Specialized Interview with Karen Hulme, Professor at the University of Essex: Human Rights on Trial in the War Against Iran (Episode 3: Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict)

The consequences of armed conflicts extend far beyond human casualties, the destruction of buildings, and direct damage to civilian infrastructure. Warfare can also transform the environment into a major domain of harm, with impacts that may be immediately visible or may emerge over years and even generations through air, water, and soil contamination, ecosystem degradation, and damage to natural resources. In this context, a fundamental question arises: to what extent is international humanitarian law capable of protecting the environment during armed conflicts, and are the existing legal rules sufficient to address the nature and scale of environmental harm resulting from contemporary warfare?

One of the central challenges in this field concerns the legal status of the environment within the framework of the law of armed conflict. The environment is primarily protected through rules governing the protection of civilian objects and restrictions on the methods and means of warfare. However, certain forms of environmental damage benefit from specific protection only when they reach the exceptionally high threshold of being “widespread, long-term, and severe.” At the same time, attacks against energy infrastructure, oil facilities, gas installations, and particularly nuclear facilities raise complex questions concerning the principles of proportionality and precautions in attack, as well as the assessment of indirect, long-term, and transboundary consequences of military operations.

Recent armed conflicts, from the war in Ukraine to hostilities involving Iran, have once again placed these issues at the center of international legal debates. Attacks on critical infrastructure, the risk of widespread pollution, the cascading effects on public health and the environment, the challenges of documenting environmental harm during ongoing conflicts, and the limitations of existing mechanisms for holding states and individuals accountable demonstrate that environmental protection in armed conflicts is not merely an ecological concern. Rather, it lies at the intersection of international humanitarian law, the law on the use of force, international criminal law, state responsibility, and international environmental law.

These issues are among the central concerns of the specialized interview series Human Rights on Trial in the War Against Iran, an academic initiative of the Human Rights Institute of the University of Isfahan (HRIUI). Through conversations with academics, international lawyers, and experts in relevant fields, the series explores the legal, humanitarian, and human dimensions of the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran, as well as the challenges this conflict presents to the international legal order.

Within this framework, Professor Karen Hulme, Professor of Law at the University of Essex and a leading scholar in the field of international law and environmental protection during armed conflicts, examines the legal status of the environment under the law of armed conflict and the challenges of ensuring its protection in contemporary warfare. The discussion addresses the threshold of “widespread, long-term, and severe” environmental damage, the protection of the environment against military attacks, the consequences of attacks on oil and gas infrastructure and nuclear facilities, the role of proportionality and precautions in attack, the documentation of environmental harm, post-conflict responsibility, and the need to strengthen existing legal frameworks. Underlying these issues is a fundamental question: as contemporary warfare produces environmental consequences that may be extensive, irreversible, and intergenerational, to what extent has international law succeeded in balancing military necessity with the imperative of protecting the environment and future generations?

Interview Details

• Interviewer: Mahdi Baeidi Nejad | PhD Student in International Relations, University of Isfahan
• Interviewee: Professor Karen Hulme | Professor of Law, University of Essex
• Date of Interview: Wednesday, 29 April 2026
• Main Topics:

1. The Environment under the Law of Armed Conflict
2. The “Widespread, Long-Term and Severe” Threshold: An Excessively Stringent Standard?
3. Attacks on Energy Infrastructure: Proportionality, Collateral Damage, and Environmental Impacts
4. Nuclear Facilities in War: The Boundary between Military Objectives and Civilian Objects
5. Proportionality and Intergenerational Risks in Attacks on Nuclear Facilities
6. Slow Violence: Cumulative and Long-Term Environmental Harm
7. Documenting and Attributing Environmental Damage during Armed Conflict
8. Accountability for Environmental Damage
9. Post-War Environmental Restoration
10. The Future of Environmental Protection in War

Note: In order to preserve academic independence and diversity of perspectives, it should be emphasized that the opinions expressed in this interview reflect solely the personal views of the interviewee and do not necessarily imply endorsement or adoption of a position by the Human Rights Institute of the University of Isfahan.

