard to risk” is used in order to distinguish it from ordinary negligence. Likewise, the concept of dolus eventualis refers to a situation in which a person foresees the possibility of a result occurring and nevertheless continues the conduct despite that possibility. The precise relationship between these concepts and the elements of each offence must be assessed within the framework of the relevant legal system and the specific criminal charge concerned.
The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case of Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, when interpreting the intentional element of the crime of attacking civilians, held that this concept also encompasses recklessness; namely, a situation in which the perpetrator, without certainty that the consequence would occur, accepted the possibility that it might occur (ICTY, 2003). However, mere negligence or the absence of foresight regarding the outcome is insufficient to establish this mental element. This judgment is significant in demonstrating the distinction between negligence and the acceptance of risk, but it should not be applied as a uniform rule to all criminal offences or all legal systems.
In paragraph 125 of its report, the Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the conduct of the United States of America in targeting the Minab school building went beyond mere negligence and involved a mental element of recklessness with regard to risk; an element which the report describes as closely related to dolus eventualis or the conscious acceptance of risk (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2026). Its reasoning is based on the combination of apparent reliance on outdated information, visible indicators of the building’s educational function, and statements by senior United States officials concerning the requirements of international humanitarian law. On this basis, the Mission inferred the existence of awareness of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object and a reckless disregard for the realization of that risk.
Nevertheless, transferring this reasoning from the fact-finding stage to individual criminal proceedings requires additional evidence. General statements by officials may constitute contextual evidence, but they cannot replace proof of the information available to a particular decision-maker and the decisions taken by that person. The public visibility of indicators demonstrating the school’s function does not necessarily amount to actual knowledge by every individual within the decision-making chain. The target file, records of intelligence reviews, possible warnings, the transmission of information, and the role of each decision-maker are essential for judicial assessment of such a conclusion; evidence which the Mission did not claim to have fully accessed.
The criminal characterization of an indiscriminate attack also requires precision. Rule 156 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law provides that launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects may constitute a war crime where the other conditions of criminal responsibility are satisfied (ICRC, n.d.). In such an assessment, the nature of the attack, civilian consequences, causal relationship, nexus with the armed conflict, and mental element must each be established separately. The severity of damage and the number of casualties are relevant, but they cannot, by themselves, replace the examination of the required mental element.
The criminal formulations contained in different legal instruments are not entirely identical. Article 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions considers the launching of an indiscriminate attack that strikes the civilian population or civilian objects and causes death, injury, or damage of the type specified in the Article to constitute a grave breach. (ICRC, 1977). However, the establishment of criminal responsibility requires the determination of all other material and mental elements of the offence within the framework of the relevant legal system.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court does not provide for an independent criminal category using the general expression “indiscriminate attack”. Nevertheless, depending on the characteristics of the attack and the perpetrator’s mental element, such conduct may fall within specific categories of crimes listed in Article 8. This provision criminalizes, in separate paragraphs, intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to education that are not military objectives, and intentionally launching an attack with knowledge that the incidental damage to civilians or civilian objects would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. Furthermore, Article 30 establishes that, unless otherwise provided, the material elements of a crime must be committed with intent and knowledge for criminal responsibility to arise (ICC, 1998).
Accordingly, the Mission’s conclusion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a war crime has been committed must be understood within the limits of the function of that report. This conclusion is neither insignificant nor equivalent to the criminal conviction of specific individuals. In Minab, the criminal analysis is based on the risk arising from the misidentification of the target and reliance on outdated information; whereas in Lamerd, it concerns the choice of munition and the disregard of the possible effects of that munition in a civilian environment. The distinction between these two analytical paths must be preserved in any subsequent investigation.
At the level of State responsibility, establishing the criminal intent of an individual is not a general prerequisite. If conduct is attributable to a State and an international obligation has been breached, the consequences of responsibility may include the cessation of an ongoing wrongful act, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition where appropriate, and full reparation for the harm caused. Therefore, consideration of reparation should not be postponed until the conclusion of individual criminal proceedings or treated as identical to them; just as reparation does not replace criminal accountability for individuals who meet the relevant conditions.
Conclusion
The legal examination of the two cases demonstrates that the central issue in the report is not merely the lethal outcome of two attacks, but rather the quality of the decisions taken before the munitions struck their targets. In Minab, the focus of the analysis is how a building displaying indicators of educational use remained classified as a military objective in the targeting process on the basis of apparently outdated information. In Lamerd, the issue is whether the effects of the selected munition could be assessed and limited within an environment containing civilians and civilian objects. This distinction determines the legal structure of each case and the type of evidence required for its assessment.
The analytical conclusion emerging from these two incidents is that the assessment of responsibility should not be reduced to the moment of firing or the accuracy of impact. The temporal validity of intelligence, the examination of contradictory indicators, the process of target classification, the selection of the type of munition, and knowledge of its effects constitute interconnected components of an operational decision. A deficiency at any of these stages may affect the legality of an attack. Conversely, the occurrence of extensive civilian casualties alone does not establish all requirements of individual criminal responsibility, particularly the mental element and the role of a specific person.
Therefore, the principal value of the report lies in transforming broad allegations into specific questions requiring investigation and accountability: What information formed the basis of the attack? When and how was that information reviewed? What indicators contradicted the classification of the target? How were the effects of the munition anticipated? And which individuals played a role in the final decision? Evidence-based answers to these questions are necessary both for judicial assessment of the Mission’s findings and for transforming the principles of distinction and precautions into operational practices capable of evaluation. Independent investigations, disclosure of the results of internal reviews, and reparation for victims should all be based on this careful distinction between stages of decision-making and levels of responsibility.
References
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- United Nations Human Rights Council. (2026, September 18). Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/63/61, advance edited version), para. 125. United Nations Human Rights Council. From: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session63/a-hrc-63-61-aev.pdf
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- United States Central Command. (2026, March 31). CENTCOM Refutes Media Claims of U.S. Strikes in Lamerd, Iran. CENTCOM. From: https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4448978/centcom-refutes-media-claims-of-us-strikes-in-lamerd-iran/
