The Minab Tragedy and the Horizons of International Justice: From Criminal Responsibility to Legal Narration

Prof. Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein

Faculty Member, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran

Introduction

The Minab tragedy, particularly the attack on the city’s school, is not merely a human catastrophe, but also carries profound and multi-layered legal implications within the domains of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Criminal Law. Given the nature of the targeted object, the status of the affected individuals, and the context of its occurrence within an armed conflict, this incident underscores the urgent necessity of a precise re-examination of the rules governing the protection of civilians and civilian objects, especially educational institutions.

Within this framework, analyzing the conduct of the involved actors and assessing the extent to which their actions comply with international obligations is not only essential for determining potential dimensions of legal and criminal responsibility, but also fundamental for identifying existing normative gaps, deficiencies, and challenges within the international legal system.

From this perspective, the legal scrutiny of the Minab tragedy should be understood as an effort to attain a more accurate understanding of the relationship between the protective norms of international law and the violent realities of contemporary armed conflicts.

Rethinking Humanitarian Legal Frameworks

Recent developments in the international system, particularly in the aftermath of the 2023 Gaza war and the continuation of regional conflicts, have once again brought the question of the effectiveness of IHL to the forefront. What emerges from these developments is not merely the violation of existing rules, but rather a growing gap between legal norms and the operational realities of contemporary warfare. If sustained, such a gap may lead to the gradual erosion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of this legal regime. From this perspective, revisiting existing frameworks is not a matter of choice, but a structural necessity to ensure their adaptation to evolving patterns of conflict.

In this regard, one of the fundamental debates concerns the classical distinction between jus ad bellum (the right to resort to force) and jus in bello (the law governing armed conflict). Within the dominant legal tradition, irrespective of the legality or illegality of the use of force, all parties to a conflict are considered equally bound by humanitarian rules. However, this formal equality, particularly in situations where one party is acting in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense, gives rise to problematic implications.

Indeed, the normative equalization of the aggressor and the defender may generate a form of internal inconsistency within the legal system. Not only does it obscure the distinction between fundamentally different legal situations, but in conditions of asymmetrical power realities, it may operate to the advantage of the aggressor. Consequently, such a framework risks undermining the practical capacity of the right to self-defense, weakening its effectiveness in the face of unlawful aggression.

Legal Assessment of the Attack: From the Principle of Distinction to Criminalization

In the specific legal analysis of the Minab incident, the principle of distinction occupies a central position as one of the most fundamental principles of IHL. Under this principle, a clear distinction between combatants and civilians must be maintained at all stages of military operations. War, as an organized and state-driven phenomenon, is conducted between armed forces, and civilians, who play no role in the initiation or continuation of hostilities, must be protected from attack. Any direct targeting of civilians or civilian objects constitutes a clear instance of a war crime.

Within this framework, the criminal qualification of “directing attacks” against civilian objects assumes particular importance. According to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its founding instrument, the Rome Statute of the ICC, the mere act of intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population or civilian object is sufficient to establish criminal liability, regardless of whether the attack ultimately achieves its intended result. Where such an attack results in destruction of property or loss of life, it may give rise to a concurrence of offenses, thereby aggravating criminal responsibility.

In the case of the Minab school, this situation is realized in a compound manner. On the one hand, the attack was directed against a civilian object, a school, and on the other, a civilian population, including students and educational staff, was directly targeted.

Furthermore, international law provides enhanced protection for certain groups and objects, which may be conceptualized as a form of protective differentiation. Schools, due to their direct connection with the right to education, itself a foundational enabling right, retain their protected status even when not in active use or temporarily unoccupied. The destruction of such infrastructure has long-term repercussions on the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, including the rights to health, livelihood, and social participation.

Additionally, children, as one of the most vulnerable groups in armed conflicts, benefit from heightened protection under international law. Attacks against children are therefore prioritized within the framework of international criminal justice. From this perspective, attacks targeting educational institutions or resulting in mass casualties among children acquire particular significance, not only due to their humanitarian consequences, but also because of the normative and expressive function of international criminal law in condemning such acts.

