Universalism of Human Rights and Cultural Relativism in International Law: Challenges and Approaches

Zahra Yazdanmehr

Bachelor’s Student in Law, Shiraz University

Introduction

The contemporary international human rights system has been founded upon the fundamental assumption that all human beings, regardless of racial, religious, national, or cultural affiliations, possess a set of fundamental and inalienable rights rooted in the inherent dignity of the human person. Nevertheless, the practical realization of this universal ideal has consistently encountered serious challenges from the paradigm of cultural relativism; a school of thought which argues that moral values and legal norms are products of particular historical and social contexts, and that no singular or transcendental standard may legitimately be imposed upon culturally diverse societies. This fundamental tension is not merely a theoretical debate within the philosophy of law, but also an ongoing conflict within diplomatic institutions and international judicial practices that directly affects the implementation of states’ obligations and the mechanisms established for the protection of individuals’ rights.

Although the claim of universality has been explicitly entrenched within international legal instruments, both theory and practice continue to confront profound challenges arising from this paradigm. Critics of universalism, by questioning the ontological foundations of human rights, regard them as the immediate product of Western history and culture and emphasize the necessity of adapting legal standards to the cultural and religious particularities of non-Western societies. Meanwhile, human rights, as one of the principal pillars of the international order in the twenty-first century, assert that human dignity transcends cultural boundaries. Therefore, examining the relationship between universality and cultural diversity is not merely an abstract discussion, but rather a fundamental necessity for ensuring the effectiveness and legitimacy of international law in the contemporary era.

Philosophical and Historical Foundations of the Claim to Universality

The claim to the universality of human rights rests upon a solid foundation in the history of political thought and moral philosophy. The earliest theoretical endeavors in this regard emerged in Ancient Greece and manifested themselves in the teachings of the Stoic school. The Stoics believed that all human beings are equal by virtue of sharing the seed of reason bestowed upon them by nature. This common rationality formed the basis for the development of natural law, which was considered superior and prior to all positive human laws and the will of rulers. Subsequently, Cicero, the Roman philosopher and statesman, transferred this concept into the public sphere and argued that justice is rooted in nature and that sound reason dictates that the fundamental rights of individuals should not be subjected to transient interests or the power-oriented will of dictators.

During the medieval period, the concept of natural rights became intertwined with theological assumptions. Theologians, relying upon the doctrine of divine creation, considered the human being to possess inherent dignity deriving from the divine spirit breathed into humanity. Although this perspective carried a religious character, it nevertheless gave rise to a form of primitive universalism according to which fundamental rights were not granted by governments but ordained by the Creator. With the advent of the Enlightenment, these rights were detached from their theological foundations and redefined on the basis of rational individualism. A structural transformation occurred when the concept of natural rights evolved into the modern conception of human rights. Thinkers such as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, through the theory of the social contract, argued that all individuals in the state of nature possess inalienable rights such as life, liberty, and property. Locke maintained that safeguarding these self-evident rights constituted the principal purpose of government and the philosophical justification for political authority. These ideas ultimately found expression in the foundational documents of the eighteenth century.

Following the humanitarian catastrophes of the Second World War, the necessity of establishing a legal order capable of holding states accountable for their treatment of their own populations led to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Contrary to common criticisms portraying this paradigm as exclusively Western, historical evidence demonstrates that representatives from diverse cultural and geographical traditions actively participated in the drafting process of the Declaration; a fact indicative of a conscious effort to formulate a common transnational language beyond religious boundaries (Káčer, 2021: 509). Following the adoption of the Declaration, international efforts to transform these moral principles into binding legal norms resulted in the drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. Together with other specialized conventions, these instruments established a framework in which states are recognized as the primary duty-bearers toward their citizens. Nevertheless, the formal accession of states to these treaties has not always entailed practical compliance, and many international actors continue to evade the full implementation of their obligations by invoking regional approaches or national particularities (Stango, 2014: 158-161).

Scholars such as Johannes Morsink emphasize that the Declaration was deliberately drafted in a manner that avoided religious or nationalist language so as to ensure its acceptability across all cultures. In this context, universality was understood not as a form of cultural imposition, but rather as a functional necessity aimed at preventing a return to barbarism.

