Introduction
Over the past decade, the crisis in Yemen has evolved into one of the most complex cases of political, security, and humanitarian breakdown in the Middle East. Domestic rivalries, foreign interventions, and the proliferation of armed actors have pushed the state to the margins while giving rise to a wide array of armed groups across the country. Against this backdrop, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), relying on a network of local forces, has played a significant role in shaping the balance and structure of power in Yemen’s southern and coastal regions. This approach enabled Abu Dhabi to maintain its influence over the country’s security, political, and territorial dynamics without relying entirely on a direct military presence. At the same time, however, the expansion of these structures contributed to the emergence of multiple centers of power, parallel chains of command, and security institutions operating beyond the coherent control of the state.
Over time, this situation has had profound consequences for human rights, civilian security, the rule of law, and the capacity of Yemen’s formal institutions. Numerous reports documenting arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, the use of unofficial detention facilities, and restrictions on civic space demonstrate that Yemen’s current predicament is not limited to armed rivalry among insurgent groups, but also concerns the suffering inflicted on civilians in a variety of ways. At the same time, shifting alliances, the integration or reorganization of some of these groups, and the reduction of the UAE’s direct presence in recent years have altered the structure of this network without eliminating its effects. Even where some forces have moved closer to structures affiliated with the central government or Saudi Arabia, their origins, command patterns, and security legacy remain part of Yemen’s political reality.
Incidents
Following the start of the Arab Coalition’s intervention in Yemen in 2015, the UAE gradually pursued a strategy centered on establishing and supporting local armed forces in Yemen’s southern and coastal regions. These forces, recruited primarily from local communities and tribal structures, were formed to fight Houthis, counter Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)[1], and provide security in areas under coalition influence. In practice, however, many of these groups operated outside a coherent command structure under the Yemeni government and became some of the UAE’s most important instruments of influence in Yemen’s political and security landscape. The network of UAE-backed forces encompassed a range of groups with different objectives and areas of operation, from southern security formations such as the Security Belt Forces, the Hadrami Elite Forces, and the Shabwani Elite Forces, to combat formations such as the Giants Brigades and Tarek Saleh’s National Resistance Forces. Throughout the war, human rights organizations documented numerous abuses committed by some of these groups, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and the operation of detention facilities outside judicial oversight[2]. Among these was Beir Ahmed Prison, where forces under Emirati command reportedly subjected detainees to stripping and body searches[3].
The precise number of personnel in these forces has always been difficult to determine because of their broad dispersion. Estimates published in 2020 and 2021, however, placed the size of the network of UAE-backed Yemeni forces at approximately 90,000 personnel. This network comprised tribal forces, militias, and units such as the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani Elite Forces, and the Hadrami Elite Forces. This figure, however, reflects the situation at that time and, given the subsequent integration, dissolution, and shifting allegiances of many of these forces, cannot be applied to the structure that exists in 2026[4]. A substantial proportion of these forces were trained, equipped, and financed by Abu Dhabi and received political and military support from the UAE, and human rights organizations have accused them of serious human rights violations. Despite the withdrawal of Emirati military forces from Yemen and the reduction or cessation of some forms of direct support from Abu Dhabi in late 2025 and early 2026, many Yemeni forces that had previously received UAE support did not disappear. Instead, some were incorporated into new structures, while others moved closer to the camp of the Saudi-backed government.
- Security Belt Forces (SBF)
Known in Arabic as Quwwat al-Hizam al-Amni, the Security Belt Forces were based in southern Yemen and were initially organized to provide security in southern areas, combat groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and support coalition military operations against Houthis. Over time, however, they became one of the UAE’s most important instruments of influence in southern Yemen, operating in governorates including Aden, Lahij, and Abyan.
The group was repeatedly implicated in serious human rights violations. Mwatana for Human Rights documented 19 cases in which schools continued to be occupied by the Security Belt Forces and pro-government resistance groups or were used as military barracks, detention facilities, and training centers. In June 2017, at the height of the civil war, the Security Belt Forces entered and occupied the local education administration building and Sayfan High School in the Mahfad District of Abyan Governorate. The school was used as a military barracks, and the forces also damaged the water and sewage network[5].
