War Reparations in International Law: Legal Frameworks and Historical Practice

Zahra Yazdanmehr

Bachelor’s Student in Law, Shiraz University

Introduction

The international responsibility of States for damage arising from armed conflicts is one of the most complex and fundamental areas of public international law. To properly understand the legal regime governing the payment of war reparations, it is first necessary to distinguish the concept of reparation from other similar and related legal concepts within the framework of State responsibility under international law. Within the law of international responsibility, primary obligations determine the substantive duties incumbent upon States, whereas secondary obligations regulate the legal consequences arising from breaches of those primary obligations. The international responsibility of a State arises where an internationally wrongful act, whether an act or omission, is attributable to that State. Once an internationally wrongful act has been established, a new legal relationship arises between the responsible State and the injured State or the international community affected by the breach, at the core of which lies, among the resulting secondary obligations, the obligation to make reparation in its broad sense.

The term “reparation” is an overarching concept encompassing all measures that the responsible State must take to remedy the adverse consequences of its wrongful act. Pursuant to Article 34 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), full reparation encompasses three principal forms: restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. The concept of compensation, or the payment of financial compensation, regulated under Article 36 of the ILC Articles, constitutes a specific form of reparation and applies where the damage caused cannot be made good by restitution. This form of reparation is based on the monetary quantification and economic assessment of the loss suffered, including both material and moral damage capable of financial assessment.

By contrast, restitution, as provided for in Article 35, means re-establishing the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed; examples include the return of confiscated property or cultural property unlawfully removed during an occupation. Satisfaction, pursuant to Article 37, applies where the injury cannot be made good through restitution or compensation and may take such forms as an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or other appropriate modalities.

The distinction between “war damage” and “war reparations” is likewise of fundamental legal significance. War damage refers to human, material, or economic losses resulting from an armed conflict, regardless of whether they originate from lawful or unlawful conduct; by contrast, war reparations concern the obligation of the responsible State to provide financial compensation for damage caused by an internationally wrongful act, including violations of the rules governing the use of force (jus ad bellum) or international humanitarian law.

Legal Bases of State Responsibility and the Principle of Full Reparation

The fundamental legal basis for requiring a responsible State to make reparation under customary international law is the principle of full reparation. This principle was first expressly formulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in its landmark 1928 judgment in the Factory at Chorzów case. In that judgment, the Court stated that it is a fundamental principle of international law that the breach of every obligation entails an obligation to make adequate reparation; such reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the unlawful act and re-establish the situation that would, in all probability, have existed had that act not been committed (Desierto, 2022).

Establishing the international responsibility of a State in armed conflicts, within the framework of the general rules of State responsibility, requires the fulfillment of two essential elements. First, the conduct in question, whether an act or omission, must be attributable to the State under the rules of international law. Such conduct may be carried out by official organs of the State and its armed forces, by persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority, or, under the conditions prescribed by international law, by non-State persons or groups acting under the direction or control of the State. Second, the attributable conduct must constitute a breach of an international obligation binding upon that State at the time the conduct occurs. In the context of armed conflicts, such a breach may concern the rules governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum), including the prohibition on the use of force set out in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, or the rules of international humanitarian law. Pursuant to Article 2 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the existence of damage or a causal relationship does not, in itself, constitute a necessary element for establishing an internationally wrongful act. Nevertheless, at the stage of claiming and determining financial compensation, it becomes necessary to establish both the existence of compensable damage and a sufficiently close causal nexus between the wrongful act and the damage sustained. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) likewise stated in its 2022 judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case that an award of compensation requires a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act and the injury, and that the degree of such connection may vary depending on the nature of the rule breached and the nature and extent of the damage (Ventura, 2023).

State responsibility in armed conflicts may also be distinguished at two levels. First, there is responsibility arising from violations of the jus ad bellum, under which an aggressor State is responsible for all direct damage resulting from an unlawful war. Second, there is responsibility arising from violations of the law governing armed conflict, under which even a State acting in self-defense will be responsible for making reparation for damage resulting from its own specific unlawful conduct if it commits war crimes or violates international humanitarian law.