Foundations of Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism, as a foundational intellectual school, is based upon the assumption that there exists no objective, transcendental, or universal criterion for judging the legitimacy or illegitimacy of cultural patterns (Káčer, 2021: 507). This approach maintains that moral values and legal norms acquire meaning solely within their specific historical and cultural contexts, and that no superior standard exists in the international sphere for privileging one value system over another (Price, 2002: 1).

The methodological roots of this school of thought may be traced to Boasian anthropology in the early twentieth century. Franz Boas and his followers, including Melville Herskovits, sharply criticized evolutionary approaches that regarded Western civilization as the ultimate pinnacle of human progress and instead emphasized the principle of the equal value of all cultures (Brown, 2008: 365). During the mid-twentieth century, this perspective gained further depth with the expansion of anthropological studies focused upon the diversity of human lifeworlds. In 1947, simultaneously with the efforts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Anthropological Association issued a historic statement warning that human rights could not genuinely attain universality unless the cultural diversity of human societies was recognized (Price, 2002: 4). Anthropologists argued that the personality structure of every individual is shaped within the cultural framework of their society; consequently, disregarding indigenous and cultural standards amounts to disregarding the essence of human identity itself (Hahn, 2023: 6).

In explaining the various forms of this approach, a distinction must be drawn between radical and moderate relativism. In radical cultural relativism, culture is regarded as the sole legitimate source of moral principles and legal norms, while the universality of human rights is fundamentally impossible and described as a form of cultural imperialism. Proponents of this perspective argue that the excessive emphasis upon individual rights in international instruments conflicts with the collectivist values prevalent in many Eastern and African traditions. For example, within the paradigm of Asian values, concepts such as social harmony and respect for authority are prioritized over individual freedoms. By contrast, moderate cultural relativism, while accepting a fundamental core of human rights, maintains that the interpretation and implementation of these rights should take local circumstances and national traditions into account in order to facilitate localization and enhance the cultural legitimacy of such norms.

Structural relativism further contends that human rights are a social construct rather than an eternal or natural truth; therefore, their legitimacy depends upon the voluntary acceptance of societies based on their historical traditions (Binder, 1999: 214). In this regard, certain states, particularly within Asia and the Islamic world, argue that human rights should be understood within the framework of a dynamic process of international norm-formation that incorporates religious components and historical heritage in order to prevent conflict with collective identities.

The Vienna Conference of 1993

The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna was convened with the objective of revisiting and reaffirming international norms within the post–Cold War environment. The conference became an arena of diplomatic confrontation between classical Western approaches, which insisted upon the unconditional implementation of human rights, and blocs of developing countries that demanded formal recognition of cultural plurality. The background to these tensions had already emerged during preparatory meetings, particularly in the Bangkok Declaration, where several states emphasized regional particularities and called for a reconsideration of legal priorities, including the superiority of economic rights over civil and political rights.

The culmination of these intensive disputes was reflected in Paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which today stands as one of the most frequently cited provisions in international human rights literature. According to this paragraph: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” This document is regarded as a turning point in the history of human rights because it consolidated the principles of universality, indivisibility, and interdependence.

By normatively recognizing the right to development, the Vienna Declaration effectively brought an end to the traditional controversy surrounding the priority of civil rights over economic rights and affirmed that all categories of rights possess equal value. The strategic innovation of the Conference lay in its recognition of culture as a context facilitating implementation rather than as a justification for human rights violations.

This formulation sought to preserve the principle of universality as a non-derogable norm while simultaneously acknowledging the importance of cultural contexts. Nevertheless, the structural ambiguity of the language employed in this paragraph has continued to leave room for divergent interpretations by states. In addition, the establishment of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights constituted one of the major institutional achievements of the Conference. By strengthening supervisory mechanisms, the Conference demonstrated that a form of diplomatic and legal balance could indeed be achieved between the universality of principles and pluralism in implementation.

The Question of Islamic Human Rights

One of the most prominent manifestations of the conflict between universalism and relativism has emerged at the intersection between the international human rights system and traditional interpretations of Islamic Sharia. Critics argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was drafted during a period in which many Islamic countries were either under colonial domination or had only limited participation in the drafting process; a circumstance that, according to this view, resulted in tension between certain provisions of the Declaration and definitive rulings of Sharia (Schirrmacher, 2011: 43).