The Security Belt Forces were among the most important security formations affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and backed by the UAE. Following the military defeat of the Southern Transitional Council and the restructuring of security arrangements in government-controlled areas in January 2026, however, the principal components of these forces were incorporated into the newly established National Security Forces, operating under the umbrella of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
- Southern Transitional Council (STC)
The Southern Transitional Council was established in May 2017 by a group of former leaders and officials from southern Yemen under the leadership of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the former governor of Aden. The Council’s principal objective was to restore an independent state in southern Yemen. Alongside its confrontation with the Houthis, however, the STC also became involved at various points in rivalry and armed clashes with forces affiliated with Yemen’s internationally recognized government and with groups backed by Saudi Arabia, although its representatives had also served on the Presidential Leadership Council since 2022.
At the end of 2025, the group launched a large-scale offensive in southern Yemen against other factions and seized control of key areas in Hadramawt, the country’s richest governorate in terms of natural resources. It also consolidated its control over Aden, the seat of the internationally recognized government, as well as large stretches of Yemen’s southern coastline[6]. These gains, however, did not endure. In early January 2026, Saudi-backed forces wrested most of the captured areas, including Aden and Mukalla, from the control of STC forces.
Subsequently, some of the Council’s leaders in Riyadh announced its dissolution, but the leadership aligned with Aidarous al-Zubaidi rejected the decision. As a result, the organizational and political status of the Southern Transitional Council after January 2026 remained marked by internal divisions and uncertainty. China’s Xinhua News Agency has also explicitly described these forces as UAE-backed and seeking to bring about the independence of southern Yemen and separate it from the rest of the country[7].
The group’s objective is to restore southern Yemen to the status it held between 1967 and 1990[8]. It has also threatened to declare its own constitution and establish a new state under the name “South Arabia[9].”
- Shabwani Elite Forces
The Shabwah Governorate consists of 17 districts spread across an area of more than 40,000 square kilometers. Despite its relatively limited size, the region has long experienced significant tensions and came under the control of UAE-backed Shabwani forces, which consolidated their position after driving the Houthis out of the area. The earlier structure known as the Shabwani Elite Forces was subsequently reorganized, and forces associated with it continued to operate primarily under the Shabwani Defense Forces. Following the developments of January 2026, these forces were also incorporated into the broader restructuring of forces affiliated with the Presidential Leadership Council. This reorganization, however, does not negate the record of their conduct during the period in which they exercised control over the region.
Following the group’s consolidation of control, human rights violations in the governorate increased. Among the most significant abuses reported were torture, arbitrary detention, the recruitment and use of children as fighters, and the deployment of landmines outside active combat zones. In one documented case, a force of approximately 80 soldiers from the Shabwani Elite Forces raided the village of Nokhan in Ataq District during an operation to arrest a teacher. The force arrived at approximately 2:00 a.m.; the soldiers switched off the exterior lights of the houses, surrounded the home of Abdallah al-Sudala, a local resident, from all directions, and arrested him[10].
- Giants Brigades
This group, also known as the Southern Giants, has been the largest UAE-backed force in Yemen. By 2018, it was estimated to comprise between 20,000 and 28,000 personnel. The fighters in these brigades were primarily southern Yemenis with Salafi leanings and members of tribes from the Yafa region[11].
Following the crisis involving Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Southern Transitional Council in late 2025 and early January 2026, the commander of the Giants Brigades, Abdulrahman al-Mahrami (Abu Zara’a), aligned himself with the newly configured structure of the Presidential Leadership Council. The commander, who had long operated in close alliance with the UAE, abruptly shifted toward the Saudi-backed central government[12].
In July 2026, at the conclusion of a military training course, the group conducted a live-fire military exercise with the support and supervision of the Arab Coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The exercise was intended to enhance the effectiveness and skills of its fighters and strengthen their field and combat readiness for carrying out military duties[13].
Despite the clear shift of the group’s leadership toward Saudi Arabia, the extent of the members’ and commanders’ continued loyalty to the United Arab Emirates, as well as their material and non-material dependence on it, remains somewhat unclear.
- Tarek Saleh’s National Resistance Forces
The National Resistance Forces are an anti-Houthi force led by Tarek Saleh, the nephew of Yemen’s former president and a member of the Presidential Leadership Council[14]. Over the past several years, Tarek Saleh’s National Resistance Forces have been among the most important anti-Houthi forces operating along Yemen’s western coast, with their principal base located in Mokha.