Interview Summary

Topic 1: The Environment under the Law of Armed Conflict

• Question: How should environmental protection be conceptualized within the framework of the law of armed conflict? Should it be understood as part of the protection of civilians and civilian objects, regarded primarily as an ecological concern, or should the environment be treated as a distinct legal category entitled to special protection?

In responding to this question, Professor Hulme takes as her starting point the existing structure of the law of armed conflict and the way in which it defines what is protected. In her view, if the issue were considered solely from the perspective of environmental law, the ideal would be for the environment to have its own legal regime as a distinct ecological entity. Within the current framework of the law of armed conflict, however, she does not consider such a model realistic. Professor Hulme explains that specific rules of armed conflict have developed at least since the 1950s and, in a broader sense, since 1907 and even earlier. Fundamentally changing this structure would therefore be extremely difficult, and she believes that states would not readily agree to the creation of a third, independent legal category for the environment. Environmental protection must consequently be analyzed largely within the existing dichotomy between military objectives and civilian objects.

Within this structure, anything that is not a military objective, or does not meet the criteria for falling within the definition of a military objective, is by definition a civilian object. In her view, the concept of “civilian” may not seem entirely appropriate or sufficient to convey the environment’s particular status and importance. Nevertheless, under present conditions, this framework remains one of the principal legal means of protecting the environment during armed conflict. As long as an element of the environment does not fall within the definition of a military objective, it retains civilian status and the protections that flow from it. To explain this position, Professor Hulme also draws on the development of environmental law in peacetime. She notes that many peacetime environmental protections initially developed within other branches of law, including tort law and, in some instances, criminal law. The fact that the environment receives protection through another branch of law therefore does not necessarily mean that it is afforded either less or more protection. Ultimately, in her view, the central question is how far the potential of existing rules can be used to protect the environment effectively within the current legal framework.

Topic 2: The “Widespread, Long-Term and Severe” Threshold: An Excessively Stringent Standard?

• Question: International humanitarian law establishes a high threshold of “widespread, long-term and severe” environmental damage. Given the nature of environmental damage in contemporary wars, and particularly the recent attacks on energy infrastructure in Iran, does this threshold remain appropriate and adequate for addressing real and tangible environmental harm?

Professor Hulme explains that legal scholars have debated the adequacy of this threshold, and the need to lower it, for several decades. An important feature of the standard is that all three elements—“widespread,” “long-term,” and “severe”—must be met cumulatively, making the threshold very difficult to reach. She explains that, although there is no formally agreed definition of each element, an understanding has developed in practice whereby “widespread” may refer to damage extending over hundreds of square kilometers, “severe” requires very serious or significant damage, and “long-term” has generally been understood to mean damage lasting for decades, rather than merely one or two seasons. The threshold is therefore very high.

In Professor Hulme’s view, the height of the threshold is partly attributable to the rationale underlying the provision. The rule effectively establishes an “absolute ceiling of harm”: even if a particular level of damage could be justified under an ordinary proportionality assessment, it must not exceed that absolute ceiling. The stringency of the standard can therefore be explained, in part, by its function. Nevertheless, she emphasizes that she and many colleagues working in this field have regarded the threshold as inadequate for years and have, in practice, largely moved away from relying primarily on this provision. In her view, only a truly exceptional and extremely serious incident might now meet the threshold.

One of the few examples in which she considers it arguable that this standard has been met is the attack on the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine. Even here, however, there is a complication: the environment has the capacity to recover and regenerate. If the legal standard requires proof of long-term damage, the onset of environmental recovery may raise questions about whether this element has been satisfied. Professor Hulme notes that signs of natural regeneration have also been observed in some affected areas of Ukraine. In her view, therefore, although the “widespread, long-term and severe” threshold is too high and has failed to realize its full potential to protect the environment, changing it would be difficult without the support of states. Academics, and even the International Committee of the Red Cross, can put forward proposals, but international law ultimately rests to a considerable extent on state practice. For this reason, many specialists have, in practice, turned their attention to using other rules of armed conflict to protect the environment.

