The Rise of the Far Right in Global Politics: What Future Awaits Human Rights?

Rasool Mogooei

PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of Isfahan

Introduction

The expansion of far-right and radical political movements in recent years has become one of the most significant political developments across many parts of the world, substantially reshaping the traditional boundaries between mainstream politics and forces once regarded as peripheral. This transformation is not confined merely to rising vote shares for a number of parties or the electoral victories of particular candidates; rather, it reflects deeper changes in political attitudes, social structures, identity-based divisions, and levels of public trust in existing institutions. Economic crises, migration, globalization, cultural change, dissatisfaction with political elites, and growing political polarization have created conditions in which nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-establishment discourses have gained greater appeal. At the same time, the emergence of political figures characterized by personalized leadership styles, confrontational rhetoric, and extensive use of new media has further accelerated this trend.

The experiences of countries such as the United States, Italy, Germany, Poland, Argentina, and Colombia likewise demonstrate that these movements have taken different forms, ranging from opposition politics to the direct attainment of political power. The significance of this phenomenon from a human rights perspective becomes even greater when the discourses and policies associated with it affect the rights of migrants, minorities, civil liberties, pluralism, the rule of law, and the independence of democratic institutions. Examining the far right in the contemporary world therefore requires simultaneous attention to its social and political roots, the different pathways through which it has risen, and the consequences it may have for democratic order and the protection of fundamental rights.

The Far Right, Radical Right, and Populist Right

The global transformation of the far right serves as a reminder of the extent to which these political parties and currents, social movements, and groups have expanded within the space between democratic illiberalism and outright opposition to democracy. Countries such as Italy and Hungary have been governed by far-right parties; European Parliament elections have produced new record levels of support for far-right groups; and Donald Trump, despite the fact that his defeat in the 2020 election culminated in an attempted coup, once again won the 2024 United States presidential election. Such forms of politics have moved beyond the confines of the Global North, where they initially appeared to have emerged and remained concentrated. Since the beginning of the present century, countries including Brazil and India, and more recently Argentina, have likewise experienced similar developments (Newth et al., 2025). While the far right has become a permanent feature of contemporary politics, its internal evolution reflects diverse forms of ideological and organizational combination. On the one hand, collective far-right actors may outwardly present themselves as committed to democracy while, in practice, behaving in ways that run counter to its requirements (Pirro, 2023).

In this context, the far right is an umbrella concept encompassing a range of political currents on the right that are generally characterized by intense nationalism, exclusionism, authoritarianism, or opposition to certain principles of liberal democracy. Alongside this concept, terms such as the radical right and the populist right are also used to describe movements that emphasize national identity, social order, and criticism of political elites and existing structures. These terms, however, are not fully synonymous, and they differ in the extent of their opposition to pluralism, liberal institutions, and democracy itself. Accordingly, contemporary political figures and movements should not all be described using these concepts interchangeably.

Nativism, authoritarianism, and populism have traditionally been regarded as the defining ideological dimensions of populist radical right parties. Authoritarianism, however, has received less theoretical attention in studies of party discourse and, compared with the other two dimensions, has been subject to relatively limited empirical examination (Praet, 2024). By contrast, the radical right is generally identified with nativism and authoritarianism; that is, it emphasizes the preservation of the identity and interests of the native group, displays suspicion toward non-native elements, and supports social order and strong leadership. This current is at odds with certain principles of liberal democracy, but unlike the extreme right, it does not necessarily reject democracy itself (Arzheimer, 2026). More generally, however, according to Alexander Alekseev of the University of Helsinki, the radical and populist right are commonly regarded not only as inherently opposed to democratic values, but also as incompatible with the institutions and rules of liberal democracy; in this respect, their parties have often been viewed as political heirs to fascism in Europe (Alekseev, 2024).