In September 2026, however, the military situation on the western coast changed fundamentally. During a major offensive, the Houthis captured the strategic city of Mokha and then advanced toward Bab al-Mandab, taking control of areas including Dhubab and Mayyun Island (Perim). These developments have posed a serious challenge to the military position of Tarek Saleh’s forces along the western coast[15].
According to an estimate by Al Jazeera, the group has more than 20,000 personnel. Because of the extensive support it previously received from the United Arab Emirates, it has enjoyed particularly strong access to weapons and military equipment and is regarded as one of the most heavily armed forces in Yemen[16].
The group has also been among the most prominent opponents of the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen’s internal arena. Tarek Saleh and three figures close to him within the Presidential Leadership Council issued a statement opposing the central government and Saudi Arabia, which had called for the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen. They stated:
“We explicitly affirm that no individual or entity, whether within the Leadership Council or outside it, has the authority to expel any member state of the Arab Coalition or to claim that its role or presence has ended, as this matter is governed by regional frameworks, alliances, and international agreements and cannot be made subject to personal preferences or individual decisions. The UAE has been, and continues to be, one of the principal partners in confronting the Houthi project[17].”
Challenges and Responses
- Internal Collapse, Protracted Civil War, and the Persistence of the Status Quo
The proliferation of local armed forces and parallel security structures in Yemen has been one of the factors contributing to the intensification of institutional collapse and the growing vulnerability of civilians. In areas where these forces have exercised effective control, the multiplicity of power centers and the absence of a unified chain of command and accountability have created conditions conducive to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and the operation of both official and unofficial detention facilities. Human Rights Watch has stated that UAE-backed forces, including the Southern Transitional Council and the Joint Forces, alongside other parties to the conflict, have been implicated in such abuses, with hundreds of Yemenis detained in various facilities[18].
In addition, the detention of members of the National Commission for the Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights by UAE-backed forces in January 2026 demonstrated that security fragmentation has obstructed even the work of institutions responsible for documentation and accountability. In this regard, Niku Jafarnia, Yemen and Bahrain researcher at Human Rights Watch, stated:
“The Southern Transitional Council has maintained secret prisons in Yemen for years, where it has committed serious abuses against people it arbitrarily detained and often forcibly disappeared. Now, they are even detaining those investigating these abuses. They should be held accountable for their widespread violations[19].”
Under such circumstances, Yemen’s civil war has contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law, the restriction of civic space, weakened victims’ access to justice, and the intensification of human insecurity. Amnesty International has also emphasized in its recent assessment that various parties in Yemen continue to target critics, human rights defenders, journalists, and humanitarian workers through detention, enforced disappearance, and prosecution[20].
- Domestic Responses
In an official statement issued on December 30, 2025, the UAE expressed concern over Saudi Arabia’s positions regarding developments in Yemen, while rejecting any role in escalating tensions among Yemeni parties or exerting pressure on local groups to undertake operations against Saudi security. Abu Dhabi emphasized that, since the beginning of developments in Hadramawt and Al Mahrah, its position had focused on containing tensions, supporting de-escalation, and protecting civilians.
The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs also rejected the coalition’s allegation that weapons had been transferred from the Port of Fujairah to Mukalla, stating that the shipment in question contained no weapons and that the vehicles unloaded were intended for Emirati forces stationed in Yemen, not for any Yemeni party. The Ministry described the UAE’s presence in Yemen as having been based on a request from the country’s legitimate government and conducted within the framework of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition, with the stated objectives of restoring legitimacy and combating terrorism.
The UAE further warned that the management of the crisis should be based on coordination, restraint, and verified information in order to prevent further escalation. Abu Dhabi concluded by stressing that the recent developments should be addressed in a manner that preserves regional security and stability, shared interests, and the political process aimed at bringing the Yemeni crisis to an end[21].