Attribution, Mens Rea, and Violations of Fundamental Principles

A legal analysis of the Minab tragedy necessarily entails an examination of attribution, as one of the core elements of international responsibility. Although no official report has yet been issued by judicial authorities or international fact-finding bodies, a convergence of evidence, including documented reports by reputable non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as investigative media analyses published by outlets such as The New York Times and The Guardian, points toward the attribution of this attack to the United States. The reliance of these assessments on field data and the type of weaponry employed provides a level of analytical confidence that cannot be disregarded in legal evaluation.

Within the framework of International Criminal Law, the establishment of mens rea (criminal intent) plays a decisive role in determining criminal responsibility. In the present case, the hypothesis of human error appears inconsistent with the pattern of the attack. The execution of two consecutive strikes within a short time interval, particularly where the first strike could have revealed the nature of the target, significantly weakens any claim of mistake.

In other words, at the time of the second strike, the civilian character of the target would have been both discernible and, arguably, obvious to the attacker. This conclusion is reinforced by several factors, including the considerable distance of the school from nearby military objectives, the presence of clear physical indicators such as a sports field and visible markers denoting educational use, as well as the attacker’s access to advanced surveillance and targeting systems. These elements collectively constitute strong evidence of either actual knowledge or, at a minimum, reckless disregard regarding the civilian nature of the target.

In continuation of this analysis, a violation of the principle of precaution, a fundamental rule of IHL, is also clearly established. This principle obliges the attacking party to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians. However, the timing of the attack, during peak hours of student presence, particularly at the beginning of the academic week, indicates a serious departure from this legal obligation. International jurisprudence has consistently emphasized that conducting operations at times of high civilian concentration is manifestly incompatible with precautionary requirements under IHL.

From the perspective of the principle of proportionality, the attack likewise constitutes a grave breach. The extensive civilian casualties, most notably the killing of more than 168 students and nearly 200 individuals in total, are manifestly disproportionate to any conceivable military advantage. In legal discourse, the presence of children among the victims significantly amplifies the weight of disproportionality. Accordingly, even assuming the existence of a legitimate military objective, such a scale of human loss would place the attack firmly within the category of serious war crimes.

From a War Crime to Broader Patterns of Violations

The analysis of the Minab tragedy cannot be reduced to the level of an isolated war crime; rather, it must be assessed within a broader context of behavioral patterns that carry implications beyond singular violations. A body of evidence, including prior threats against critical infrastructure and the repeated targeting of educational facilities, suggests a degree of pattern and continuity in conduct. In certain legal interpretations, such patterns may approach the material and mental elements of the crime of genocide.

Within this framework, attacks on schools, as centers for the production and transmission of knowledge, combined with the killing of children as carriers of a future generation, may be interpreted as contributing to conditions aimed at the gradual weakening or even destruction of a national group. While the legal threshold for genocide remains high and requires specific intent (dolus specialis), the cumulative nature of such acts warrants careful legal scrutiny in light of evolving jurisprudence.

In this context, the function of International Criminal Law extends beyond prosecution and punishment; it also carries an expressive function. This means that the system is capable of highlighting cases such as the Minab tragedy in order to expose broader patterns of violations of international law and to reinforce the normative sensitivity of the international community.

Focusing on such a case, therefore, is not only justified by its humanitarian gravity, but also by its capacity to amplify the voices of vulnerable groups, particularly children, and to transform the incident into a focal point for pursuing international accountability. Consequently, a case like Minab can play a significant role in strengthening protective norms and enhancing accountability mechanisms in response to grave breaches of international law.