Topic 3: Attacks on Energy Infrastructure: Proportionality, Collateral Damage, and Environmental Impacts

• Question: Attacks on oil storage facilities, gas facilities, and other energy infrastructure can cause long-term pollution and have serious effects on public health and the environment. How should international law and international humanitarian law assess such attacks in terms of the principle of proportionality, collateral damage, and immediate and long-term environmental risks?

Professor Hulme begins by distinguishing between two questions: first, how international law currently assesses the risks arising from attacks on energy infrastructure; and second, how that assessment ought to be conducted. She explains that attacks on oil infrastructure and, in many cases, chemical facilities have occurred in numerous conflicts. Smoke from the destruction of these facilities can contain hazardous chemicals, cause air pollution, and have both short-term and long-term effects on human health. If oil pollution enters the marine environment, it can also produce reverberating effects: fish and other marine organisms may initially suffer harm, which can then affect humans through the food chain. Professor Hulme observes that these types of long-term effects have been seen in many armed conflicts involving attacks on energy infrastructure. Existing law, however, does not provide special protection specifically for oil storage facilities or gas facilities. The International Committee of the Red Cross has suggested that some of these facilities might be brought within the scope of rules protecting installations such as nuclear power plants and other facilities whose destruction could lead to the release of hazardous substances. In Professor Hulme’s view, however, state practice has not yet reached the point of accepting such an interpretation. Under the current framework, these facilities may be attacked if they meet the criteria for a military objective. In such cases, their principal protection comes from the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack. The effects of an attack on civilians, nearby civilian infrastructure, and the environment are assessed as collateral damage, and military commanders must weigh this potential damage against the military advantage expected from attacking the target in question.

Professor Hulme identifies a fundamental difficulty in this balancing exercise: the two sides of the equation are not commensurable. On one side are environmental damage and harm to civilians; on the other is the potential military advantage. In her view, these considerations are not readily commensurable. Nevertheless, she believes that there is greater scope today than there was fifty years ago, or even during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, to argue that the environment should carry more weight in this calculation, particularly where the military advantage consists merely of disabling energy infrastructure. Another important issue, in her view, concerns the reverberating and delayed effects of damage. Military forces generally calculate immediate damage but are less likely to consider consequences that may emerge several years later. For example, they may not examine how marine pollution caused by an attack could subsequently affect the genetic makeup of fish, the survival of other species, or the food chain.

Professor Hulme explains that one effort made in engagement with military forces has been to encourage them to look one, two, or even three steps ahead when assessing the consequences of an attack. Military forces generally argue, however, that such consequences are difficult to foresee and that other intervening factors, such as cleanup operations by the affected state, may alter the course of the damage. Nevertheless, in her view, military assessments must, as far as possible, also take account of consequences beyond the immediate effects of an attack. Later in this part of the discussion, Professor Hulme emphasized that damage to energy infrastructure and the environment is not necessarily confined to the territory of the state under attack. Given the interconnectedness of the global economy, trade in food, and the movement of resources between countries, environmental harm can have transboundary and even intergenerational effects, ultimately affecting the attacking state as well.

Topic 4: Nuclear Facilities in War: The Boundary between Military Objectives and Civilian Objects

• Question: Given that attacks on nuclear facilities can create a risk of radiological contamination and environmental consequences extending beyond national borders, is the current framework of international law adequate to address such risks? In particular, how does international law distinguish between civilian nuclear facilities and facilities that may serve a military function?

Professor Hulme’s short answer to this question is “probably not.” To explain her position, she again refers to the experience of Ukraine and to attacks or hostilities in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. She explains that the starting point for the legal analysis is to determine whether the nuclear facility in question constitutes a military objective. If a facility is clearly engaged in producing weapons, ammunition, plutonium, or uranium for military use, it may fall within the definition of a military objective. In such circumstances, once the military nature of the facility has been established, other rules, including the principle of proportionality, enter into the assessment.