Principal International Instruments and Conventions

The legal regime governing the payment of war reparations rests on a body of international treaties and instruments that may be divided into two principal categories: first, instruments that directly establish an obligation to pay compensation; and second, instruments that indirectly provide the basis for responsibility by establishing primary obligations and protecting victims.

The most important early instrument of international humanitarian law expressly providing for the financial responsibility of States is the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, particularly Article 3 thereof. Under this provision: “A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” This provision established the principle of the direct responsibility of the State for violations committed by members of its armed forces and prevents a State from escaping international responsibility merely by invoking the fact that its military agents acted beyond the scope of their authority (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1907).

As international humanitarian law continued to evolve, Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, employing language closely resembling that of Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention, reaffirmed and developed this rule in relation to violations of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. Under this provision, a party to the conflict that violates the provisions of the Conventions or the Protocol shall be liable to pay compensation and shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1977).

In addition, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain a key common provision prohibiting the absolution of liability (Article 51 of the First Geneva Convention, Article 52 of the Second Geneva Convention, Article 131 of the Third Geneva Convention, and Article 148 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). These corresponding provisions stipulate that no High Contracting Party is permitted to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of liability incurred in respect of grave breaches. Although these provisions do not expressly refer to financial compensation, they prevent States, through peace agreements, from waiving or extinguishing their legal and financial responsibility for the commission of war crimes.

The Charter of the United Nations, particularly the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII, provides for the adoption of binding decisions for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council, acting pursuant to these powers, affirmed in Resolution 687 Iraq’s liability under international law for direct loss and damage resulting from its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait and provided for the establishment of a Compensation Fund; it subsequently established the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) through Resolution 692. The United Nations Compensation Commission therefore represents a distinctive example of the exercise of Chapter VII powers to establish a compulsory reparations regime.

In addition to the aforementioned treaties, the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2005) brought about a structural development in this field. This soft-law instrument, by systematizing existing principles concerning victims’ right to an effective remedy and reparation and emphasizing a victim-centered approach, strengthened and consolidated the position of victims as rights-holders within the reparations process and identified five principal forms of reparation: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition (United Nations, 2006).

The Three Forms of Reparation and Non-Monetary Measures

Reparation in international law extends beyond monetary compensation, and the choice of the appropriate form of reparation depends on the nature of the obligation breached, the type of injury sustained, and objective feasibility. Pursuant to Article 35 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, restitution is regarded as the primary form of reparation and takes precedence over the payment of financial compensation (International Law Commission, 2001). The purpose of restitution is to eliminate, both physically and legally, all consequences of the internationally wrongful act. Prominent examples of this form of reparation in the law of armed conflict include the release of prisoners and civilians unlawfully detained, the return of property, equipment, vessels, aircraft, or seized documents, the restitution of works of art and cultural property looted during occupation, and the repeal of laws or regulations concerning the unlawful annexation of occupied territories. The limitations on restitution arise where its implementation is materially impossible, such as in cases involving the destruction of irreplaceable property or the loss of human life, or where it would impose a burden that is wholly disproportionate to the benefit derived by the injured State.

Where restitution does not fully make good the injury caused, financial compensation applies as an alternative or supplementary form of reparation. Financial compensation encompasses any damage capable of financial assessment and covers various categories, including direct material damage, loss of life and bodily injury, damage to the environment and natural resources, as well as loss of profits.

Where the injury cannot be fully made good through restitution or financial compensation, the responsible State is required to provide satisfaction. Satisfaction is particularly applicable to non-material injury arising from a wrongful act and, pursuant to Article 37 of the Articles on State Responsibility, may take such forms as formal recognition and acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or other appropriate modalities. In certain circumstances, depending on the nature of the primary obligation breached, an investigation into the relevant events or the adoption of disciplinary or criminal measures against the perpetrators may also form part of the State’s legal response to the violation. However, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are, within the structure of the Articles, institutionally distinct from the three forms of reparation and are addressed in Article 30 alongside the obligation of cessation of the wrongful act. Depending on the circumstances, such guarantees may include legal, administrative, or institutional reforms aimed at preventing the recurrence of the violation.