The Challenge of Reprisals and Rethinking the Rights of the Defender in Armed Conflicts

One of the fundamental issues in the legal analysis of armed conflicts concerns the scope and permissibility of reprisals within the framework of IHL. In addressing the question of whether attacks against civilian objects, such as schools, within the territory of an aggressor state may be justified as a reciprocal response, the dominant interpretation of IHL unequivocally rejects such measures.

This position is grounded in the foundational principle of the equality of belligerents in the application of humanitarian rules. According to this principle, regardless of the legality or illegality of the use of force, all parties to a conflict are equally bound by the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. Within this framework, any form of countermeasure or retaliatory act that involves targeting civilians or civilian objects is considered unlawful and constitutes a clear violation of IHL.

The only recognized exception in this regard relates to situations involving a change in the nature of the target. In other words, if a civilian object, such as a school or hospital, is effectively converted into a military objective, it loses its protected status and may lawfully be targeted. Absent such a transformation, however, attacks against civilian objects cannot be justified under any circumstances, even under the pretext of reprisals.

Despite this restrictive framework, contemporary developments, including conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and attacks against Iran, have highlighted the need to reassess the effectiveness of existing legal rules. In practice, these rules may, in certain contexts, operate in a manner that constrains the deterrent capacity of the defending party, while simultaneously allowing the aggressor to exploit existing legal gaps.

In such circumstances, a fundamental question arises: if the legal order prevents the adoption of effective measures to halt aggression, should these frameworks not be reconsidered in order to preserve the inherent right of self-defense?

In support of this critical perspective, reference may be made to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons. While the Court acknowledged the inherent tension between such weapons and the principle of distinction, it was unable to categorically declare their absolute prohibition in situations where the survival of a state was at stake. This reflects the possibility that, under exceptional circumstances, certain classical rules may be influenced by more fundamental considerations.

Ultimately, a crucial distinction must be drawn between vengeance and deterrence. While acts motivated purely by vengeance are prohibited, the concept of deterrent retaliation has emerged in contemporary doctrinal debates. This notion is not aimed at retribution per se, but rather at halting ongoing aggression and preventing its recurrence.

From this perspective, the development of a critical reading of international law may contribute to the emergence of a framework that, while preserving humanitarian principles, prevents the asymmetrical weakening of the defender’s position and limits the ability of the aggressor to exploit legal loopholes.

Rethinking Defensive Doctrines and the Rights of the Defender in Contemporary Conflicts

In the analysis of contemporary armed conflicts, the necessity of revisiting the theoretical and practical foundations of IHL, particularly in relation to the rights of the defender, becomes increasingly evident. Within this framework, the existing legal order requires a degree of reconfiguration, such that it not only regulates the conduct of parties to a conflict but also prevents its instrumentalization by aggressors seeking to legitimize unlawful actions.

Accordingly, there is a growing emphasis on the development of a defender-oriented international legal framework, whereby legal rules operate not to disproportionately constrain defensive capacities, but rather to enhance deterrence and ensure the effective protection of victims. Such an approach seeks to restore normative balance by addressing asymmetries that arise in the practical application of existing rules.

In this context, a fundamental critique may be directed at the ostensibly neutral character of current legal norms. Where these norms are applied in a manner that restricts the inherent right of self-defense, particularly in situations of occupation or armed attack, or that limits various forms of resistance against aggression, their reinterpretation and, where necessary, reform become imperative.

Any legal limitation that undermines the effective exercise of self-defense ultimately operates to the advantage of the aggressor and disrupts the normative equilibrium of the international legal system. Therefore, a recalibration of legal doctrines is required to ensure that humanitarian protections are preserved without resulting in the one-sided weakening of the defending party’s legal and operational position.

Institutional Challenges and Double Standards in the International System

In analyzing the performance of the international system, a direct critique may be advanced regarding the functioning of formal institutions and decision-making structures at both national and international levels. Within this framework, certain statements and positions issued by official bodies, including high councils and political institutions, often lack the necessary legal rigor and, in some instances, are inconsistent with the underlying spirit of international law.