Overall, the far right may be understood as a diverse spectrum of political forces located at the outermost edge of the political right which, despite differences in their degree of commitment to democracy, share nationalist, exclusionary, and authoritarian tendencies. Rather than referring to a wholly uniform ideology, the concept functions as an umbrella for a range of radical and extremist currents whose boundaries—both among themselves and between them and mainstream politics—have become increasingly blurred in recent years. Right-wing politics, in this sense, is a movement that seeks to reconstruct a better version of yesterday. At the same time, it is a highly modern, and even postmodern, force that has adapted effectively to the political, social, and intellectual conditions of the 2020s. This adaptability is both a source of its strength and a justification for describing it as “new” (Leonard, 2026).

Drivers of the Growth of the Far Right

Over recent decades, in Europe and other regions, including the Americas, radical-right and populist-right parties and politicians have gained increasing electoral support. Since the 1960s, the vote share of these currents in national parliamentary elections and elections to the European Parliament has more than doubled. In the Netherlands, for example, their vote share increased from 5.9 percent in 2006 to 21.2 percent in 2025. In Germany, the vote share of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) likewise rose from 4.7 percent in 2013 to 20.8 percent in 2025 (van Gennip et al., 2026).

It should be noted that the growth of far-right currents cannot be reduced to a single factor; rather, the phenomenon is the result of a combination of economic, social, cultural, and political developments. Research indicates that economic insecurity, a perceived decline in social status, concerns over migration and cultural change, declining trust in political institutions, and increasing social polarization are among the most important conditions that can strengthen support for right-wing parties and political figures. In many cases, globalization and migration have influenced voter preferences not merely as economic phenomena, but also through concerns relating to identity, culture, and perceptions of social threat. In the United States, the cultural argument revolves around the deep and enduring current of racism in American society. In Europe, it focuses on hostility toward Muslim and African immigrants, a factor that has long constituted one of the foundations of support for far-right parties such as the French National Front (Rodrik, 2021).

In the economic sphere, the contraction of fiscal space in many European countries also turned the financial crisis into a particularly favorable environment for the growth of right-wing populist parties. The reason is clear: identity-based protective policies generally require relatively limited public expenditure, whereas the redistributive welfare policies advocated by left-wing populists continued to remain ideologically attractive to a substantial segment of society. Consequently, the shift toward right-leaning economic preferences may be understood, at least in part, as arising from the perception that the implementation of comprehensive welfare policies is no longer feasible (Guiso et al., 2026).

The opening of national economies, the relocation of production, foreign competition, and job losses—particularly in manufacturing industries—have also created fertile ground for political discontent. The “China Shock”, together with the combined effects of automation and the offshoring of production, has contributed in some societies to strengthening anti-system and nationalist forces. Economic discontent is often intertwined with cultural backlash, nostalgia for the past, nationalism, and opposition to liberal global values and institutions. This interaction between economic and cultural factors is highly significant in explaining the appeal of nationalist leaders (Kahler, 2026). In relation to the interaction between cultural and economic factors, the ethnic competition theory has also been advanced: when individuals perceive immigrants as competitors for scarce resources, welfare services, or economic opportunities, anti-immigration attitudes are more likely to intensify (Brils et al., 2020).

Overall, the most significant factors contributing to the growth of the far right include:

• the erosion of trust in political elites and mainstream parties;
• migration and the intensification of identity-based, cultural, and security concerns;
• the economic consequences of globalization and the decline of certain traditional industries and occupations;
• perceptions of declining economic and social security and the intensification of relative deprivation;
• negative reactions to the costs associated with certain climate and economic policies;
• the gradual normalization of certain far-right discourses among mainstream political parties; and
• the expansion of transnational networks and the mutual influence of new-right currents upon one another (Cliffe et al., 2025).

Case Studies of Different Countries

• Poland

In recent years, Poland has become one of the most important Central European cases for examining the growth of the radical right and far right. A new turning point in this trajectory came with the 2025 presidential election, in which Karol Nawrocki, the candidate backed by the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS), won with nearly 51 percent of the vote (President of the Republic of Poland, 2025) and assumed the presidency on 6 August 2025.

At the same time, more explicitly far-right candidates also performed notably well in the first round. Sławomir Mentzen secured approximately 14.8 percent of the vote, while Grzegorz Braun received more than 6 percent, bringing the combined vote share of this political spectrum to over 20 percent (Wlodarczak-Semczuk & Pawlak, 2025). These results demonstrated that the radical and far right in Poland have become influential components of political competition and may even shape the political orientation of the president as well as the future of right-wing coalition-building.

