The Internet as a Human Right: Examining Ethical Foundations and Legal Obligations

Mahsa Dini

M.A. in International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’i University

Introduction

In the contemporary world, the Internet is no longer merely a technology or a communication tool; rather, it has become the principal platform for human social, economic, and political life. Digital transformation has become so deeply embedded in every dimension of human existence that access to the Internet has transcended the status of a luxury commodity or welfare service and has instead emerged as one of the essential prerequisites for a dignified human life. This normative transformation is rooted in a deeper understanding of the fundamental and universal interests of human beings—interests that are of such profound significance that they justify the imposition of both negative and positive obligations upon states and the international community. Accordingly, access to the Internet is understood not merely as a technological matter, but as a universal moral right grounded in the necessity of protecting and promoting other human rights.

On this basis, recognizing the Internet as a fundamental right entails significant theoretical and practical consequences. From a theoretical perspective, this right possesses a unique and irreducible content; that is, it cannot merely be regarded as a digital extension of rights such as freedom of expression or freedom of information. Rather, the Internet constitutes the essential platform and prerequisite for the practical realization of these rights in the digital age. From a practical standpoint, deprivation of Internet access amounts to exclusion from effective participation in social and political life and to the inability to benefit from the opportunities that this global medium provides for the realization of fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, justifying this moral right requires a realistic engagement with the challenges and harms associated with cyberspace. Therefore, just as democratic institutions are not abandoned despite their shortcomings, the Internet likewise requires effective governance and regulation in order to fulfill its function in safeguarding the vital interests of humanity.

Universal Moral Rights

The right of citizens to access the Internet has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights due to the global nature of communications and the necessity of access to information available through it. In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution concerning the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet. Indeed, because the exercise of human rights—particularly the right to freedom of expression on the Internet—has become increasingly significant in light of the rapid development of technology, individuals around the world have been enabled to utilize new information and communication technologies. The United Nations emphasizes that the same rights people possess offline must also be protected online. In this regard, the organization recognizes the global and open nature of the Internet as a driving force in accelerating progress toward development in its various forms, and for this reason calls upon all states to promote and facilitate Internet access in order to advance media development as well as information and communication facilities (United Nations, 2012: 1–2).

Accordingly, access to the Internet is itself a moral human right and entails that all individuals should enjoy uncensored access to this global medium. Therefore, citizens, through access to the Internet as a necessity of modern life, should be able to attain an adequate minimum standard of living.

In this context, as the Australian philosopher John Tasioulas argues, “the integrity of international human rights as part of international law lies in the fact that it is primarily concerned with the realization of universal moral rights, insofar as it is appropriate for international law to do so through the technique of assigning the same set of individual rights to all human beings” (Tasioulas, 2017: 5). On this basis, the foundation of moral human rights lies in the fundamental and universal interests of human beings. When these interests possess a sufficiently high degree of importance, they generate two categories of obligations for others: negative obligations (duties of non-interference) and positive obligations (duties to act in order to secure those interests). The essential condition is that the moral importance of these interests must be significant enough to justify the burdens and costs imposed upon others through the fulfillment of such obligations. In essence, it is the implementation of these obligations that guarantees the protection or realization of the right in question.

Therefore, free access to the Internet should be regarded as a universal moral and human right because, in the digital age, it is indispensable for the protection and promotion of other established human rights. Consequently, the justification for this human right is grounded in its importance for the realization of, in particular, Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, whether orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of one’s choice (United Nations, 2019).

An important point to note is that although the justification for the human right to free Internet access is largely instrumental in nature—because it is essential for the realization of other human rights—the content of this right remains unique. Access to the Internet constitutes a distinct and exceptional right because it cannot be reduced to, nor fully subsumed under, any other individual right. This right is not merely a digital form of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, or freedom of information, even though it facilitates the enjoyment of those rights within the digital sphere. The reality is that such rights within the global virtual environment cannot be fully realized without Internet access. Therefore, although the justification of this right is primarily instrumental, its conceptual independence as a unique right that provides the framework for the realization of other rights in cyberspace firmly establishes its status among the fundamental human rights of the digital age.

The Internet as a Necessary Condition for the Realization of Other Human Rights

The necessity of Internet access for the realization of fundamental political rights provides a compelling argument for recognizing it as a basic human right. The profound transformation that the Internet has brought about in human communication and political life is such that deprivation from it severely restricts individuals’ ability to exercise rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly—a restriction that is neither morally nor legally justifiable. The following example demonstrates that the Internet has created unprecedented and effective opportunities for rapid and broad political participation in the virtual age.

