War for Profit: Examining the Interests of Major Corporations in the U.S. and Israeli War against Iran

Mahdi Baeidi Nejad

PhD Student in International Relations, University of Isfahan

Introduction

War is, before anything else, a human experience of insecurity, fear, vulnerability, and the collapse of everyday order. For people exposed to attacks, threats, infrastructural disruption, or economic pressure, war is not an abstract concept in security literature; it is a lived reality that manifests itself in public anxiety, rising costs of living, threats to health, disruption of education, difficulty in accessing basic services, and the erosion of psychological and social security. In this sense, the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran cannot be understood merely as a military confrontation or strategic rivalry between states; it is simultaneously part of a broader human and social crisis whose effects extend beyond the battlefield.

Yet, for some economic actors, the same event carries an entirely different meaning. What signifies insecurity, rising prices, and threats to everyday life for ordinary people may, for certain arms companies, military contractors, energy firms, war-risk insurers, and financial actors, mean increased demand, new contracts, rising stock values, and unexpected profits. This duality is the point of departure for the present article: war can simultaneously be a crisis for one group and an economic opportunity for another.

The significance of Iran as a case study arises precisely from this point. Because of Iran’s position in the geography of global energy and its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran does not remain merely a regional crisis. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoints, and Reuters reports have shown that around one-fifth of the world’s daily supply of oil and liquefied natural gas passes through this route. Therefore, any disruption along this passage can rapidly affect energy, transport, and insurance markets. The International Monetary Fund has also warned, in its analysis of the economic consequences of war in the Middle East, that such a war could lead to higher energy prices, slower economic growth, and inflationary pressure, especially for countries dependent on energy imports.

On the other hand, rising energy prices do not affect all actors equally. Reuters’ report on the oil-related consequences of the war indicates that higher oil prices, while placing pressure on consumers and energy-importing economies, can generate substantial profits for major oil companies. The report highlights the rise in oil prices following the war and the possibility of greater profitability for companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell. The same logic can be observed in the arms market: the escalation of war leads to the consumption of ammunition, the need to replenish stockpiles, the purchase of air-defense systems, and an increase in military orders.

Therefore, without claiming that “corporate profit is the sole cause of war,” this article examines how war, once it begins, creates a profitable economic chain. The article focuses on the political economy of war; that is, on the question of who pays the costs of war and who benefits from it. Within this framework, the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran will be examined not only as a military crisis, but also as a case study of the relationship between violence, markets, weapons, energy, and corporate profit.

Conceptual Framework: War for Profit

The concept of “war for profit” does not mean that wars are always launched directly and exclusively at the command of corporations, or that all military decisions should be explained solely through economic logic. Such an interpretation is analytically simplistic and ignores the security, geopolitical, ideological, and legal complexities of war. In a more precise sense, “war for profit” means that wars, after they begin, activate a network of economic interests in which certain companies and markets profit from the continuation of insecurity, the intensification of threats, and the expansion of military demand.

The first key concept in this regard is the military-industrial complex. This term refers to the structural relationship among the state, the military, arms companies, defense contractors, legislative bodies, lobbies, research centers, and financial markets. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the former President of the United States, warned in his farewell address about the growing influence of this complex over public policy, emphasizing that the link between a vast military establishment and major arms industries could have serious consequences for politics, the economy, and democracy (Eisenhower, 1961). The importance of this warning lies in the fact that it shows that the issue of war and profit is not merely a moral or media-related concern, but is connected to institutional structures of power.

The second concept is the political economy of war. The political economy of war asks how war redistributes public resources, which groups bear its costs, and which actors benefit from its continuation. From this perspective, military budgets, arms sales, reconstruction contracts, rising energy prices, war-risk insurance, and financial markets are all part of the economic mechanism of war. In such an analysis, war is not only a security event; it is also a process in which political power and economic interests become intertwined. Scholars of the political economy of war have also shown that armed violence is often connected to systems of resource distribution, corporate interests, and profit-making structures, even if these connections are not the sole cause of war (Cramer, 2006).

The third concept is profiting from insecurity. In conditions of persistent insecurity, states buy more weapons, companies provide more security services, the energy market faces price shocks, insurance and transport costs increase, and defense industries find political and financial justification for expanding their production capacity. In other words, insecurity is a threat to citizens and civilians, but for part of the war economy it can become a source of demand. This is precisely the point at which human rights analysis and political economy intersect: the costs of war become public and socialized, while its profits often remain private and corporate.