Such approaches, rather than strengthening a state’s legal position in international claims, may in fact undermine it. The absence of precise documentation and robust legal analysis limits the effective utilization of available legal capacities, thereby weakening the potential for meaningful engagement within international legal forums.

Furthermore, a form of double standard is observable within the international normative system. While in certain cases, such as conflicts involving Russia and Ukraine, legal and normative mechanisms are activated with relative speed and intensity, in other situations, such as Gaza or attacks against civilian targets in Iran, including the Minab tragedy, the system demonstrates delay, passivity, or minimal response.

This imbalance in reaction underscores the necessity for non-Western and independent states to develop and strengthen their own independent legal doctrines. Such doctrinal development can contribute to reducing reliance on selective enforcement mechanisms and to fostering a more balanced and equitable international legal order.

Lawfare and the Mission of Legal Narration in International Law

In the analysis of contemporary conflicts, the concept of lawfare has emerged as a key component. This notion indicates that conflicts are not confined to the military domain, but are also conducted at the level of legal interpretation, narrative construction, and discursive framing. Within this context, the role of the legal expert is redefined as that of a legal narrator, one who translates factual events on the ground into structured, evidence-based legal claims capable of being presented before international forums.

In this regard, documentation constitutes one of the fundamental responsibilities of legal practitioners. Reliance on objective evidence, credible documentation, and the specialized literature of IHL and International Criminal Law enables the accurate reconstruction of events within a coherent legal framework. Such documentation not only supports legal accountability but also contributes to the preservation of historical truth.

In parallel, the production of legal content, including analytical essays, legal commentaries, and active engagement in public and digital platforms, serves as an effective tool for clarifying the legal dimensions of events and shaping international public opinion. In the contemporary information environment, the articulation of well-founded legal arguments plays a crucial role in countering distorted narratives and ensuring that violations are properly understood within their legal context.

At the same time, a serious critique may be directed at the silence and inaction of segments of the legal community, including academics, lawyers, and students. In this framework, silence in the face of war crimes may be interpreted as a form of indirect complicity. Conversely, even modest individual actions, such as drafting a legal analysis, publishing a short commentary, or adopting a reasoned position in public discourse, can cumulatively contribute to the formation of an effective expressive function against the aggressor and help amplify the voices of victims at the international level.

Finally, drawing on the perspectives of prominent scholars of international criminal law, including M. Cherif Bassiouni, emphasis is placed on the individual-driven nature of this field. Fundamental developments in International Criminal Law are often not the product of state will alone, but rather the result of active engagement, sustained documentation, and the efforts of committed and independent legal actors.

Victims’ Rights and State Responsibility in the Pursuit of International Justice

In the analysis of international justice, a central focus must be placed on the rights of victims of war crimes and the corresponding responsibilities of states in pursuing those rights. Within this framework, reductionist approaches that confine victims’ rights solely to financial compensation are subject to critique. Under contemporary international law, these rights encompass broader dimensions, commonly articulated through three fundamental pillars:

• the right to truth (Right to Truth), understood as the right to know the identity of perpetrators and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime;
• the right to justice (Right to Justice), referring to the prosecution and punishment of both direct perpetrators and those in positions of command; and
• the right to reparation (Right to Reparation), which extends beyond monetary compensation to include restitution, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition.

Within this framework, states are under no circumstances permitted to disregard these rights, particularly the rights to truth and justice, through political compromise or by limiting their response to financial settlements.

In continuation, a critique may be directed at the performance of domestic institutions, including the judiciary and the ministry of foreign affairs. Despite the passage of time since significant events, such as the Iran–Iraq war, targeted assassinations, and more recent attacks including the Minab tragedy, the effective utilization of both domestic and international legal mechanisms remains insufficient.

In this regard, the absence of specialized courts for adjudicating international crimes in accordance with global standards constitutes a serious deficiency. Such a gap prevents the production of well-reasoned and internationally credible judgments, thereby limiting their evidentiary and persuasive value in international forums.