• Germany

Germany is currently one of the most prominent European examples of the growth of the far right. In the February 2025 federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 20.8 percent of the party-list vote, nearly doubling its share compared with 2021 and becoming the country’s second-largest electoral force. Its result was only around two percentage points below that of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the party to which Friedrich Merz belongs (The Federal Returning Officer, 2025).

This trend continued into 2026. Under the leadership of Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, the party even moved ahead of other political alliances in some national opinion polls. The trajectory took on still greater significance in September 2026, when the AfD won the Saxony-Anhalt state election on 6 September with 43.8 percent of the party-list vote and secured 39 of the 83 seats in the state parliament, placing first by a substantial margin (State Returning Officer of Saxony-Anhalt, 2026).

Despite this unprecedented victory, the party failed to secure an absolute majority, while Friedrich Merz and his party once again ruled out any cooperation with the AfD. As a result, the policy commonly known as the “firewall” (Brandmauer) continues to serve as a barrier to the AfD’s entry into the state government, although the result of the Saxony-Anhalt election has significantly intensified political pressure on the continuation of this policy (Murray & Rinke, 2026).

In German politics, the term “firewall” (Brandmauer) is used as a metaphor for the clear boundary drawn against extremist parties. Just as a firewall is designed to protect buildings from fire, the political firewall is intended to protect democracy (Hasselbach, 2026). Despite the AfD’s substantial increase in electoral influence, the party has not yet entered the governing structure at the federal level.

• Colombia

In 2026, Colombia witnessed one of the most significant recent political shifts in Latin America. Abelardo de la Espriella, a criminal lawyer with no previous electoral experience, entered the presidential race with a platform centered on hard-line security policies, nationalism, downsizing the state, support for the private sector, and strong opposition to the left. He won the second round of the June 2026 presidential election with 49.66 percent of the vote (Bocanegra et al., 2026a).

He assumed office as president on 7 August 2026 and, from the outset, pledged to reduce the size of the state by as much as 40 percent, terminate peace negotiations with armed groups, intensify the fight against drug trafficking, and revive the oil and gas sector (Bocanegra et al., 2026b).

This victory, alongside widespread public concern over crime, insecurity, and the economic situation, has been interpreted as part of a broader regional shift to the right. His campaign was centered on the idea of defending a “Patria Milagro” (Miracle Homeland), a country grounded in traditional values with the economy and security at its core, and in which the left—or what he refers to as “communism”—as well as centrist parties, would no longer play a central role (Stacey, 2026).

• Argentina

In Argentina, Javier Milei, an economist and political outsider, won the presidency in the 2023 election on a strongly anti-establishment platform (Politi & Salomon, 2023), defined by opposition to the political class and a commitment to downsizing the state. From the outset, he positioned himself against what he called the “political caste.” His government has been characterized by austerity measures, market liberalization, and extensive cuts in public spending, alongside a broader cultural struggle against the left, feminism, gender policies, and segments of the media.

Milei is commonly classified among the populist right because of his ability to mobilize public opinion and his extensive use of political symbolism in advancing his agenda. In June 2022, in the province of Córdoba, he introduced a proposal that he called the “Chainsaw Plan.” The plan set out his blueprint for a sweeping restructuring of the state: reducing public expenditure, abolishing half of the ministries, privatizing state-owned companies, and eliminating the Central Bank.

The chainsaw was not the first symbolic instrument in Milei’s rhetorical arsenal. In a short campaign video from 2020, he appears with a mischievous smile, wearing a black leather jacket and lifting a medieval-style sledgehammer before smashing a model of the Central Bank. A group of black-clad supporters, raising their fists, can be seen shouting calls for destruction (Politi & Biller, 2023).

As of the writing of this article in September 2026, Milei remains one of the most prominent figures of the global new right and one of the principal actors in the recent political shift to the right in Latin America, a region long regarded as one of the world’s most important strongholds of the left.