On this basis, the central statement of this article is as follows: war for profit does not mean that economic profit is the sole cause of war; rather, it means that war, once it begins, activates a network of corporate interests that become stakeholders in the continuation, escalation, and normalization of violence. This framework allows us to examine the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran not only from a military or legal perspective, but also from the perspective of profit-generating mechanisms—mechanisms that begin with arms sales, extend into energy and insurance markets, and in some cases even reach financial transactions and profits derived from wartime information.

Case-Study Background: The U.S. and Israeli War against Iran and the Activation of the Arms Market

The U.S. and Israeli war against Iran did not occur in a vacuum; rather, it took shape in a regional environment that was already highly militarized, securitized, and dependent on foreign arms imports. In recent decades, the Middle East has not only been one of the main centers of military crises and geopolitical rivalries, but has also become one of the world’s most important markets for arms imports. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2021 and 2025, more than half of the Middle East’s arms imports—around 54 percent—were supplied by the United States. During the same period, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait were among the ten largest arms importers in the world, a fact that shows that the region’s security structure had already been built on extensive arms purchases, dependence on foreign military technologies, and ties with Western, especially American, defense industries (SIPRI, 2026).

From this perspective, the war against Iran is not merely a new military event, but one that takes place upon an already prepared arms market. More precisely, in a region where states had already become dependent on the purchase of defense, missile, radar, drone, and air systems in order to confront real or perceived threats, wartime conditions create a greater capacity for turning the region into an emergency arms market. In such circumstances, the “Iranian threat,” as a security proposition, is rapidly translated into the language of defense contracts. Regional states, especially in the Persian Gulf, perceive the war not only as an immediate danger, but also as a justification for strengthening their arsenals and recalibrating their security calculations (Dang & Kelly & Stephenson, 2026).

A clear example of this process is the U.S. government’s decision in March 2026 to approve more than $16.5 billion in potential arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan. According to Reuters, these packages included missiles, drones, radar systems, munitions related to F-16 fighter jets, and air- and missile-defense systems. The principal contractors for these potential sales were identified as companies such as RTX, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin—companies at the heart of the U.S. military-industrial complex, whose revenue and future order backlogs depend significantly on governmental and military demand (Reuters, 2026).

The importance of this data lies in the fact that it shows that the profitability of war is not limited to arms sales to Israel. The war against Iran can turn the entire security periphery of Iran into a broader market for the U.S. military industry. Here, war functions as a regional catalyst: the higher the level of threat, the more U.S.-allied states in the region come under political and security pressure to purchase additional defense equipment. At the same time, arms companies benefit from this threatening environment, because war makes demand more urgent, more political, and less postponable.

Therefore, the case study of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran shows that contemporary war does not produce effects only on the battlefield; it also creates a chain of demand, orders, contracts, and profits in arms markets. In this framework, “security” becomes an expensive commodity, and “threat” assumes the role of a market-driving engine. This does not mean that all arms purchases lack security logic; rather, the main point is that security logic, within the structure of the political economy of war, becomes tied to the logic of corporate profitability. For this reason, the war against Iran must be analyzed not only as a military crisis, but also as a point of reactivation for the regional arms market.

U.S. Arms Companies: From Emergency Arms Sales to Increased Orders

One of the most important dimensions of the political economy of war is the way security and military decisions are converted into real contracts for arms companies. In the case of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, this issue must be understood within the framework of the long-standing military relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv—a relationship that had already been consolidated before the escalation of the war through mechanisms of foreign military sales, military aid, and long-term contracts. The Council on Foreign Relations has reported that, as of April 2025, Israel had 751 active Foreign Military Sales cases with the United States, worth approximately $39 billion. This figure shows that Israel’s military dependence on the U.S. arms market is not merely a temporary reaction to a particular crisis, but part of a stable structure of military supply, support, and modernization (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025).

Within such a structure, war plays the role of an accelerator. When the level of conflict rises, so too does the need for ammunition, parts, guidance systems, missiles, technical support, and the replenishment of consumed stockpiles. For example, in February 2025, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency approved a possible $6.75 billion sale of munitions, guidance kits, fuzes, and weapons-support services to Israel. This package included thousands of bombs, JDAM guidance kits, and related fuzes (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025).