In 2005, two Australian activists established the GetUp platform—an online movement platform that promotes political initiatives by providing citizens with means to contact their representatives and engage in continuous political participation, rather than one-time participation in political protests. Today, the GetUp movement has more than one million members (more than the combined membership of all Australian political parties), has influenced the outcome of national elections, secured an important ruling before Australia’s highest court concerning the expansion of voting rights, and contributed to the adoption of laws protecting refugees and the environment (Heimans & Timms, 2018: 55).

It may therefore be argued that merely formal equality with respect to fundamental freedoms is insufficient to guarantee their genuine enjoyment. Citizens require access to certain resources in order to effectively exercise these freedoms. What precisely counts as a sufficient level of resources may admit different answers. Nevertheless, in the contemporary world, access to the Internet—alongside democratic institutions, universal education, free information, and minimum social protections—is undoubtedly among the essential prerequisites for the concrete realization of freedom of expression and the right of assembly. Furthermore, Internet access may also be understood as a form of positional good. These are “goods with the feature that one’s relative position in the distribution of the good affects one’s absolute position with respect to its value” (Brighouse & Swift, 2006: 473).

Although the concept of “positional goods” may initially seem unfamiliar when applied to fundamental political freedoms, such an understanding becomes comprehensible in light of the transformation the Internet has introduced into the exercise of these rights. By dramatically reducing the costs of accessing, producing, and disseminating information, the Internet has exponentially expanded the boundaries of our communicative society. Although traditional media such as radio, television, and print journalism still retain broad audiences, and although conventional methods of information exchange remain in use, these media largely reflect the perspectives of a limited group. In contrast, by eliminating barriers to the global exchange of information, the Internet has opened unprecedented horizons for the realization of freedom of expression and the right of assembly.

What emerges from this discussion is that the Internet has altered the “value” of certain fundamental political freedoms. If we accept that Internet access is necessary for a minimally decent life in today’s digital society, then ignoring this necessity amounts to denying the transformative nature of the Internet in the various dimensions of our individual and collective lives. The profound dependence of freedom of expression and access to information upon Internet access has reduced the relative value of these freedoms for those deprived of this technology. Under such conditions, recognizing access to the Internet as a human right becomes necessary in order to guarantee adequate opportunities for the enjoyment of freedoms that constitute the core of a minimally decent human life.

The Internet as a Tool for the Protection of Human Rights

If properly realized and preserved, Internet access can become an unparalleled instrument for the protection of fundamental human rights—rights such as the right to life, liberty, freedom from torture, and bodily integrity. Such a function provides a powerful argument for considering Internet access a human right, insofar as the Internet constitutes a unique mechanism for safeguarding humanity’s vital interests. This idea bears considerable resemblance to the argument advanced by Thomas Christiano, Professor at the University of Arizona, in defense of a human right to democracy. He defends the right to live within a democratic state because “democracies are generally necessary and reliable in protecting basic human rights regarding personal integrity” (Myers, 2020: 15).

At first glance, the Internet may appear to be an unreliable platform for the protection of fundamental rights such as life, liberty, and bodily integrity. A notable example is the Arab Spring uprisings, which, despite extensive use of social media for disseminating information, coordinating protestors, and exposing state repression, ultimately achieved limited success and were therefore referred to as “Twitter Revolutions” (Joseph, 2012: 146). However, such examples should not lead to the conclusion that the right to free Internet access is undermined. On the one hand, expecting a single right to safeguard all vital human interests is unreasonable; on the other hand, the effectiveness of any right depends upon the existence of a supportive environment conducive to its realization. In reality, the insufficiency of Internet access alone in protecting human rights does not diminish its value in any way.

The same logic applies to democratic institutions. The effectiveness of these institutions in protecting fundamental rights depends upon the existence of internal support and the absence of forces actively seeking to undermine them. In situations where domestic or foreign actors attempt to destabilize democracy, democratic institutions themselves may fail to fulfill their role in protecting fundamental rights. Thus, any social institution—whether democracy, an effective legal system, a free press, or the Internet—can function as a reliable protector only when it is not subjected to active destabilization and when it benefits from the support of vital domestic and international forces. Therefore, the fact that the Internet alone cannot fully guarantee fundamental human rights is neither surprising nor a decisive argument against recognizing access to the Internet as a right.