Professor Hulme then refers to the provisions of Additional Protocol I concerning the protection of certain dangerous installations. She makes clear, however, that these provisions were not applicable as treaty law in the conflict involving Iran, because Iran, Israel, and the United States have not ratified that particular treaty. Nevertheless, in her view, aspects of these protections have acquired the status of customary international law, and state practice indicates that certain restrictions on attacks against nuclear facilities have been accepted as customary rules. Regarding the specific facilities in Iran, Professor Hulme refrains from taking a position on their military or civilian character, citing the lack of sufficient factual information to make such an assessment. In her view, if a facility is actually used to produce weapons, the question of its status as a military objective is different; if, however, it is simply a civilian power plant generating electricity for the national grid, its legal position is entirely different.

In this context, she refers to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. According to her, the plant was not used to produce nuclear weapons; its function was to generate electricity for the national grid. Nevertheless, it was attacked, or exposed to attacks in its vicinity, during the conflict. Professor Hulme considers that, in such cases, it may even be argued that existing law is itself sufficient, since there is fundamentally no reason to attack an entirely civilian nuclear power plant. The principal problem here is not the absence of a rule, but states’ failure to comply with existing rules. She also emphasizes that nuclear risks do not arise solely from direct attacks. The experience of Ukraine has shown that the occupation or improper management of a power plant can also create serious hazards. Disruption of cooling systems, a loss of power, or management problems can, in themselves, create a risk of a nuclear meltdown. Nuclear safety must therefore encompass both direct attacks and the condition of facilities under occupation or military control. In Professor Hulme’s view, the experience of recent conflicts has underscored the need for a more thorough reconsideration of the protection of nuclear power plants. The experience of Chernobyl in 1986 also clearly demonstrates that the effects of nuclear accidents can be very widespread and long-lasting.

Topic 5: Proportionality and Intergenerational Risks in Attacks on Nuclear Facilities

• Question: In practice, it can be very difficult to determine whether a nuclear facility serves an exclusively civilian function or is used for military purposes. If a nuclear facility is ultimately deemed a military objective, how should an attack on it be assessed in terms of the principle of proportionality and precautions in attack? In particular, how can the expected military advantage be weighed against the potential risk of extensive harm to civilians, radiological contamination, and intergenerational environmental consequences?

Professor Hulme regards this situation as one of the most difficult conceivable cases for applying the proportionality test. If the evidence shows that a particular facility is producing nuclear weapons, it may qualify as a legitimate military objective under the law of armed conflict, just as a facility producing bombs or missiles would. In such a case, its destruction could yield a significant military advantage and therefore carry considerable weight on one side of the proportionality assessment. On the other side, however, is the possibility of massive environmental damage and extensive harm to civilians. Professor Hulme again refers to the experience of Chernobyl, recalling that a nuclear meltdown can have very widespread and long-term effects. In her view, the difficulty for the law in such a situation is that decision-makers must balance two fundamentally incommensurable considerations: a military advantage against immense human and environmental harm. She believes that most states would find this an extremely difficult equation to resolve in practice. One practice observed in the past in relation to certain facilities allegedly intended for weapons production has been to attack them before they became operational. The aim of this approach was to prevent the greater risks that would arise once the facilities were operating. Nevertheless, Professor Hulme emphasizes that even these cases involve very difficult decisions.

She then refers to Article 56, explaining that the rationale behind this rule is that, even if a particular facility becomes a military objective, it should not be attacked in a manner that causes severe harm to the civilian population. A facility’s status as a military objective therefore does not confer an unrestricted entitlement to attack it; the manner of attack and its potential consequences must remain subject to protective rules. Later in the discussion, the interviewer referred to the need to pursue diplomatic and peaceful avenues before resorting to force and asked whether states should first ensure that negotiations and diplomacy have been sufficiently pursued before taking military action.