The importance of these kinds of contracts lies not only in their initial financial value, but also in their repetitive and chain-like nature. The sale of munitions and guidance kits, unlike the sale of certain major and slow-consumption equipment, depends on operational use, replacement, and subsequent orders. In a war in which guided munitions, air-to-ground missiles, and support systems are continuously consumed, each wave of operations can create the need for a new wave of purchases and replacements. The same logic can be seen in the possible sale of 3,000 Hellfire missiles worth $660 million, whose principal contractor was identified as Lockheed Martin and which, in addition to missiles, included spare parts, software support, training, testing equipment, and technical and logistical services (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025).

The more significant part of the matter is that some of these sales are carried out under the logic of “emergency.” On February 28, 2025, the U.S. Secretary of State approved the possible $675.7 million sale of munitions, guidance kits, and support services to Israel, and the same notification explicitly stated that, due to the existence of an emergency, the usual congressional review requirements under the Arms Export Control Act had been waived. The principal contractors for this package were announced as Repkon USA and Boeing. This example shows that war not only increases demand, but can also shorten the oversight and timing pathways for arms transfers; from the perspective of the political economy of war, this means the faster conversion of a security decision into a contractual opportunity (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025).

In June 2025, the United States also approved a possible $510 million sale of munitions guidance kits and related support to Israel. This package included, among other items, thousands of JDAM kits for MK-83 and BLU-109 bombs. The analytical significance of this sale lies in the fact that it shows that the arms supply chain continues even after the initial waves of war. In other words, arms profits do not stop at the initial sale; they continue through maintenance, repair, training, parts, upgrades, logistical support, and the replacement of consumed stockpiles (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025).

This section points to a deeper and more structured mechanism that operates beyond the simple sale of weapons and shows how the U.S. military industry maintains both its economic interests and geopolitical influence through a continuous network of production, support, and security dependence. Accordingly, companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, RTX, and Northrop Grumman are not merely producers or sellers of military equipment; rather, they are involved in a continuous cycle of arms production, consumption, replacement, and upgrading—a cycle that becomes more active with crises, wars, and intensifying security rivalries. Within this framework, the sale of a fighter jet, missile system, or defense equipment is only the beginning of a long-term relationship, because the purchasing country remains dependent for years on training services, spare parts, maintenance, software updates, technical support, and even human-resource training. By referring to the official Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, this text shows that the U.S. government also institutionally strengthens this dependence. According to official definitions, the FMS program is not limited merely to the transfer of “goods”; rather, it encompasses a wide range of defense equipment, services, training, technical support, and security cooperation for foreign partners. From this perspective, the arms trade becomes an instrument for shaping long-term strategic ties—ties that not only provide sustained economic profit for U.S. military-industrial complexes, but also consolidate and reproduce the political, security, and technological influence of the United States in purchasing countries (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025).

Profit, Orders, and Stock Value: Financial Indicators of Military Companies

If the previous section examined the contractual logic of war, this section must consider how that logic appears in the financial language of military companies. Defense companies usually express their profits through terms such as annual sales, net income, cash flow, recorded orders, future order backlogs, and shareholder returns. These very concepts show how war and insecurity move from the level of the battlefield into corporate financial statements. For example, Lockheed Martin’s 2025 financial report announced $75 billion in sales, $5 billion in net earnings, and a record future order backlog of around $194 billion. These figures do not, by themselves, necessarily prove that one particular war caused all of the company’s profitability, but they do show how defense demand in a tense global environment becomes a major financial support for military contractors (Lockheed Martin, 2026).

Another example is RTX, a company that, through units such as Raytheon, plays a key role in missiles, air-defense systems, and technologies related to warfare. RTX’s 2025 annual report shows that the backlog of its Raytheon segment increased from $63 billion at the end of 2024 to $75 billion at the end of 2025, and that this segment recorded $40 billion in defense orders during the same year. This data is analytically important because future order backlogs are, in effect, an indication of future revenue and contractual obligations; in other words, war and rising threats strengthen not only a company’s current sales, but also its future financial horizon (RTX Corporation, 2026).

This pattern can also be seen in Northrop Grumman. The company’s 2025 financial report refers to $42 billion in sales and a record backlog of $95.7 billion. The report also shows that the company’s annual net orders reached $46.3 billion. These figures show that military companies, in tense situations, do not benefit only from immediate contracts, but also from the accumulation of long-term orders that make future income more predictable. For this reason, war is not merely a short-term event for these companies, but a stabilizing factor for their multi-year financial outlook (Northrop Grumman, 2026).

