Prof. Heybatollah Najandimanesh
Faculty Member, Department of Public and International Law, Allameh Tabataba’i University
Introduction
An analysis of the temporary ceasefire in the conflicts involving the United States and Israel against Iran requires moving beyond classical frameworks of war and peace and toward the conceptualization of an intermediate and transitional legal condition. In such a situation, hostile operations have been temporarily suspended, yet the political will necessary for the final termination of the conflict and the establishment of durable peace has not yet emerged.
From a legal perspective, this situation involves considerable complexity, because the traditional assumptions of international law, which have largely rested on a relatively clear binary between war and peace, lose part of their analytical utility here. Accordingly, a temporary ceasefire cannot be regarded merely as a practical interruption; rather, it must be approached as an independent legal condition requiring conceptual reconsideration.
The significance of this issue has become even more pronounced in light of developments in contemporary international law. In recent decades, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the pattern of armed conflicts has undergone fundamental changes, with prolonged, asymmetric, and multilayered conflicts replacing short-term classical wars. In this context, temporary and phased ceasefires have become one of the principal instruments of crisis management. Experiences such as the continuation of the ceasefire situation after the Iran–Iraq War, or the comparable situation in the Korean War, demonstrate that a ceasefire may in practice replace a peace treaty without fully terminating the legal status of the conflict.
The Central Issue
Within this framework, the fundamental question is how the legal status of the rules governing the conflict should be determined in circumstances where the conflict has not ended, yet hostile operations have been suspended under a temporary ceasefire. This question specifically concerns several key axes: the continuation or limitation of the application of international humanitarian law, the fate of the right of self-defense in such a situation, and the manner in which the obligations of the parties toward one another and toward the international community should be redefined.
These issues are not merely theoretical; they have direct practical consequences. The answers to them affect whether limited violations of the ceasefire lead to escalation of the conflict or are managed within a controlled framework, and whether actions such as limited operations or measures below the threshold of armed confrontation are considered lawful in this situation.
The Temporal Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law
One of the most fundamental issues in this field is determining the temporal scope of application of international humanitarian law in circumstances where the conflict has not fully ended but has entered a state of suspension through arrangements such as a ceasefire or humanitarian pause. Answering this question requires a careful distinction between the legal and military concepts used in the literature of international law.
Within this framework, a distinction must be drawn between concepts such as a ceasefire, suspension of operations, armistice, and humanitarian pause. A ceasefire is understood as an agreement, whether oral or written, to temporarily halt hostile operations. A suspension of operations has a defined temporal and geographical scope and refers only to the temporary cessation of hostilities. An armistice is a military agreement with a broader scope for the suspension of hostilities, whereas a humanitarian pause has a limited and purpose-oriented character and is established with the aim of facilitating humanitarian action.
It is worth noting that the common feature of all these concepts is their temporary nature; none of them amounts to the termination of the state of conflict. Therefore, as long as no peace treaty has been concluded, the state of conflict continues from a legal perspective.
The Fundamental Rule
The fundamental rule in this regard is that international humanitarian law continues to apply as long as the armed conflict has not genuinely come to an end. On this basis, a ceasefire or humanitarian pause does not alter the principle of the applicability of these rules; rather, it merely affects the conditions of their implementation.
Principles such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution remain valid, although the scope of their practical application becomes more limited under conditions in which hostilities have ceased. At the same time, a violation of a ceasefire cannot be analyzed merely as a breach of an agreement. In certain cases, particularly where the conditions of the ceasefire are used to carry out surprise attacks, it may also constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.
The Relationship between Ceasefire, the Resort to Force, and Self-Defense
The analysis of the relationship between a ceasefire and the resort to force (jus ad bellum), particularly in connection with the status of self-defense, directly engages the boundary between the law of armed conflict and the law governing the resort to force.
A ceasefire may be understood as a suspension of active military operations; that is, what is suspended is actual hostile conduct, not the legal status of the conflict. As a result, the conflict continues in theoretical terms, even though its practical conduct has been restricted. Within this framework, the principal question is what effect a ceasefire has on the possibility of renewed resort to force.