In response, Professor Hulme emphasized the need to distinguish between two separate bodies of law. She explained that the rules of international humanitarian law apply once an armed conflict has begun and the parties are conducting military operations. By contrast, the legality of resorting to force in the first place falls under a different body of rules, known in international law as the law on the use of force, or jus ad bellum. In her view, this area of law provides various mechanisms intended to prevent the use of force, including treaty regimes, disarmament arrangements, diplomatic negotiations, and, in some cases, Security Council resolutions. A range of legal and diplomatic mechanisms therefore exists before the outbreak of conflict with the aim of preventing the use of force, while, once a conflict has begun, the rules of international humanitarian law govern the conduct of the parties.

Topic 6: Slow Violence: Cumulative and Long-Term Environmental Harm

• Question: Environmental damage caused by war is not always immediately apparent and may spread gradually through air, soil, and water pollution. How can international law better account for these long-term, cumulative, and sometimes invisible forms of damage, which may have intergenerational and even transboundary effects, in its legal assessments?

Professor Hulme believes that, at this point, we are approaching, to some extent, the limits of what international humanitarian law can achieve in protecting the environment. This is because international humanitarian law is primarily designed to regulate the conduct of armed conflict and the behavior of the parties during hostilities; it does not necessarily constitute a comprehensive regime for addressing all the long-term environmental consequences of war. She again refers to the limitations of the “widespread, long-term and severe” threshold and the difficulty of applying the proportionality test, but believes that greater attention has been paid to long-term effects in recent years, particularly in relation to oil facilities. In her view, an important task for environmental lawyers is to record and document long-term damage accurately, especially where earlier conflicts now provide researchers with twenty or thirty years of data with which to study the actual effects. Alongside developing a more precise understanding of the damage, this documentation aims to influence state practice. Professor Hulme believes that states should be encouraged to accept that infrastructure such as oil facilities should, as a general rule, not be attacked unless it genuinely plays a significant role in supporting the enemy’s military operations. In her view, there are signs of gradual movement in this direction.

She refers to her experience of training and engaging with military forces in recent years and believes that awareness of these issues has increased among some military personnel. Her hope is that certain types of energy infrastructure will, in the future, be excluded in principle from the category of military objectives, although she believes that this point has not yet been reached.

Professor Hulme then emphasizes the importance of the rule on precautions in attack. She explains that, when military forces intend to attack a particular target, they must assess the potential damage to civilians and civilian objects, including the environment. If the anticipated damage is very extensive, they must consider whether the same target could be attacked in a different manner that would cause less harm. Nevertheless, she makes clear that international humanitarian law has limitations in addressing the overall condition of the environment in a war zone, particularly in prolonged conflicts. In such circumstances, the issue once again turns to ending the conflict and pursuing negotiations, since continuing the war may no longer serve a meaningful purpose and may merely lead to further destruction.

Once the conflict has ended, other branches of law assume greater importance. These include transitional justice mechanisms, human rights obligations, and rules of environmental law concerning the cleanup and restoration of affected areas. Accountability mechanisms addressing violations committed during the war may also be activated. From an environmental perspective, the ultimate goal is to ensure that the environment is cleaned up and restored, both for its intrinsic value and because of human dependence on it.

Topic 7: Documenting and Attributing Environmental Damage during Armed Conflict

• Question: In ongoing conflicts, including the situation in Iran, restricted access to affected areas and a lack of sufficient data can make monitoring and verifying environmental damage extremely difficult. What are the main legal and practical challenges in collecting evidence, documenting, establishing, and attributing such damage during armed conflict?

In responding to this question, Professor Hulme again draws on the experience of Ukraine, explaining that substantial work has been undertaken in this area over the past few years and that this experience can help illuminate the challenges involved. She explains that, apart from the Vietnam War, the 1991 Persian Gulf War was one of the first instances in which the environment featured prominently in discussions of compensation. In that case, the role of the Security Council and the relevant resolutions helped establish a relatively successful compensation mechanism.