Ultimately, what studies and reports confirm is that the Internet, in both democratic and non-democratic societies, has opened new and effective avenues for the advancement of human rights. Undoubtedly, the continuation and deepening of such empowerment depend upon the realization of universal and unconditional Internet access. Indeed, empirical research has confirmed the Internet’s effective role in protecting citizens’ political rights and enhancing governmental accountability. These findings explain why the United Nations consistently emphasizes and promotes access to the Internet.

Universal Access to the Internet by Humanity

Although the preceding arguments have demonstrated the unique value of Internet access for the realization of fundamental human rights, the justification of a moral right requires going beyond the mere importance of an interest. The essential criterion is that such an interest must also be capable of justifying the creation of obligations for others; for there may be interests that are desirable for individuals, yet whose realization imposes heavy and unacceptable costs on society. On this basis, one may acknowledge the importance of Internet access while nevertheless opposing its recognition as a human right because of the substantial costs associated with providing it universally. Yet the reality is that, once the actual requirements are clarified, the financial burden of universal Internet access is neither unreasonable nor overwhelming. Consequently, the vital interests that every individual has in accessing the Internet adequately justify the proportionate costs generated by this right.

In assessing the costs of universal Internet access, it is first important to understand the scale of the challenge it presents. The United Nations International Telecommunication Union estimated that by the end of 2018, 51 percent of the world’s seven-billion population had access to the Internet (International Telecommunication Union, 2018). Although many people in poorer regions of the world still lack Internet access, their number is declining as technology becomes more affordable. Nevertheless, data indicate that the expansion of Internet access has slowed in recent years. This suggests that universal Internet access will not occur naturally without targeted advocacy and promotion (Affordability Report, 2018). Therefore, the human right to free Internet access provides the normative foundation for such action.

Although free access to the Internet deserves the status of a human right because it facilitates the realization and protection of fundamental human rights, the danger of cyber-utopianism should not be overlooked. Cyber-utopianism refers to an uncritical belief in the inherently emancipatory nature of virtual communications and a deliberate neglect of their drawbacks (Mozorov, 2011: 119). Accordingly, any attempt to justify the right to Internet access as a human right must necessarily take into account the serious harms associated with Internet use.

In this regard, the Internet may undermine individual rights and enable harmful practices. For example, it facilitates mass surveillance and weakens the right to privacy (Goldsmith, 2018: 64), while also making censorship and population control easier. Given that this space belongs largely to the private sector and is designed for profit-making, it also entails further risks and harms. This both restricts access and distorts virtual discourse in favor of commercial interests. Indeed, it has been argued that such imperatives promote fake news, racism, misogyny, and image-based abuse, and may even threaten the foundations of deliberative democracy (Saul & Nussbaum, 2011: 71).

Nor can it be denied that the Internet has become a platform for the promotion of “surveillance capitalism,” which some have described as “a new form of information capitalism that aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control” (Zuboff, 2015: 79). Thus, Internet use is accompanied by various harms and costs. However, access to the Internet is grounded in its empowering capacity. This valuable medium is vital and necessary for the realization of human rights and democratic participation in the virtual world. Moreover, the right to Internet access itself can serve as a response to some of these harms. For instance, state surveillance and control violate rights such as the right to privacy, and recognizing the right to free Internet access provides a means of resisting such violations.

Because the Internet has become fundamentally embedded in contemporary life, non-participation in it is no longer a realistic possibility. Accordingly, the central question is not whether to use or not use the Internet, but rather how it should be regulated and supervised. Similarly, democratic decision-making in the real world, if insufficiently regulated, can lead to problems such as the tyranny of the majority or the influence of campaign financiers. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of democracy do not lead us to abandon it; rather, they compel us to improve it.

Consequently, in order for the Internet to contribute to the advancement of human rights in the manner described above, it requires more regulation and governance than currently exists. However, such regulation is necessary not to restrict access, but to organize and govern the manner of its use. Just as few rights are absolute, the right to access and use the Internet is no exception. The obvious limitations in this sphere are the same well-established limitations that apply offline to freedom of opinion and expression. Child sexual abuse material and speech inciting violence and discrimination must also be prohibited online. In addition, there are other online behaviors and risks that may require regulation, including cyberattacks, the spread of fake news, the use of social bots to manipulate voters, and mass surveillance of the online activities of uninformed citizens, even by democratic states. Although the precise legal nature of these limitations has not yet been clearly defined, the harms resulting from current Internet use do not weaken the arguments in favor of access (Reglitz, 2020: 24).