Two doctrinal approaches may be identified in response to this issue. The first approach, found among classical jurists, emphasizes the continuation of the state of conflict and therefore does not consider a ceasefire to be an obstacle to the resumption of military operations, although such resumption must comply with conditions such as prior notification. By contrast, the contemporary approach, in light of the structural transformation of the law on the use of force under the United Nations Charter, emphasizes that even during a ceasefire, the resumption of hostilities must once again be justified within the framework of self-defense.
Despite the importance of these two views, a comprehensive analysis of the ceasefire situation requires attention to the ceasefire agreement itself as the determining source of its legal effects. In practice, a ceasefire creates a special legal regime (lex specialis) in which the resort to force is contractually limited and conditioned. Under this regime, the parties undertake to refrain from offensive operations, and this obligation rests on the principle of good faith in the performance of international obligations. At the same time, this situation neither amounts to complete freedom to resort to force nor to a full return to the legal regime of peacetime; rather, it creates an intermediate condition.
Consequences of Violating a Ceasefire
The possibility of lawfully resuming hostilities depends on the manner in which the ceasefire is violated. Here, a distinction must be drawn between a material breach and minor violations. A breach of a ceasefire does not necessarily amount to a violation of international humanitarian law. However, where a material breach occurs, the opposing party may terminate the agreement and resume hostilities.
This does not necessarily require reaching the threshold of an armed attack within the meaning of the United Nations Charter; rather, it may arise solely from the breach of the contractual obligations of the ceasefire. Accordingly, a ceasefire creates a hybrid legal situation in which the continuation of the conflict, the suspension of hostilities, and the restriction of resort to force coexist simultaneously.
Institutional Management of a Ceasefire under Conditions of Distrust
At the practical level, a ceasefire is not merely a legal obligation; rather, it stands at the intersection of law, security imperatives, and political considerations. Where structural distrust exists between the parties, the durability of a ceasefire faces serious challenges. This fragility does not stem from the weakness of legal rules, but from the prevailing political and security conditions.
In such a context, a mere commitment to halt the conflict is not sufficient, and complementary mechanisms become necessary. These mechanisms include neutral international monitoring, joint commissions for dispute management, and guarantees by third powers. By increasing transparency, reducing uncertainty, and imposing political costs for violating the agreement, these mechanisms play an important role in sustaining the ceasefire.
Ultimately, a ceasefire must be analyzed at the boundary between law and politics. Legal rules provide the normative framework, yet it is the balance of power and political will that determine the extent of their effectiveness. Therefore, the sustainability of a ceasefire, particularly under conditions of distrust, requires a combination of legal, institutional, and political mechanisms; the absence of any one of these elements may reduce it to a fragile and merely formal agreement.
Naval Blockade and Its Impact on the Ceasefire Situation
An analysis of the ceasefire situation would remain incomplete without attention to the operational measures accompanying it, particularly in the sphere of the use of force. Within this framework, the action of the United States in imposing a naval blockade against Iran constitutes a clear example of the continuation of hostility in a different form, with direct legal consequences for the durability of the ceasefire.
This measure has reportedly involved an official announcement and the commencement of operations to intercept, divert, and seize vessels connected to Iran, and in some cases has led to the use of force against oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. In response, Iran has characterized these measures as unlawful and tantamount to piracy. The central question is whether such conduct can be justified within the framework of a lawful naval blockade.
Under the international law of armed conflict, a naval blockade is defined as an act of war and an instrument of coercion aimed at preventing vessels from entering or leaving the ports of an adversary state. This concept has been established in both classical and contemporary instruments, including the San Remo Manual, and is also recognized as an act of aggression under Article 3(c) of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314. Accordingly, from the perspective of the law governing the resort to force, a naval blockade is in principle prohibited, except within the exceptional frameworks of the United Nations Charter, namely Security Council authorization or self-defense.
For such a measure to be lawful, specific conditions must be satisfied. First is the principle of declaration and notification, which requires the precise determination of the scope, time, and conditions of the blockade. In the situation under discussion, the declaration made lacks the necessary details and is therefore legally problematic in this respect.
Second is the principle of effectiveness, which refers to the existence of actual capacity to enforce the blockade; this requirement appears to have been met, at least to some extent, by the United States. Third is the principle of impartiality and non-discrimination, under which any selective conduct undermines the legality of the blockade. Fourth is compliance with humanitarian considerations, a principle that prohibits the widespread deprivation of civilians of essential needs and, if violated, may give rise to criminal accountability.