• Italy

Italy represents one of the most important European cases of the radical right entering government. Giorgia Meloni and the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), a party whose roots can be traced to Italy’s post-fascist tradition, came to power in the 2022 elections, with Meloni becoming prime minister. Since taking office, while maintaining hard-line positions on migration, family issues, and certain cultural questions, she has sought to recast her party’s image from that of a marginal and extremist force into a conservative movement regarded as acceptable at the European level.

In early 2024, a video emerged showing members of the youth wing of Meloni’s party, some of whom were giving the fascist salute and chanting “Sieg Heil.” Meloni sought to distance both herself and her party from such conduct, presenting it as incompatible with their political outlook (Balmer, 2024).

Nevertheless, the party’s historical roots in a neo-fascist movement established after the Second World War, its migration policies—including the transfer of asylum seekers to Albania—certain restrictions on civil liberties, and controversies concerning minority rights have continued to fuel debate over the position of Meloni and her party within the radical and hard-line right. According to Reuters, Meloni has also emerged as a leading figure within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political family at the European level (Rose et al., 2024).

• United States

In the United States, the far-right current emerged from within one of the country’s mainstream political parties, the Republican Party. After losing the 2020 presidential election, Donald Trump returned to the presidency in the 2024 election and further consolidated the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement as the dominant force within the Republican Party. According to an analysis by the Brookings Institution, by May 2026 approximately 62 percent of Republicans identified themselves as MAGA (Kamarck & Dionne, 2026).

On the first day of his second presidential term, Trump ordered the termination of all federal programs related to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI). This was the first in a series of measures that weakened programs and institutions designed to combat racial discrimination and other forms of discrimination. These measures included a range of executive orders and policies that severely constrained the effective enforcement of civil rights across different parts of the federal government and eliminated nearly all federal initiatives intended to remedy past unlawful discrimination, including the enduring legacies of chattel slavery. The administration also redesigned the country’s refugee resettlement program in a manner that now operates almost exclusively to the benefit of white South Africans (Human Rights Watch, 2026a).

More broadly, Trump’s political discourse has been built around “America First,” restrictive immigration policies, the strengthening of executive power, confrontation with political elites and established institutions, and the redefinition of American national identity. His second presidential term has likewise been accompanied by an expansion of presidential authority and more restrictive immigration policies. Studies indicate that the growing share of immigrants in the population, changes in the ethnic composition of immigrant communities, and the political system’s inability to reform immigration law contributed to the emergence of a political tipping point and a resurgence of anti-immigration sentiment. Four decades of failure by Congress and administrations of both parties to reach a durable solution on immigration created a political opportunity for Trump: in other words, the mainstream political establishment’s inability to resolve the issue opened space for an anti-establishment and hard-line politician (Dionne, 2026).

The United States therefore constitutes an important—and perhaps the most significant—case in this study of how a populist and nationalist right-wing current can evolve from an electoral movement into a dominant force within a country’s political structure.

Human Rights Implications of the Growth of the Far Right

The expansion of far-right movements can have consequences that extend well beyond electoral competition and affect a broad range of fundamental rights and freedoms. The most significant concerns in this regard relate to the rights of migrants and refugees, the prohibition of discrimination, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, women’s rights, freedom of expression and assembly, the independence of democratic institutions, and the rule of law. The normalization of anti-immigration and anti-minority discourses can also intensify social discrimination and confer legitimacy on restrictive policies. In more extreme forms, the spread of white-supremacist and anti-government networks has even been associated with growing threats and violence against racial, religious, and political groups. The emergence of violent groups such as the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IBD, Identitarian Movement Germany) in Germany; Generace Identity (Generation of Identity) and the Pro-Vlast movement in the Czech Republic; Soldiers of Odin in Belgium; and Blood & Honour in Portugal, Scottish Dawn, and National Action, a National Socialist anti-capitalist organization in the United Kingdom (Jones, 2018), along with many other cases, illustrates this concern.