In response to this normative gap, the Organization of the Islamic Conference adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam in 1990. This instrument was introduced as a parallel framework in which the definition of human rights was exclusively grounded in Islamic Sharia. Nevertheless, the Cairo Declaration became the subject of extensive criticism due to its conditioning of all rights and freedoms upon compliance with Sharia principles. Under Articles 24 and 25 of the document, Sharia is recognized as the sole reference for the interpretation and clarification of the Declaration’s provisions; an issue which, in practice, poses serious challenges for rights such as freedom to change one’s religion, full legal equality between women and men, and freedom of expression in matters concerning criticism of religion (Kayaoglu, 2020: 3).

In contrast to this rigid approach, thinkers such as Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im have proposed an alternative framework under the concept of intercultural dialogue. An-Na’im contends that the existing conflict is not between revelation and rights, but rather between historical interpretations of Sharia and the contemporary requirements of humanity. Through his theory of internal structural reform, he argues that Islamic societies should reconstruct human rights concepts from within their own traditions through the reinterpretation of religious texts and the application of modern hermeneutical methods. In his view, human rights lacking indigenous and cultural roots remain merely a fragile legal shell.

In recent years, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has revised some of its earlier positions and adopted a new declaration in 2020 reflecting an increasing tendency toward convergence with global standards. Although this document still differs from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in certain respects, it demonstrates greater conformity with international jus cogens norms in areas such as the prohibition of torture and the right to education (Kayaoglu, 2020: 1). This normative transformation confirms that even religious traditions possess the capacity for reinterpretation and evolution when confronted with international pressures and the necessities of changing times (Kayaoglu, 2020: 5).

Tradition and Culture versus Women’s Rights

One of the most controversial dimensions of the cultural relativist paradigm is the instrumental use of the concept of tradition to justify the structural subordination of women and the deprivation of their fundamental rights (Cao, 2022: 236). Today, women’s rights are widely regarded as the front line of confrontation between the universality of human rights and cultural relativism, because in many social contexts, the preservation of cultural authenticity and collective identities becomes directly linked to controlling women’s bodies, behavior, and social roles.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1979 may be considered the most radical international instrument confronting relativist positions. Article 5 of the Convention obliges States Parties to take effective measures to modify social, cultural, and behavioral patterns based upon notions of the inferiority or superiority of either sex or upon gender stereotypes. Nevertheless, resistance to this universal norm has manifested itself through reservations, as a wide range of states, invoking conformity with religious or customary laws, have imposed significant limitations upon the implementation of this provision (Raday, 2012: 520).

Under such approaches, many harmful practices—including child and forced marriages and so-called honor crimes—are justified under the guise of preserving cultural authenticity. Likewise, structural inequalities in areas such as inheritance, divorce, and child custody, which in many societies are represented as inseparable components of religious identity, constitute key obstacles to the realization of universal human rights standards.

In this context, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has, in recent years, adopted an intersectional approach, emphasizing that women within indigenous societies simultaneously face multiple layers of gender-based, cultural, and racial discrimination (CEDAW, 2022: 2). Accordingly, the protection of cultural rights should not entail legitimizing oppressive intra-group traditions, because the ultimate objective is to transform culture from a structural obstacle into a medium for women’s empowerment (Raday, 2012: 521).

Feminist and postcolonial analyses further demonstrate that the concept of culture within traditional societies is often defined and interpreted by power elites—predominantly men—in ways that secure their gendered and class-based interests. Culture is not a static or homogeneous phenomenon, but rather a field of ongoing contestation and reinterpretation. Therefore, when a state declares women’s freedoms incompatible with national culture, it is in reality seeking to suppress dissenting voices and internal movements advocating transformation within those very cultural structures.

The historical practice of widow self-immolation in India (Sati) illustrates how traditionalist groups attempted to portray an overtly violent practice as a symbol of sanctity and cultural authenticity (Rasha, 2023: 4). Similarly, the continuing tensions between customary laws and constitutional standards in societies such as South Africa and Zimbabwe demonstrate that actors within these societies seek a hybrid mode of existence; namely, one in which they remain attached to their cultural identities while simultaneously insisting upon access to modern rights in order to free themselves from the harmful and oppressive dimensions of tradition.