Comparative Analysis of Historical Examples and Case Studies

The Treaty of Versailles represents a prominent example of an imposed and politically driven reparations regime based on the logic of victor and vanquished. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, commonly known as the “War Guilt Clause,” declared Germany and its allies responsible for all loss and damage suffered by the Allied Powers (Yale Law School, 1919). From a legal perspective, the Treaty did not draw a clear distinction between legal responsibility arising from a wrongful act and the imposition of liability resulting from defeat in war. The determination of the amount of reparations was entrusted to the Reparation Commission, which in 1921 fixed a nominal figure of 132 billion gold marks (Halpérin, 2021). The structure of this amount, however, was not uniform, and a significant portion of it, particularly the so-called C Bonds, was contingent upon Germany’s economic capacity and subsequent developments. The reparations obligations imposed substantial financial and political pressure on the Weimar Republic, and disputes over their payment played a role in crises such as the occupation of the Ruhr. Nevertheless, attributing Germany’s hyperinflation and economic instability solely or primarily to the Versailles reparations would oversimplify a multifactorial process in which domestic fiscal and monetary policies, war debts, political crisis, and the occupation of the Ruhr also played fundamental roles. In any event, the Versailles experience demonstrated that designing reparations regimes without adequate regard to capacity to pay, economic stability, and political consequences can itself become a source of post-war instability.

Drawing lessons from the Versailles system, the Allies adopted a different approach to German reparations after 1945. At the Potsdam Conference and under the Paris Agreement on Reparations, reparations were primarily structured in the form of the transfer and dismantling of portions of industrial installations and equipment, the use of German external assets, and other forms of transfer of property and resources (Yale Law School, 1945). With the onset of the Cold War, the priorities of the United States and its Western allies gradually shifted from the imposition of heavy reparations toward the economic reconstruction and stabilization of West Germany. The 1953 London Agreement on German External Debts likewise deferred consideration of claims against Germany arising out of the Second World War until the final settlement of the reparations question (United Nations, 1953).

With respect to Japan, the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty) established special arrangements. Article 14 of the Treaty recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers, while expressly acknowledging that Japan’s resources were insufficient to make full reparation for all such damage (United Nations, 1951). Accordingly, Japan concluded bilateral agreements with Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar, under which a significant portion of reparations was provided through Japanese services and products, capital goods, and the implementation of economic and infrastructure projects.

Another important development was the arrangements commonly referred to as the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952. Within this framework, the Federal Republic of Germany, on the one hand, concluded an agreement with Israel providing for payments intended to cover the costs of resettling and integrating large numbers of Jewish survivors who had been persecuted by the Nazi regime and, on the other hand, entered into separate arrangements with the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany for the settlement of claims and compensation of Jewish victims. This mechanism constituted one of the leading examples of the expansion of post-war reparation beyond purely inter-State relations toward arrangements in which the claims of non-State victims were also accorded an independent place.

The eight-year Iran–Iraq War was likewise one of the longest and bloodiest conventional wars of the twentieth century and began with Iraq’s military aggression in September 1980. As to its legal basis, the report of the United Nations Secretary-General dated 9 December 1991, prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 598, addressed the question of responsibility for the war in detail. In paragraph 6 of that report, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated that Iraq’s initiation of the war on 22 September 1980 was contrary to the principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and entailed Iraq’s international responsibility for the conflict (United Nations Secretary-General, 1991). In addition to violations of the jus ad bellum, Iraq committed numerous and successive violations of international humanitarian law during the war, including the extensive and documented use of chemical weapons against military personnel and civilians, indiscriminate missile attacks against residential areas, and attacks on oil tankers and oil facilities. Despite the legal and formal determination of Iraq’s international responsibility by the United Nations Secretary-General, no enforcement mechanism was established for the assessment, quantification, and recovery of reparations owed to Iran. The principal reasons for this related to geopolitical considerations following the Gulf War, internal developments in Iraq, and the Security Council’s preference for managing the Kuwait crisis. The Iran–Iraq reparations case demonstrates how the absence of a compulsory enforcement mechanism and the predominance of political considerations within the Security Council can delay the implementation of legal obligations arising from the international responsibility of States.

Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the United Nations Security Council established the most robust reparations mechanism in the history of international law. In Resolution 687, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council expressly declared that Iraq was liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, or injury suffered by foreign Governments, nationals, and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait (United Nations Security Council, 1991). Resolution 692 established the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) as a subsidiary organ in Geneva. The Commission was not a court, but rather an administrative body responsible for the assessment, verification, and payment of claims, with its financial resources secured through the allocation of a percentage of the proceeds from Iraq’s exports of petroleum and petroleum products to the United Nations Compensation Fund (United Nations Security Council, 1991). Following its final payment in January 2022, the Compensation Commission’s completion of its reparations mandate was acknowledged by the Security Council in February of that year, and after the completion of final administrative procedures, it formally ceased operations on 31 December 2022. The Commission processed more than 2.7 million claims and paid approximately USD 52.4 billion in compensation to around 1.5 million claimants, making it one of the most extensive and structured reparations mechanisms in contemporary international law.

The Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case also constitutes one of the most important contemporary judicial decisions concerning war reparations. In its 2005 judgment on the merits, the International Court of Justice held Uganda responsible for the occupation of the Ituri region, violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and the plundering of the Congo’s natural resources, and called upon the parties to negotiate the amount of compensation. Following the failure of those negotiations, the Court resumed the proceedings and delivered its final reparations judgment on 9 February 2022 (Campos, 2022). The Congo had claimed more than USD 11.3 billion, but the Court awarded a total of USD 325 million in compensation, consisting of USD 225 million for damage to persons, USD 40 million for damage to property, and USD 60 million for damage related to natural resources and the environment. Given the considerable passage of time, the destruction of records, and evidentiary difficulties inherent in conflict situations, the Court relied on considerations of equity and an overall assessment of the available evidence and employed a global-sum approach. The Court also rejected the Congo’s claim for large-scale macroeconomic losses because of the absence of a direct and certain causal nexus and insufficient evidence. Payment of compensation was structured in five annual installments of USD 65 million, subject to a 6 percent default interest rate (Kumar, 2022). The Court emphasized that Uganda, as an occupying Power in the Ituri region, was under a duty of vigilance to prevent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the region, including rebel groups. Accordingly, Uganda was required to make reparation for damage arising from the conflict in Ituri, including damage caused by the conduct of third parties, unless, with respect to a particular item of damage, it could establish that the damage was not caused by its failure to discharge its obligations as an occupying Power.

One of the most significant emerging models in the field of war reparations is the mechanism associated with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. On 14 November 2022, the United Nations General Assembly, through the adoption of Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5, emphasized the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable and to require it to bear the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts, including reparation, and recommended the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation and a register of damage (United Nations General Assembly, 2022). On 12 May 2023, the Register of Damage for Ukraine was established within the framework of the Council of Europe, and it began receiving claims on 2 April 2024. By 30 September 2026, all 43 categories of claims had been opened for submission: 21 categories for natural persons, 11 categories for legal persons, and 11 categories for the State of Ukraine (Register of Damage for Ukraine, 2026). The next development was the adoption and opening for signature in The Hague, on 16 December 2025, of the Convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. This Commission is intended to constitute the second component of the reparations mechanism and, once the Convention enters into force, is expected to examine registered claims and determine entitlement to and the amount of compensation. The establishment of a compensation fund is also envisaged as the third component of this structure, although it has not yet been completed (Council of Europe, 2025). Alongside this mechanism, the question of using Russia’s frozen sovereign assets, particularly the assets of its central bank, to finance reparations remains one of the major legal controversies concerning State immunity and immunity of central bank property.