The Right of Access to the Internet in the Council of Europe as a Case Study

Recalling Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)16 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on measures to promote the public service value of the Internet, as well as the international universal service obligations established by the United Nations International Telecommunication Union and the European Union Directive on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Directive 2002/22/EC), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe emphasizes universal service obligations concerning the Internet throughout Europe and beyond (Council of Europe, 2014).

In light of the significant role that the Internet plays for individuals, groups, and states within modern society, the Assembly believes that the Internet should be accessible to everyone regardless of age, place of residence, or income, and that stronger efforts at the local, regional, national, and European levels are necessary to guarantee Internet access for all.

In this regard, public authorities bear the responsibility of ensuring the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression online. Accordingly, the Assembly recommends that the member states of the Council of Europe guarantee the right of access to the Internet on the basis of the following principles:

• Everyone shall have the right to access the Internet as an essential requirement for exercising the rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights;
• The right of access to the Internet includes the right to access, receive, and impart information and ideas through the Internet without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers, subject only to the restrictions set forth in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given the importance of the Internet for democratic societies, any such restrictions must be clearly defined;
• Since fear of surveillance may lead to self-censorship, any such measures must comply with the limitations established under Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
• Since Internet access is also necessary for the exercise of other human rights, such as the right to freedom of assembly and the right to private and family life, member states should recognize the fundamental right of access to the Internet both in law and in practice;
• Internet access and service providers should comply with universal service obligations concerning the Internet, such as those established by the United Nations and the European Union;
• Access to a minimum quality of Internet service for all constitutes a shared responsibility between member states and Internet service and access providers. Particular emphasis should be placed on affordability, interoperability, and the integrity of Internet services, taking into account the latest technological developments;
• There should be no discrimination in the treatment of Internet data and traffic on the basis of device, content, author, origin, or destination of content, service, or application; thus, network neutrality should be guaranteed under national law;
• National laws and practices should recognize individual access to the Internet, and any restriction on this right must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic society. The Assembly does not regard general restrictions on Internet access for individuals as an appropriate sanction for minor violations of intellectual property rights;
• Access to the Internet through public access points should be particularly promoted by educational and cultural institutions;
• Member states should intensify their efforts to ensure Internet access for persons with special needs;
• Member states should promote technological research aimed at improving Internet accessibility, as well as open access to essential software and services; member states may restrict the distribution of software that could affect human rights or national security;
• Member states should require public authorities to provide open access to their information and services through the Internet; multilingual Internet access, insofar as possible, should be regarded as a public objective (Council of Europe, 2014).

The Assembly calls upon the United Nations and the European Union to engage in closer cooperation with the Council of Europe in defining and implementing the right of access to the Internet and related standards at the European level. It also invites Internet business stakeholders to cooperate with governments and parliaments in their efforts to implement the above principles and achieve universal Internet access. Furthermore, the European Internet Service Providers Association is invited to develop quality standards in this field. Finally, the Assembly calls upon the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to formulate targeted programs supporting member states in national legislative initiatives aimed at guaranteeing universal Internet access throughout Europe.

Conclusion

In the contemporary world, the right of access to the Internet has transcended the status of a mere technology and has come to be recognized as one of the fundamental human rights. This normative transformation, which has also been emphasized by the United Nations General Assembly, stems from the unparalleled role of cyberspace in the realization of other human rights. Internet access constitutes a necessity for modern life and a prerequisite for the enjoyment of a minimally dignified human existence.

The nature of the Internet as a universal moral right is rooted in the fundamental and vital interests of human beings—interests so significant that they justify the imposition of both negative and positive obligations upon states and the international community. Through its profound transformation of communicative and political practices, the Internet has altered the value of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Examples such as online political participation platforms demonstrate that deprivation from Internet access severely restricts individuals’ capacity to exercise their rights. Accordingly, as a positional good, Internet access plays a decisive role in the concrete and equal realization of these rights.

Although challenges such as mass surveillance, fake news, and threats to privacy are undeniable realities of cyberspace, such harms cannot weaken the argument in favor of the right to Internet access. Just as democratic institutions are not abandoned despite their shortcomings, the Internet likewise requires effective regulation and governance. The approach adopted by the Council of Europe in recognizing this right and emphasizing principles such as network neutrality, affordable access, and non-discrimination provides an appropriate framework for the realization of this right. Ultimately, recognizing the right of access to the Internet constitutes a necessary step toward guaranteeing equal opportunities in the enjoyment of those rights that form the very core of human life in the digital age.

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