In this context, the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz is also of particular importance. The United States invokes the concept of transit passage in support of freedom of navigation, whereas this is a treaty-based concept rooted in the 1982 Convention. Iran, in its domestic legislation on maritime zones, has accepted innocent passage and, in the interpretive declaration it issued upon signing the 1982 Convention, objected to the customary status of transit passage and stated that it continues to accept innocent passage as a customary rule. At the same time, Tehran declared that passage through the Strait of Hormuz is subject to innocent passage.
Under such circumstances, Iran may regulate passage within the framework of innocent passage; a point that further calls into question the legality of U.S. measures.
In conclusion, a naval blockade cannot be regarded as a neutral measure within the context of a ceasefire. Rather, it must be analyzed as an ongoing hostile act. Such a measure demonstrates that the conflict has not ended, but has merely shifted from direct military confrontation to a pattern of structural and non-kinetic pressure. Consequently, under these circumstances, the ceasefire is not properly understood as an actual cessation of war, but as the continuation of war in a different form; a reality that directly undermines its durability and credibility.
Legal and Strategic Consequences of a Naval Blockade for a Temporary Ceasefire
A naval blockade, even if implemented in a limited manner and without direct military confrontation, constitutes a continuous hostile act from both a legal and functional perspective. For this reason, its impact on a ceasefire is not merely incidental; rather, it fundamentally transforms the nature of the situation. This impact may be analyzed through several principal components.
First, the continuation of the blockade transforms the ceasefire from a “pause in war” into the “continuation of conflict through indirect means.” Although a ceasefire means the suspension of direct hostile operations, a blockade, as a continuous operational condition aimed at restricting the economic and logistical capacity of the opposing party, effectively ensures the continuation of the conflict in a different form.
Second, a naval blockade weakens the stabilizing function of a ceasefire and undermines behavioral predictability between the parties. Measures such as the inspection of vessels, seizure of cargo, and creation of uncertainty in maritime trade flows turn the ceasefire, instead of a mechanism for de-escalation, into an unstable and fragile condition.
Third, this measure transforms the parties’ legal interpretation of the ceasefire situation. A naval blockade demonstrates that the conflict has not only failed to end, but is being pursued at another level. As a result, the ceasefire shifts from a state of temporary suspension into an unstable suspension within an active conflict.
Fourth, at the political level, the blockade reduces incentives for compliance with the ceasefire. From the perspective of the party under pressure, the ceasefire no longer means a reduction of threat, because economic and strategic pressures continue. This situation may increase the incentive to withdraw from the ceasefire or violate it.
Ultimately, a naval blockade blurs the boundary between war and peace. A ceasefire, which in its classical form functions as a temporary dividing line between these two conditions, becomes in such circumstances a gray zone: a situation that is neither full-scale war nor genuine peace. The outcome of this process is the emergence of a form of controlled conflict in which the ceasefire becomes a cover for the continuation of hostile rivalry.
Conclusion
From the perspective of the scope of application of international humanitarian law, a temporary ceasefire by no means signifies the end of the conflict; rather, it merely amounts to the suspension of hostile operations. As long as the conflict has not genuinely come to an end, the fundamental rules of this legal regime remain applicable and are only reduced at the practical level.
With regard to the right to resort to force, a ceasefire does not extinguish the right of self-defense, but it significantly restricts the manner in which that right may be exercised. In such a situation, the threshold for resorting to force is raised, and the criteria of necessity and proportionality are interpreted more strictly. Therefore, not every violation of a ceasefire necessarily gives rise to a right of self-defense; in practice, the ceasefire operates as a legal filter.
At the institutional and practical levels, a ceasefire is an inherently fragile condition whose survival depends on a combination of legal rules, monitoring mechanisms, and political will. Measures such as a naval blockade demonstrate how, even without resorting to direct confrontation, the space of hostility can be reproduced and the agreement gradually eroded.
Consequently, a ceasefire must be analyzed as an unstable equilibrium between the reduction of direct violence and the continuation of structural tension. Ultimately, a temporary ceasefire is neither the end of war nor genuine peace, but a form of managed suspension of violence in which the conflict is not eliminated, but rearranged. This very feature makes it one of the most complex points of intersection between international humanitarian law and the law governing the resort to force; a space in which law is compelled to play, simultaneously, both a regulatory and crisis-management role under conditions marked by ambiguity.