The large-scale armed conflict that began on 28 February 2026 with joint air strikes by the United States and Israel against military and nuclear infrastructure and centers of State authority in Iran raises new legal dimensions concerning the international responsibility of States, the assessment of war damage, and the legal regime governing reparations. From the perspective of the jus ad bellum, the incompatibility of the initial attacks with the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, together with the absence of the conditions required for the exercise of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, constitutes a fundamental legal challenge in this case. By contrast, Iran’s subsequent missile and drone responses against military positions and bases, as well as controversies relating to maritime security and alleged mine-laying in the Strait of Hormuz, have created a complex legal framework of competing claims of international responsibility. From the perspective of international humanitarian law and the principle of full reparation, the conflict has involved severe damage to civilian infrastructure, extensive human harm, including documented civilian casualties resulting from attacks on urban locations and facilities such as the Shajareh Tayyebeh School in Minab and the Lamerd sports hall, destruction of property, disruption of international energy transmission routes, and environmental pollution in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. In addition, the conduct of joint military operations by the United States and Israel raises complex questions concerning the attribution of specific conduct, shared responsibility, and the apportionment of reparation under the rules set forth in the Articles on State Responsibility. Damage to oil tankers, commercial infrastructure, and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as disruption to energy flows (Wintour, 2026), has also generated direct and indirect transnational losses for third States and corporations, the financial quantification of which requires the application of novel methodologies. Finally, because a permanent member of the Security Council is directly involved as a party to the conflict, the establishment of a centralized and compulsory mechanism comparable to the United Nations Compensation Commission on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is, in practical terms, foreclosed. Consequently, the legal pursuit and recovery of reparations will face structural obstacles arising from the principle of State immunity and international political deadlock.

The Position of Victims in the Contemporary Reparations Regime

One of the most fundamental developments in international law over the past three decades has been the shift from a purely State-centered system toward a victim-centered model in the reparations process. Under the traditional model of international law, particularly within the framework of the doctrine of diplomatic protection, claims at the international level were generally brought through the State of nationality of the individual, and injury suffered by a national was framed as injury to the State of nationality itself. Individuals therefore generally lacked an independent and direct capacity to bring claims before international bodies; subsequent developments in international law, particularly in the field of international human rights law, however, led to increasing recognition of individual rights and of individuals’ direct or indirect access to international mechanisms. In addition, traditional peace agreements frequently contained waiver or release clauses under which States were deemed to waive or relinquish the rights of all their nationals to obtain compensation from the opposing State. Nevertheless, the convergence of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law has contributed to a departure from this traditional structure and to the emergence of new legal concepts.

In this regard, the International Court of Justice, in its 2004 advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, expressly stated that Israel was under an obligation to return all property and land unlawfully seized and, where restitution was materially impossible, to compensate all natural or legal persons concerned for the damage suffered (International Court of Justice, 2004). This opinion constitutes a prominent example of the express recognition of the right of injured natural and legal persons to obtain reparation within the framework of the international responsibility of a State, although the Court did not address in that opinion whether such persons possess independent legal standing to bring claims at the international level.

In the same vein, Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court brought about a structural development in strengthening the position of victims. Under this provision, the Court may issue direct orders for individual or collective reparations. The establishment of the Trust Fund for Victims under the Rome Statute has likewise created a mechanism for implementing the Court’s reparations orders. Among other circumstances, where the convicted person is indigent, the Fund may use its own resources and voluntary contributions to participate in financing and implementing reparations, without extinguishing the convicted person’s legal responsibility to provide reparation. This mechanism has been employed in the Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mahdi cases (International Criminal Court, 1998).