In the field of migration and asylum, one of the most tangible consequences of this political shift has been the gradual weakening of protective safeguards. In February 2026, Amnesty International warned that new safe third country rules could result in asylum applications being rejected without a substantive examination, applicants being transferred to countries with which they have no connection, and even individuals being removed while appeals are still pending (Amnesty International, 2026). Human Rights Watch has likewise emphasized, in relation to the European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum, that accelerated procedures, increased detention, reduced procedural safeguards, and the possibility of transferring asylum responsibilities to third countries place the right to asylum at serious risk. This trend has emerged in a broader context marked by the normalization of anti-migrant rhetoric and the adoption of increasingly restrictive policies by mainstream political actors (Human Rights Watch, 2026b).

The consequences are not limited to migration. Reports by human rights organizations indicate that the influence of the far right, together with the emulation of some of its policies and rhetoric by mainstream parties, has contributed to rising discrimination and intolerance against Muslims, racial minorities, migrants, and others. At the same time, in some countries, the discourse of traditional values has become an instrument for rolling back women’s rights (Human Rights Watch, 2026c). At the institutional level, the erosion of the rule of law, the shrinking of civic space, and pressure on independent media are likewise among the major concerns. In its 2026 report, Freedom House identified media freedom, individual freedom of expression, and the right to a fair trial as among the rights that have suffered the most serious deterioration under authoritarian trends over the past two decades (Freedom House, 2026).

Moreover, some studies suggest that the growth of the far right may also affect the very mechanisms designed to safeguard rights and freedoms. In political science literature, far-right parties have attracted particular attention because of their tensions with principles such as minority rights, pluralism, media freedom and independence, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and systems of checks and balances (Manucci, 2024). The experiences of Poland and Hungary demonstrate that democratic backsliding may be accompanied by the weakening of judicial independence, increased political control over public media, and restrictions on the capacity of civil society to monitor and hold those in power accountable. Such developments ultimately diminish the effectiveness of checks and balances within the political system (Bernhard, 2021).

At the same time, far-right influence can affect fundamental rights even without the complete capture of political power, by shifting the agenda of mainstream parties. A clear example can be seen in the European Union’s migration policy. Reuters reported in June 2026 that new restrictive reforms in the areas of migration and asylum entered into force at a time when European governments were facing growing pressure from right-wing nationalist parties. These rules provide for stricter border controls, accelerated procedures, increased removals, and more extensive use of detention, while critics have warned that they may restrict access to asylum and certain legal protections (Ismail, 2026). Accordingly, one of the most significant consequences of the rise of the far right may be understood as the gradual shifting of the boundaries of politically acceptable policy and the incorporation of some of its restrictive agendas into mainstream politics.

Conclusion

Current developments indicate that the growth of the far right cannot be understood merely as a temporary reaction to an economic, migration-related, or electoral crisis. Rather than being the product of any single factor, the phenomenon results from the intersection of a range of economic, identity-based, and political grievances that have converged in a context marked by declining public trust and the erosion of the credibility of traditional political forces. More importantly, the success of these movements does not necessarily depend on gaining full control of government. Even in countries where they have not yet succeeded in attaining power directly, they have been able to move their issues, language, and priorities to the center of political competition and push mainstream parties to redefine their positions, particularly in the areas of migration, security, identity, and national sovereignty. From this perspective, one of the most significant transformations has been the gradual shifting of the boundaries of what is considered politically acceptable in contemporary politics.

From a human rights perspective, the principal danger lies precisely in this gradual process. When exclusionary, authoritarian, or anti-pluralist attitudes move from the political margins into mainstream political discourse, restrictions on the rights of migrants and minorities, declining tolerance toward political opponents, pressure on the media and civil society, and the weakening of mechanisms designed to constrain the exercise of power can gradually acquire political legitimacy. At the same time, the experiences of the countries examined in this study demonstrate that the far right is neither a uniform political current nor one that follows a predetermined trajectory. Institutional capacities, political traditions, and social resistance can limit or moderate the extent of its influence. Addressing this phenomenon, therefore, depends less on its mere electoral exclusion or political labeling than on confronting the very conditions that have enabled its growth: reducing inequality and insecurity, rebuilding trust in democratic institutions, responding effectively to questions of migration and identity, and strengthening meaningful mechanisms of political participation and representation.

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