On the Israeli side, Elbit Systems provides a clear example of the conversion of war into corporate financial indicators. Reuters reported in March 2026 that the company’s revenue in 2025 had increased by 16 percent to $7.9 billion, that its future order backlog had risen from $22.6 billion in 2024 to $28.1 billion, and that the company’s management expected further growth following the Iran war. More importantly, 72 percent of the company’s future order backlog was related to orders outside Israel. This means that war does not only increase the domestic consumption of military equipment; it can also strengthen a company’s export capacity and credibility in the global market (Scheer, 2026).

Profits and Losses of Arms Companies

Nevertheless, a scientific analysis should not refer only to profits. Arms companies derive clear benefits from war and insecurity: increased sales, growth in long-term orders, higher future order backlogs, strengthened stock value, expanded exports, and broader maintenance and support contracts. Yet this profitability is also accompanied by risks, including pressure on supply chains, rising raw-material costs, shortages of skilled labor, and human rights and reputational risks resulting from excessive dependence on cycles of war. Even in official corporate reports, signs of these risks can be observed; for example, Northrop Grumman’s financial report refers to matters such as insurance coverage, indemnification protections from customers, and risks associated with major programs (Northrop Grumman, 2026).

Therefore, the profitability of military companies should be analyzed within a kind of “economic duality.” On the one hand, war and threat create markets, orders, and future revenue; on the other hand, this same dependence on crisis environments can expose companies to legal, ethical, reputational, and operational risks. For this reason, the evaluation of the economy of war should not be reduced to the simple claim that arms companies “profit.” Rather, it must show how this profit is produced, through which channels it continues, who pays its costs, and what risks remain hidden behind the seemingly neutral language of financial reports.

Israeli Defense Industries: War as Export Credibility

In analyzing the political economy of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, Israel should not be seen merely as a recipient of American weapons. Israel itself is one of the important actors in the global arms market, and its defense industries—especially in the fields of missiles, air defense, drones, intelligence systems, and surveillance technologies—hold a significant position in the export market. Israel’s Ministry of Defense has announced that the country’s defense exports in 2024 reached more than $14.7 billion, a figure that represented a 13 percent increase compared with the previous year and broke Israel’s defense export record for the fourth consecutive year. The significance of this data becomes clearer when the composition and destination of these exports are examined. According to Defense News, Europe was the main destination for Israeli defense exports in 2024, accounting for 54 percent, while the Asia-Pacific region ranked next with 23 percent. In addition, 48 percent of Israeli defense exports were related to missiles, rockets, and air-defense systems—precisely the areas that experience the highest demand in wartime conditions and securitized environments (Greenberg, 2025).

Here, the concept of “battle-tested” becomes important. In the commercial literature of the arms trade, technology that has been used on an actual battlefield is often presented as “battle-tested,” “operationalized,” or as having “proven performance.” The U.S. Department of Commerce’s trade guide on Israel’s aerospace and defense sector also states that Israeli arms exports, alongside rising global demand, are influenced by “demonstrated battlefield performance” and shifting security priorities in Europe and the Middle East (International Trade Administration, 2026). From an analytical perspective, this statement shows that the battlefield can become part of the process of commercial credibility-building for military technology.

This trend is not limited only to large and traditional companies. The Jerusalem Post has reported on the presence of Israeli companies at the Singapore Airshow, noting that demand for “battle-tested” technologies has increased in Asian markets and that Israeli companies are seeking to activate new markets in an environment where some European markets face political and human-rights pressures (Ahronheim, 2026). This shows that war can have two simultaneous and contradictory effects: on the one hand, it generates human rights criticism and political pressure; on the other hand, for some military customers, it creates operational credibility and an incentive to purchase.

From the perspective of industrial data, this picture is also confirmed. SIPRI has reported that the three Israeli companies included among the world’s top 100 arms-producing companies generated a total of $16.2 billion in arms revenue in 2024, representing a 16 percent increase compared with the previous year. SIPRI linked this increase both to Israeli military operations and to global demand for Israeli equipment, including drones and counter-drone systems (SIPRI, 2025). Therefore, in Israel’s war economy, the battlefield is not only a place where weapons are consumed; it can also become an operational showcase for marketing military technologies.