In addition, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, through their jurisprudence concerning armed conflicts and structural confrontations, have developed a comprehensive and detailed regime of individual and collective reparation. For example, in its 2014 judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights ordered Turkey to pay EUR 90 million in compensation for distribution among the relatives of missing persons and the enclaved residents of the Karpas region (European Court of Human Rights, 2014).

Legal and Practical Challenges in the Implementation of Contemporary War Reparations

The determination and enforcement of war reparations in contemporary conflicts face a series of fundamental legal, technical, and political challenges rooted, above all, in the changing nature of warfare. A substantial proportion of today’s conflicts are non-international armed conflicts, in which one party to the hostilities consists of non-State armed groups. The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts are fundamentally concerned with the responsibility of States, and the conduct of a non-State group is not attributable to a State merely because that group operates within the State’s territory or is otherwise connected with it. Nevertheless, the rules of attribution under the law of State responsibility are not confined to situations involving effective control or the transformation of an insurrectional movement into a new government. Depending on the circumstances, other bases—such as the exercise of governmental authority, the direction or control of a State, conduct carried out in the absence of official authorities, or the State’s subsequent acknowledgment and adoption of the conduct as its own—may also give rise to attribution. Furthermore, non-State armed groups that are parties to a conflict are themselves directly bound by the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. The principal gap in this field therefore concerns not so much the existence of legal obligations as the limitations of international mechanisms for establishing the responsibility of such groups and effectively compelling them to provide reparation.

Contemporary conflicts are also frequently accompanied by widespread environmental destruction, such as the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine or the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells, as well as the destruction of irreplaceable cultural heritage, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas or the ancient city of Palmyra. The financial valuation of damage to ecosystems, the loss of ecosystem services, and the intangible value of the cultural heritage of humankind requires complex methodologies extending beyond traditional accounting methods for material loss. In the Congo v. Uganda case, the International Court of Justice rejected claims relating to decreases in gross domestic product, inflation rates, and large-scale damage to urban centers beyond the occupied areas. Establishing whether an economic collapse resulted directly from the commission of an internationally wrongful act, or instead from domestic mismanagement, sanctions regimes, and general market conditions, constitutes one of the most difficult evidentiary obstacles in judicial practice.

The principle of State immunity, reflected in customary international law and in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004), constitutes a major legal obstacle to the enforcement of reparation awards before the domestic courts of other States. Attempts to attach and confiscate frozen sovereign assets, such as foreign-exchange reserves held by central banks, for the purpose of paying compensation to war victims encounter the constraints imposed by the rules governing immunity of State property.

One of the major philosophical and practical challenges is the need to balance the obligation to pay reparations against the right to life and development of the population of the responsible State. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in its final awards, expressly stated that the amount of compensation should not be so burdensome as to destroy the responsible State’s financial capacity to meet the basic human needs of its citizens (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2009). By contrast, in the Congo v. Uganda case, the International Court of Justice found that the total amount awarded and the terms of payment fell within Uganda’s capacity to pay and therefore saw no need to decide whether the economic circumstances of the responsible State could justify a reduction in the amount of compensation. The Court structured payment of the award in five annual installments.

Conclusion

A sequential analysis of the legal foundations, relevant instruments, and historical examples demonstrates that international law in the field of war reparations has evolved from a purely State-centered and punitive system toward a more legal, protective, and victim-centered model, although this transformation remains incomplete and imperfect. In contrast to the punitive approach embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, the establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) created a technical, specialized, and structured model of reparation based on responsibility arising from aggression and, for the first time, placed the rights of natural persons at a higher level of priority than State claims. In addition, the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) case, as well as the establishment of the Register of Damage for Ukraine, represent the high point of the growing tendency in international practice to employ equitable methodologies and human rights-based approaches to the registration of claims.

Nevertheless, the principal structural criticism of the current system is that the implementation of the principle of full reparation remains heavily influenced by power dynamics and the political will of the United Nations Security Council. Accordingly, whenever the responsible State possesses a veto power within the Security Council or benefits from the protection of major powers, compulsory enforcement mechanisms may be blocked or rendered ineffective.

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