Freedom of Expression in Confrontation with Religious Sensitivities

The conflict between the principle of freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the notion of prohibiting insults to religious sanctities constitutes one of the most complex arenas of dispute between the universality of human rights and cultural relativism. While liberal systems emphasize the fundamental right of individuals to criticize, challenge, and even offend prevailing beliefs, many religious societies demand the imposition of strict legal restrictions in order to protect religious sentiments and preserve social cohesion.

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation sought, with the support of a number of states, to secure the adoption of resolutions within United Nations bodies aimed at combating the defamation of religions. The underlying rationale of this movement was based upon the assumption that insults against sacred beliefs not only threaten global peace, but also directly contribute to violations of the rights of religious adherents. In contrast, Western governments and international civil society organizations warned that granting formal recognition to such a concept would effectively amount to creating a global license for suppressing dissenting voices and restricting the freedoms of religious minorities.

This diplomatic deadlock was ultimately addressed in 2011 through the adoption of Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18. The strategic innovation of this resolution lay in changing the object of protection: the focus shifted from protecting religious doctrines and abstract beliefs toward protecting individuals and believers themselves. This new approach demonstrated that international law, rather than embracing religious relativism, seeks to standardize limitations on expression based upon the two key principles of necessity and proportionality.

Nevertheless, regional judicial practice continues to face significant challenges. The European Court of Human Rights, in certain judgments, has accepted that states may confiscate particular artistic works in order to prevent severe offense to religious feelings deemed disruptive to public order and social peace. This approach has been subjected to serious criticism because of its unwarranted expansion of a supposed “right not to be offended.” Critics argue that the very philosophy underlying human rights is the protection of the dignity and freedom of human beings, not the shielding of ideas, beliefs, or religions from criticism and scrutiny.

Theoretical Approaches Toward Coexistence

In order to overcome the ontological deadlock between rigid universalism and radical relativism, leading human rights theorists have proposed approaches grounded in constructive dialogue and the identification of shared normative foundations. Jack Donnelly, one of the pioneers in this field, articulates the paradigm of relative universalism. From his perspective, although the core concepts of human rights are universal, different cultures may offer varying interpretations of their manifestations and may adopt diverse institutional and legal methods of implementation. Drawing upon John Rawls’ concept of overlapping consensus, Donnelly argues that societies with distinct philosophical and religious foundations can nonetheless reach agreement on a set of operational human rights standards without abandoning their own underlying beliefs (Goodhart, 2008: 187).

In a similar vein, the receptor theory, supported by scholars such as Tore Lindholm, presents an alternative approach. Rather than imposing human rights norms from international macrostructures, this theory seeks to identify cultural capacities within each society so that the localization of norms may occur organically. Within this model, universality does not signify cultural homogenization; instead, it is envisioned as a protective umbrella beneath which cultural diversity itself may flourish.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the distinguished jurist and sociologist, argues that all cultures are inherently incomplete and that none may legitimately claim totality or perfection. He therefore emphasizes the necessity of intercultural engagement (Betemps da Silva & Scott, 2022: 13). To bridge differing cultural horizons, he proposes the concept of diatopical hermeneutics (de Sousa Santos, 2017: 47). The objective of this approach is to discover functional equivalents for human dignity within diverse traditions. For instance, seeking ethical roots for human rights within concepts such as Dharma in Hinduism or the notion of Ummah in Islamic thought is considered more effective than the mere imposition of Western terminology and concepts (de Sousa Santos, 2017: 48).

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im likewise maintains that the institutionalization of human rights within non-Western societies can only occur through the internal transformation of cultural and religious traditions. Through a reinterpretation of religious texts, he argues that it is possible to formulate an interpretation of Sharia compatible with universal human rights standards. In his view, achieving intercultural consensus requires intellectual elites to mobilize their own internal cultural resources in support of human values (An-Na’im, 2010: 21).