Beyond Weapons: Oil, Insurance, Transport, and Profiting from Instability

Wartime profit is not limited to arms companies. Because of Iran’s geopolitical position and its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran has also affected the energy market, maritime insurance, transport, supply chains, and even financial markets. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has reported that, in 2024, around 20 million barrels of oil per day passed through the Strait of Hormuz, equivalent to around 20 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption; approximately one-fifth of global LNG trade also passed through this route (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025). This position turns the war against Iran from a regional crisis into a potential global shock.

The International Energy Agency also regards the Strait of Hormuz as one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints and emphasizes that, in 2025, around 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products passed through this route. According to the Agency, around 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade and nearly 20 percent of global LNG exports depend on this route, while alternative options for bypassing it are limited (International Energy Agency, 2026). From this perspective, any escalation of war around Iran can increase not only oil prices, but also transport costs, insurance costs, ship fuel costs, and the security costs of supply chains.

The economic consequences of this situation have also been reflected in the reports of development institutions. In its April 2026 Commodity Markets Outlook, the World Bank warned that war in the Middle East could increase energy prices by around 24 percent in 2026. It also noted that overall commodity prices could rise by 16 percent, and that fertilizer prices could come under further pressure because of a surge in urea prices, thereby affecting food security (World Bank, 2026). This point is important for the article because it shows that the profits of energy and transport companies take shape simultaneously with pressure on consumers, farmers, importing governments, and vulnerable economies.

UNCTAD has also explained, in an analysis of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, that the consequences of such a crisis extend beyond the energy market and affect maritime transport, supply chains, fertilizer prices, insurance costs, ship fuel costs, and livelihood pressures. The organization warned that rising energy, transport, and insurance costs could lead to higher food prices and intensify pressure on vulnerable groups (UNCTAD, 2026). Therefore, in the political economy of war, profit and loss are not distributed equally: some companies profit from increased risk, while a large share of the cost is transferred to consumers and weaker economies.

Another dimension of this issue is the role of information and political timing in financial markets. The Financial Times reported that traders placed around $580 million in oil bets shortly before Donald Trump’s post about talks with Iran (Financial Times, 2026). At the same time, Bloomberg reported that oil futures and stock trades worth billions of dollars had taken place around fifteen minutes before Trump’s post, after which oil prices fell and the stock market rose (Chin et al., 2026). These data do not prove insider trading, but they do show that war, political decisions, and public messages by leaders can become market-moving events. This phenomenon can be analyzed as a structural intersection between information, political timing, and the logic of profit in financial markets; that is, decisions or even political signals such as public statements or posts by leaders like Trump function as “market-making information” and shape the expectations of economic actors before events actually materialize. Within such a framework, if some traders are able to anticipate or receive these signals earlier than their public release, they may be able to make pre-emptive trades—trades that, after the official publication of the news and the market’s reaction, such as a decline in oil prices or a rise in stock markets following reduced geopolitical tensions, may result in considerable profits. Although such patterns do not, by themselves, prove access to inside information, they do indicate a form of information asymmetry and the decisive role of timing in the financial exploitation of political developments. Ultimately, this shows that war and geopolitical decisions, beyond their security consequences, also become mechanisms for generating profitable opportunities in global markets.

As a result, the war against Iran should be understood as a multi-market crisis: in the arms market, demand for ammunition and defense systems increases; in the energy market, oil and LNG prices fluctuate; in the insurance and transport markets, risk is converted into cost; and in financial markets, even the timing of political messages can become a source of profit or loss. This breadth shows that the concept of “war for profit” should not be limited merely to arms sales; rather, it must encompass the entire profitable economic ecosystem surrounding war.

Social and Human Loss versus Corporate Profit

If the analysis of the political economy of war is limited only to arms contracts, stock values, rising energy prices, or corporate profits, it overlooks the main part of the issue: the human and social cost of war. For the people of Iran and the region, the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran is, before being a financial or security event, an experience of insecurity, destruction, displacement, disruption of public services, and threats to everyday life. According to reports, nearly two thousand civilians have been killed in U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, and these attacks have also targeted or affected schools, hospitals, cultural and religious buildings, residential homes, and civilian infrastructure. These data show that, at the social level, war does not merely mean confrontation between military forces; it imposes a network of widespread harms on civilian life.