When the war in Ukraine began and environmental damage occurred, it became apparent that no standard, readily available protocols existed for collecting evidence to establish another state’s responsibility. Although considerable progress has been made in this area during the war in Ukraine, Professor Hulme considers the issue not yet fully resolved. She distinguishes between practical and legal difficulties. In practical terms, landmines, explosive remnants of war, fires, and other hazards can make access to affected areas extremely difficult or even impossible. From a legal perspective, however, any criminal investigation requires proper evidence collection and maintenance of the chain of custody. For example, if a sample of contaminated water, soil, or even air is to be collected, the location, time, and conditions of collection must be recorded precisely. The likely source of the contamination must also be identified, and laboratory findings must then confirm the nature and timing of the damage. Documenting environmental damage in wartime is therefore not a purely technical process; it must also comply with legal standards governing evidence.

Professor Hulme also refers to the role of nongovernmental organizations in Ukraine. These organizations have been able to gather information on the ground, while social media and images captured by local residents have also helped document the locations of attacks and their effects. Where images can be geolocated, they can form part of the body of evidence used to build a case. Technologies operating outside the war zone have also become increasingly important. Satellite imagery, remote sensing, and other data-gathering tools can reveal changes in vegetation and forest cover, the spread of water following the destruction of dams, and damage to infrastructure. In her view, such data can be highly valuable for potential criminal investigations. Overall, Professor Hulme believes that significant progress has been made in recent years in developing protocols for collecting and preserving environmental evidence, particularly in anticipation of some cases concerning wartime damage eventually entering judicial proceedings.

Topic 8: Accountability for Environmental Damage

• Question: Attacks on infrastructure connected to civilian life can cause foreseeable environmental damage and may, in some cases, violate international law and international humanitarian law. Under present conditions, what realistic legal avenues are available for holding states and individuals accountable for such damage? How can responsibility also be pursued in a manner that prevents similar conduct from recurring?

Professor Hulme begins her response by emphasizing the limited avenues available. In her view, international law does not offer many straightforward routes to securing accountability or establishing responsibility for environmental damage caused by war. The first avenue is criminal law. Here, a distinction must be drawn between the responsibility of states and that of individuals, including heads of government, military commanders, or those who order attacks. International criminal law is primarily concerned with individual criminal responsibility. One difficulty, however, is that environmental damage has generally not been defined as a separate war crime with broad scope under international criminal law. It may fall within existing crimes only where the damage reaches a very high level. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also addresses environmental damage that is widespread, long-term, and severe, but this provision is subject to an additional requirement of disproportionality. Consequently, the criminal threshold is even higher than the threshold applicable under the general rules of international humanitarian law.

A further difficulty concerns the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Professor Hulme notes that Iran, Israel, and the United States are not parties to the Rome Statute, and that the ordinary regime under the Statute therefore does not apply to them in the same way. Ukraine, by contrast, initially accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory and subsequently became a party to the Rome Statute. Alongside proceedings before the International Criminal Court, domestic law may also provide an avenue. Where a legal basis exists and the accused is present within its jurisdiction, a state may prosecute individuals for war crimes. In the early stages of the war, Ukraine also prosecuted certain individuals under its domestic war crimes legislation.

Professor Hulme also refers to the concept of “ecocide.” Some countries have recognized this concept in their domestic law, although its definition varies from one country to another and may include a particular threshold of harm or an element of intent. In these countries, individuals may be prosecuted domestically for ecocide. Ecocide has not yet, however, been recognized as a separate crime under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, although discussion of and support for such recognition are growing.

A different avenue exists at the level of state responsibility. In certain circumstances, states may institute proceedings against another state before the International Court of Justice. An essential requirement, however, is that the Court have a basis for jurisdiction. If states have not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, or if there is no treaty providing a jurisdictional basis, the Court cannot hear the case. The Genocide Convention is an important example of a treaty containing a specific provision for referring disputes between states to the International Court of Justice. This explains why several interstate cases have been brought under that treaty. In many other areas, however, no such clear basis exists. Another avenue may arise through the United Nations Security Council. Professor Hulme refers to the experience of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the Security Council took an active role following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, adopted resolutions, and the United Nations Compensation Commission was ultimately established. The Security Council also played a role in establishing the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. This avenue, however, faces a structural obstacle: the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members. When a permanent member is itself involved in a conflict, establishing an accountability mechanism through the Council becomes extremely difficult. To illustrate this problem, Professor Hulme refers to Russia in the context of Ukraine, observing that it is difficult to imagine Russia agreeing in the Security Council to the establishment of a special tribunal against itself. The same issue may arise where the United States is a party to a conflict. In her view, therefore, legal avenues for accountability do exist, but each faces serious jurisdictional, treaty-related, or political limitations.