By contrast, Makau Mutua, as a postcolonial critic, views the contemporary structure of human rights discourse as resting upon a tripartite metaphor composed of savage cultures, victims, and Western saviors. Criticizing this paternalistic framework, he calls for the decentralization of human rights and the establishment of a more inclusive system capable of recognizing the historical experiences and lived realities of the Global South.

The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation

At the operational level, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation functions as a moderating mechanism designed to establish a balance between universal human rights standards and the necessities of local pluralism. This doctrine, which has primarily evolved through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, grants member states a degree of discretion in areas where no European consensus exists, allowing them to make decisions based upon their own moral, religious, and cultural particularities (European Court of Human Rights Reform, 2012: 2).

The theoretical foundations of this doctrine rest upon the assumption that national authorities, by virtue of their direct connection with the social realities of their societies, occupy a superior epistemological position for determining the necessity of legal restrictions. Nevertheless, the margin of appreciation does not amount to granting states absolute discretion. Such measures remain subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court in order to ensure that the hard core of fundamental human rights is not undermined.

One of the clearest manifestations of this doctrine may be observed in cases concerning public morality and freedom of religion. Most notably, in the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, the Court did not regard the prohibition of the Islamic headscarf in university settings as a violation of freedom of religion. The Court reasoned that the Turkish state enjoyed a broad margin of appreciation in safeguarding the principle of secularism and preventing social pressure upon students who did not wear the headscarf.

The strategic application of this doctrine may serve as an effective model for resolving normative conflicts in other geographical regions, including Asia and Africa, thereby facilitating a rational balance between national sovereignty and international obligations. The use of legal instruments such as the margin of appreciation and the principle of proportionality allows states to remain committed to universal obligations while simultaneously reflecting unique local characteristics within their domestic legal systems.

Although critics argue that the doctrine of margin of appreciation may pave the way for judicial relativism and contribute to the fragmentation of human rights standards within Europe, political and legal realities indicate that without this degree of flexibility, the acceptance of international judicial decisions by sovereign states would face profound structural challenges and crises of legitimacy.

Conclusion

An examination of the conflict between cultural rights and the universality of human rights reveals that this confrontation is not a permanent deadlock, but rather a necessary dialectical tension essential for the dynamism and evolution of the international order. Universalism devoid of sensitivity toward cultural diversity becomes a formalistic and abstract framework lacking legitimacy and practical influence within local societies. Conversely, radical cultural relativism, detached from supranational standards, is prone to becoming an instrument for justifying authoritarian structures and disregarding the inherent dignity of the human person.

The findings of this study demonstrate that the future of human rights depends upon a transition toward a paradigm of pluralistic universalism. Achieving this objective requires four strategic steps: distinguishing between immutable fundamental rights and rights subject to interpretation; strengthening the legitimacy of norms through bottom-up processes; reclaiming the concept of culture from political power elites; and developing a shared inter-civilizational legal language. Accordingly, rights such as the prohibition of torture, slavery, and racial discrimination must be universally enforced as jus cogens norms without any cultural exceptions. At the same time, in areas such as models of political participation or social customs, broader space may legitimately be afforded to diversity and local discretion.

Rather than imposing human rights standards through diplomatic or economic pressure, support should be directed toward domestic democratic processes and intra-cultural dialogue so that human rights norms may be accepted as integral components of indigenous identity. Defending human rights is not equivalent to opposing culture; rather, it constitutes an effort to protect vulnerable members of every society against totalizing interpretations. The human rights system should not be perceived as a final and completed project, but as a continuous process of intercultural learning. Only under such conditions can human rights sustain their claim to universality not through hard power, but through the moral consensus of humanity.

Cultural diversity is not merely compatible with universality; by offering richer interpretations of human dignity, it contributes to the deepening and sustainability of human rights. The evolution of regional systems in Africa and the Americas toward the recognition of collective rights and cultural identity as independent rights has created a new standard for protecting minorities against forced assimilation. As emphasized by the United Nations Special Rapporteur, the international system must move beyond normative monologue and instead listen to the symphony of cultures. As agreed upon in the Vienna Declaration of 1993, culture should not serve as a pretext for undermining rights, but rather as a rich foundation for their sustainable and internalized implementation.

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