In this context, children and vulnerable groups pay the highest price. In April 2026, UNICEF warned that children in Iran and across the region had been exposed to physical harm, psychological distress, and threats against critical infrastructure—infrastructure on which children’s survival, education, health, and everyday security depend (UNICEF, 2026). In another report, UNICEF stated that since the beginning of the escalation of hostilities on February 28, more than 1,100 children had been killed or injured in the region, with part of this figure relating to Iran (UNICEF, 2026). From a human rights perspective, this situation shows that the cost of war does not appear only at the moment of attack; it continues through sustained anxiety, educational disruption, the collapse of psychological security, and long-term generational harm.

The human dimensions of war are also clearly visible in the field of health. The World Health Organization has reported that, since February 28, 2026, it had verified at least 18 attacks on health care in Iran, resulting in the deaths of eight health workers. The organization emphasized that attacks on medical facilities, patients, and health workers not only take lives, but also disrupt society’s access to vital services at the very time when such services are most needed (World Health Organization, 2026). From this perspective, the destruction or disruption of the health system is not merely a side effect of war; it is a factor that transfers the scope of harm from the battlefield to people’s everyday lives.

At the global level, the harms of war are not confined to the people of the region. Higher energy prices, disruptions to trade routes, rising insurance and transport costs, and pressure on commodity markets can affect global consumers, energy-importing economies, and low-income groups. In April 2026, the World Bank warned that war in the Middle East could significantly increase energy prices in 2026 and place new pressure on commodity markets, production costs, and food security (World Bank, 2026). Therefore, the same situation that may create profit opportunities for energy, insurance, or arms companies can mean inflation, reduced purchasing power, and the erosion of economic security for households, importing governments, and vulnerable communities.

From this point, we can arrive at the central proposition of this section: the main issue in the economy of war is that costs are socialized, while profits often remain private. People pay the costs of war through insecurity, death, displacement, psychological harm, rising prices, and the destruction of infrastructure; yet parts of the profits of war are recorded on the balance sheets of arms, energy, insurance, transport, and financial companies. This gap between public loss and private profit constitutes the ethical and human rights core of the critique of the economy of war. Therefore, by proposing the concept of “war for profit,” the present article does not seek to deny the security complexities of war; rather, it seeks to show that any serious analysis of war must ask: who suffers, who pays, and who profits?

Conclusion

The case study of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran shows that contemporary war cannot be explained only through concepts such as security, deterrence, geopolitical competition, or military conflict. These concepts are necessary for understanding part of the reality, but they are not sufficient. In the contemporary world, war is also an economic mechanism—a mechanism through which insecurity is converted into demand, threat into contract, ammunition consumption into new orders, and regional crisis into corporate profit. The present article showed that the first layer of this chain is arms profit. The sale of weapons, guided munitions, air-defense systems, missiles, parts, training, technical services, and support contracts turns war into a stable source of income for military companies. In this logic, profit does not lie only in the initial sale; it is also embedded in the continuation of war, the replacement of consumed stockpiles, the maintenance of systems, and the continuous upgrading of equipment. For this reason, war can be not an exceptional event for arms industries, but part of their economic and financial planning horizon.

The second layer is the profit of adjacent markets. Because of Iran’s geopolitical position and its connection to global energy and trade routes, the war against Iran activates not only the arms market, but also affects oil, gas, maritime insurance, transport, supply chains, and commodity prices. Under such conditions, insecurity is converted into “price”: the price of oil, the cost of insurance, transport rates, and the value of financial assets. This part of the economy of war is less visible, but it is essential for a complete understanding of the concept of “war for profit.”

The third layer is informational profit. In contemporary wars, political decisions, leaders’ messages, the likelihood of attack, delays in operations, or announcements of negotiations can move markets within minutes. This situation raises important questions about transparency, equal access to information, and the possibility of exploiting sensitive wartime information. Even if no violation has been proven, the very capacity to profit from the timing of wartime information is a sign of the increasing complexity of the economy of war.

However, the most important conclusion of the article lies at the ethical and human rights level: war creates a structure in which losses become public and social, while profits often remain private. Civilians, children, patients, consumers, and vulnerable communities pay the costs of war, while certain companies and markets benefit from the same conditions. This asymmetry is not merely an economic issue; it is a political, legal, and ethical one.

For this reason, the critique of “war for profit” must lead to a demand for accountability. Transparency in arms sales, oversight of financial transactions connected to wartime decisions, control over military lobbying, human rights assessments of defense contracts, and accountability for companies that profit from war are among the requirements of responsible policymaking in an age of costly wars.

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