- International Responses
The Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center examined the UAE’s role in establishing, training, arming, and financially supporting a range of local forces in an analytical report entitled “Seas, Checks, and Guns: Emirati and Saudi Maritime Interests in the Yemen Conflict.” These forces included the Southern Transitional Council, the Shabwani Elite Forces, the Hadrami Elite Forces, and other aligned groups. The report emphasizes that, although this policy enabled the UAE to retain considerable influence in southern Yemen and along the country’s coastline after reducing its direct military presence, it also contributed to greater political and security fragmentation, weakened Yemen’s internationally recognized government, and deepened competition between forces backed by Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Carnegie further warns that the continuation of this pattern could make efforts to achieve a durable peace agreement and unify Yemen’s armed structures even more difficult. The report also indicates that foreign support for local armed groups has not only altered the domestic balance of power in Yemen, but has also contributed to broader geopolitical competition over ports, shipping routes, and strategically important coastal areas along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. From the Center’s perspective, the continued operation of these armed networks outside a unified national security structure represents one of the major obstacles to rebuilding state institutions and achieving long-term stability in Yemen[22].
The Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI) likewise argues in an analytical report entitled “The UAE’s Three Strategic Interests in Yemen” that, following the beginning of military intervention in Yemen, the UAE gradually shifted its strategy toward establishing and supporting trusted local forces. The report notes that, in order to counter the influence of the Islah Party, preserve its influence in southern areas, and protect its maritime interests, Abu Dhabi provided financial, military, and training support to groups including the Security Belt Forces, the Hadrami Elite Forces, the Shabwani Elite Forces, and the Giants Brigades.
According to the Institute’s analysis, many of these forces operated outside the Yemeni government’s chain of command and became a means through which the UAE maintained its influence after reducing its direct military presence. The report also refers to allegations of torture, assassination, and enforced disappearance and argues that the human rights and political costs associated with supporting these forces were among the factors contributing to international pressure on the UAE to reduce its direct involvement in the Yemen war. In addition, the Institute warns that the continued activity of local armed forces outside the control of the central government has deepened Yemen’s internal divisions and made the pursuit of a sustainable political settlement more difficult[23].
In a further analysis published in January 2026 under the title “The Yemeni crisis: More complexity and many repercussions,” Al Jazeera examined the role of foreign interventions, particularly UAE support for the Southern Transitional Council, in reshaping the balance of power in southern Yemen. The report emphasizes that, by establishing, training, and financing local forces loyal to it, including forces affiliated with the STC, the UAE was able to build substantial influence across strategically important areas of southern Yemen and along the country’s coastline.
According to this analysis, the expansion of the Southern Transitional Council’s influence and its emergence as an independent military-political actor further weakened the structure of the central government and intensified competition among regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The author also argues that foreign support for local armed forces, rather than strengthening state institutions, contributed to the creation of parallel power structures in Yemen and made the prospects for a comprehensive political settlement more difficult[24].
Finally, Human Rights Watch warned in one of its reports on Yemen about the continuation of widespread human rights violations by various parties to the conflict. The organization stated that, in 2025, the Houthis, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, and the Yemeni government continued to carry out arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances in areas under their control, including against journalists and human rights defenders.
Human Rights Watch also stressed that, throughout the years of war, all parties to the conflict had subjected media professionals to arrest, enforced disappearance, and torture, contributing to a further contraction of civic space. The organization called on Yemeni parties to immediately end arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, release those unjustly detained, and fulfill their obligations to meet the population’s basic needs, including access to food and water. It also called on regional states to exert pressure to halt these abuses and the protection of civilian rights a priority[25].
Conclusion
An examination of developments in Yemen shows that the network of UAE-backed forces has played a significant role in shaping the country’s current situation. The principal importance of this network lies in the fact that it helped create a parallel model for the exercise of power in parts of Yemen—a model in which the financing, arming, and training of local forces coincided with the weakness of formal institutions and the absence of effective accountability mechanisms. Within such a structure, the boundaries of responsibility among the Yemeni government, the foreign sponsor, and local commanders became blurred, and this ambiguity made it more difficult to pursue legal accountability for violations such as arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture.
Developments in 2025 and 2026 also demonstrated that shifts in the political alignment of commanders, the integration of some forces into formal structures, or the reduction of the UAE’s direct presence do not necessarily mean that the consequences of this model have come to an end. Many of these forces continue to operate under new names, command arrangements, or organizational structures, while the power networks formed over the course of the war are not easily dismantled. The future of Yemen, therefore, depends on restoring the legitimate monopoly over the use of force to accountable institutions, establishing independent mechanisms to investigate and address past violations, and ensuring reparations for victims. Without such a process, there is a risk that the legacy of parallel armed forces, even after alliances and actors change, will remain one of the principal obstacles to political stability and the restoration of the rights of Yemeni citizens.
References
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