At the same time, reference may be made to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Under this principle, certain international crimes, such as war crimes and genocide, are considered so grave that any state may exercise jurisdiction over them, regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. Examples of this approach can be observed in the practice of several states, including proceedings related to crimes committed in Syria.

Finally, the fact that Iran is not a party to the ICC does not preclude legal engagement at the international level. Under existing mechanisms, particularly Article 15 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, it remains possible to submit information and documentation concerning alleged crimes to the Prosecutor of the Court. Even where judicial proceedings are not pursued due to political constraints, the very act of documentation and claim-making plays a significant role in shaping the legal narrative and strengthening the position of victims within the international arena.

Complementarity and the Feasibility of Recourse to International Criminal Justice

In pursuing international criminal justice in cases such as the Minab tragedy, one of the fundamental issues concerns the possibility of utilizing the capacities of the ICC in the face of political and practical constraints. Within this framework, the doctrine of complementarity stands as a cornerstone principle of the Rome Statute of the ICC.

According to this principle, the Court does not replace national judicial systems; rather, it operates as a complementary mechanism. This means that the primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting international crimes lies with domestic courts, and the ICC intervenes only where the relevant state demonstrates either unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out such proceedings.

In this context, complementarity may be employed as a strategic legal tool. Specifically, in situations where access to suspects, particularly political and military officials of the states involved, is not feasible, a state may characterize its position as one of inability, thereby creating the legal basis for referring the case to the Court. Such an approach possesses the capacity to function as a legal-defensive strategy at the international level.

However, the realization of this pathway requires the fulfillment of certain domestic legal prerequisites. Among these is the explicit criminalization of international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, within domestic criminal law, in a manner consistent with international standards. The absence of such a framework may lead the Court to consider the referral legally insufficient, thereby declining to exercise jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the harmonization of domestic legislation with the norms of International Criminal Law constitutes an essential precondition for effective engagement with the ICC.

Ultimately, the legal pursuit of atrocities of this nature cannot be reduced to a one-time action; rather, it must be understood as part of an ongoing process of legal narration. This process requires the active participation of the legal community and the continuous production of specialized legal knowledge and analysis. In this regard, the formation of a network of scholars and practitioners of international law is of fundamental importance for sustaining and advancing this discourse across different levels.

Conclusion

The Minab tragedy should not be understood merely as an isolated violation within the framework of IHL; rather, it represents a clear manifestation of a deeper crisis concerning the effectiveness and enforcement of protective norms in contemporary armed conflicts. The significance of this incident extends beyond its humanitarian and criminal dimensions, lying in its capacity to expose the widening gap between legal rules and the realities of warfare, a gap whose persistence may ultimately erode the normative authority of international law.

Within this framework, the pursuit of international justice in relation to the Minab crime is not limited to demands for the punishment of perpetrators or the provision of compensation. Rather, it constitutes an effort to affirm the victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparation, while also resisting the normalization of violence against civilians, particularly children.

From this perspective, the Minab case demonstrates that International Criminal Justice acquires meaning and effectiveness only when it is accompanied by rigorous documentation, legal narration, and sustained engagement at both the national and international levels. Without such processes, even the most robust legal frameworks risk remaining normatively symbolic rather than operationally effective.

The Minab tragedy also underscores the necessity of revisiting certain dominant assumptions within international law, including the relationship between aggressor and defender, the limits of the normative neutrality of IHL, and the effectiveness of existing institutional mechanisms. Ultimately, the importance of this case lies in its potential to serve as a benchmark for evaluating the sincerity, coherence, and effectiveness of the international legal order in protecting civilians.

Accordingly, the pursuit of justice for Minab should be regarded not merely as a legal endeavor, but as part of a broader effort to restore the credibility of law, strengthen accountability, and safeguard human dignity in the context of contemporary armed conflicts.