Topic 9: Post-War Environmental Restoration

• Question: Once a conflict has ended, what obligations exist under international law regarding cleanup, compensation, environmental restoration, and the reestablishment of safe conditions for the affected population? Does this responsibility rest primarily with the territorial state, or can the aggressor state or other responsible parties also be required, in certain circumstances, to contribute to compensation and restoration?

Professor Hulme’s short answer is that international law provides very few general or specific obligations requiring an aggressor state to restore the environment of the affected country. In her view, the structure of international law remains largely centered on the territorial state. Accordingly, if special accountability or compensation mechanisms are set aside, the general position is that each state is responsible for cleaning up and restoring the environment within its own territory. Once a conflict has ended, such obligations may arise under environmental law or human rights law. The state must make the environment safe, breathable, and habitable for its population. There is, however, no general rule automatically requiring an aggressor state to pay for, or participate directly in, the reconstruction or environmental restoration of another country.

Professor Hulme also refers to specific weapons treaties. If the territorial state is a party to treaties concerning landmines or cluster munitions, it may have obligations under those treaties to clear its territory. Conversely, states that have used mines or similar munitions also have limited obligations to provide the relevant state with information about where they have been deployed. Ultimately, however, most of the practical responsibility for clearing the territory and making it safe remains with the territorial state itself, unless special arrangements have been established, for example through a Security Council resolution or another mechanism.

Topic 10: The Future of Environmental Protection in War

• Question: Given the increasing frequency of attacks on industrial and energy infrastructure, as well as the risk of nuclear facilities being targeted in modern conflicts, what legal or practical reforms are most urgently needed to strengthen environmental protection in wartime? Should the priority be to create new rules or to implement more effectively the rules that already exist under international law?

In responding to the final question, Professor Hulme first emphasizes the need to reassess the lawfulness and practical necessity of attacks on oil infrastructure and refineries. In her view, serious consideration must be given to how often the destruction of such infrastructure is actually militarily necessary in armed conflict. If these facilities do not play a direct role in the opposing state’s military operations, she considers that there is a stronger basis for the view that they should not be attacked. Greater attention has been paid to this issue in recent years, and nongovernmental organizations have played an important role in bringing it to the fore by documenting the scale of damage caused by attacks on oil infrastructure. Professor Hulme believes that some military forces are also gradually moving toward the view that energy infrastructure should be targeted only where it has genuinely significant military value. In her view, this is one area in which rules and practices could be developed further.

The second area concerns nuclear power plants. The risk of radiation leaks and nuclear meltdowns places attacks on such facilities at the highest level of environmental risk. In her view, there is scope to discuss strengthening Article 56 further, although, in its current form, it is already a relatively stringent rule. Professor Hulme believes that most military forces would probably not deliberately target a clearly civilian nuclear power plant. The issue becomes more complex where a nuclear facility may be used to produce weapons or support military weaponry. A third area of concern for her is the protection of “environmental spaces.” In this regard, Professor Hulme refers to the relatively stringent rules protecting cultural heritage sites and buildings and believes that a similar model could be developed for certain natural areas, such as nature parks. Proposals have accordingly been put forward to prohibit the siting of military objectives in certain areas and to designate particular environmental spaces as areas excluded from military operations. The International Committee of the Red Cross has also undertaken work in this field.

Professor Hulme also acknowledges the difficulties involved in pursuing this approach. Military forces may oppose the designation of certain parks or natural areas as entirely off-limits, since these areas may occupy strategically important positions or may need to be traversed by troops, tanks, and military equipment. Ultimately, she emphasizes a fundamental point: the problem is not always a lack of new rules. International law already contains numerous rules protecting the environment, civilians, and civilian objects. In many cases, the central problem is that states violate those existing rules. Before creating an extensive new body of regulations, the initial focus should therefore be on effective implementation and state compliance with the rules already in place.

Policy Recommendations

1. Strengthening the Assessment of Long-Term Environmental Effects in Military Decision-Making: Military assessments should not be confined to the immediate and visible damage caused by an attack. Reverberating and long-term effects, including water and soil pollution, the entry of toxic substances into the food chain, ecosystem destruction, and potential intergenerational consequences, must be incorporated into proportionality assessments and the application of precautions in attack. Developing operational guidelines for armed forces and providing specialized training for commanders in this area can help narrow the gap between existing legal rules and the environmental realities of contemporary wars.
2. Restricting the Targeting of Energy and Industrial Infrastructure: Oil, gas, and chemical industry infrastructure should be targeted only where its direct and significant connection to military operations has been established. Given the extensive consequences of pollution resulting from the destruction of these facilities, more stringent criteria should be applied when assessing whether they constitute military objectives. Gradual movement toward a stronger presumption of protection for civilian energy infrastructure can reduce the risk of such facilities becoming routine targets in future wars.
3. Enhancing Legal and Practical Protection for Nuclear Facilities: Attacks on nuclear facilities require the highest level of legal and practical caution because of the potential release of radioactive materials, transboundary damage, and long-term effects. Existing protections, including the rules concerning installations containing dangerous forces, should be strengthened and clarified in terms of their status under customary law and their operational application. Particular emphasis should also be placed on preventing attacks in the vicinity of civilian power plants, protecting cooling and power supply systems, and ensuring the safe management of facilities under occupation or during hostilities.
4. Establishing Standardized Mechanisms for Documenting Environmental Damage: The experience of recent conflicts has shown that the absence of consistent protocols for collecting and preserving evidence can make it difficult to pursue responsibility. Common standards are needed for sampling water, soil, and air; recording the time and location of damage; maintaining the chain of custody; and using satellite imagery and remote sensing. Cooperation among states, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international judicial bodies can significantly improve the quality and evidentiary value of this documentation.
5. Strengthening Mechanisms for Post-Conflict Compensation and Environmental Restoration: Existing frameworks place an excessive share of the responsibility for post-war environmental restoration on the affected state. Peace agreements, international resolutions, and compensation mechanisms should make clearer provision for the financial contributions of responsible parties toward the costs of environmental cleanup and restoration. Establishing compensation funds, specialized environmental commissions, and independent assessment mechanisms can prevent the long-term costs of environmental destruction from falling solely on the affected population and state.

Conclusion

This interview demonstrates that environmental protection in armed conflict remains a challenging and evolving area of international humanitarian law. The existing structure of this body of law protects the environment primarily through the rules governing civilian objects. Creating a distinct legal category for the environment appears difficult in the short term, given the established structure of the law of armed conflict and the need for state support. At the same time, because the “widespread, long-term and severe” threshold is cumulative and exceptionally high, it has limited capacity to address much of the actual damage caused by contemporary wars. Rules such as proportionality, precautions in attack, and the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects therefore remain the most important practical tools for reducing environmental damage. This is particularly significant in attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, industrial facilities, and nuclear installations, since their effects may extend beyond immediate damage to include long-term pollution, reverberating effects, transboundary damage, and intergenerational consequences.

The interview also reveals that the central problem is not merely a shortage of legal rules. Limitations in implementing existing rules, difficulties in documenting damage, and weaknesses in effective accountability mechanisms are also important aspects of the problem. The limited jurisdiction of institutions such as the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, the dependence of certain mechanisms on state consent, and the political role of the Security Council constrain the pursuit of responsibility in many conflicts. Even after a war has ended, most of the practical responsibility for environmental cleanup and restoration remains with the territorial state, unless a special compensation mechanism is established. Strengthening environmental protection in war therefore requires an approach operating at several levels: one that emphasizes the effective implementation of existing rules, gives greater weight to the assessment of long-term effects in military decision-making, and strengthens the foundations for documentation, accountability, and post-conflict restoration.