Introduction
In recent years, migration and asylum have emerged as among the most significant political and legal challenges facing Europe. The increasing arrival of migrants through the Mediterranean routes, particularly from North Africa to Italy’s southern coasts, has placed considerable pressure on Italy’s reception system and asylum procedures. Under such circumstances, in 2023, the Italian government decided to transfer part of the process of managing asylum seekers outside its territory within the framework of a bilateral agreement, under which facilities were established in Albania for the accommodation and processing of certain migrants.
From the outset, this decision attracted significant attention within Italy, across the European Union, and among international institutions. Supporters of the initiative presented it as a mechanism to reduce pressure on Italy’s domestic system, accelerate asylum procedures, and address irregular migration flows. Conversely, critics expressed concerns regarding its legal, humanitarian, and political consequences, raising questions about compliance with human rights standards, jurisdictional authority, and state responsibility.
As the implementation of the agreement progressed, particularly during 2024 and 2025, the practical operation of the scheme became accompanied by legal developments, operational challenges, and diverse reactions. Examining the formation, implementation, and consequences of this arrangement provides a clearer understanding of emerging trends in European migration policy and their relationship with states’ legal obligations.
Incidents
The Italy–Albania migrant transfer scheme was established in November 2023 with the objective of managing migration flows originating from third countries through a bilateral protocol between the two governments[1]. The agreement was signed by Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy, and Edi Rama, Prime Minister of Albania.
The central element of this arrangement was the outsourcing of certain stages of migration management — including “initial reception, screening, detention, and accelerated processing of asylum applications” — to facilities located on Albanian territory. However, according to the official position of both governments, the primary jurisdiction and responsibility remained with Italy, while Italian authorities retained control over the operation of the facilities in Albania.
At the level of Italian domestic law, the agreement was approved through Law No. 14 of 21 February 2024 (Legge 21 febbraio 2024, n. 14), receiving 93 votes in favour and 63 votes against, and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette of Italy on 22 February 2024. On the Albanian side, the agreement was also approved by the Council of Ministers of Albania.
Under this arrangement, asylum seekers rescued in international waters while attempting to reach Italy were to be transferred to Albania. Following identification, reception, and screening procedures, individuals would then be transferred either to Italy for further processing or for the implementation of return procedures[2]. Upon disembarkation from vessels, migrants would be escorted to facilities surrounded by five-metre-high walls[3].
However, the scheme did not apply to all migrants. Its scope was limited to individuals whom Italy classified as originating from “safe countries of origin,” including countries such as Egypt, Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, and Tunisia, among others[4].
Under the Protocol, Italy was granted the right to use two designated areas in Albania, both of which were explicitly identified in the agreement. The first was the port of Shëngjin, located in north-western Albania, while the second was the village of Gjadër, which previously hosted a military air base. Italy was authorised to establish facilities in Gjadër capable of accommodating up to 3,000 migrants at any given time.
The Gjadër facility had a distinct operational function compared with the first centre. It was divided into three separate sections: one section with a capacity of 880 places for asylum seekers; another with a capacity of 144 places for migrants awaiting return procedures; and a third section with a capacity of 20 places for migrants undergoing criminal judicial proceedings[5].
Within these two designated areas, Italian authorities exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction pursuant to Italian law and European Union law. Any dispute arising between Italian authorities and migrants detained in these facilities falls exclusively under Italian jurisdiction. Albania, for its part, permits migrants detained by Italy in these centres to enter and remain on Albanian territory solely for the purposes of border control procedures or return operations conducted in accordance with Italian and European Union law, and only for the period strictly necessary to achieve those objectives[6].
The management of these facilities was assigned through a negotiated procedure, rather than through a broad and open public tender process. The cooperative Medihospes, previously operating under the name Senis Hospes, was selected after submitting a bid approximately 5 percent lower than the amount initially estimated by the Italian Ministry of Interior. The cooperative had been active for years in the field of migrant reception and accommodation; however, it had previously faced allegations and complaints concerning mismanagement in some of its operations.
For the entire four-year period of operation, approximately €133 million was allocated to this cooperative. This amount included more than €600,000 for security management, approximately €87 million for personnel costs, and around €5.7 million for telephone cards. When additional expenses were taken into account — including internal transportation of individuals within Albania, healthcare services, salaries of Italian officials and employees, and other operational costs — the total expenditure was estimated at approximately €650 million, a figure also included in the legislation approving the agreement[7].
Despite all these arrangements, however, the project quickly encountered serious difficulties. Approximately one year after the conclusion of the agreement, and despite the construction and preparation of both facilities, the entire scheme came under significant scrutiny. Italian authorities began transferring individuals to Albania in mid-October 2024. By mid-November of the same year, fewer than 25 migrants had been accommodated there, most of whom were reportedly citizens of Egypt and Bangladesh. However, Italian courts ordered their release and transfer back to Italy[8].
This outcome was particularly significant because the original plan had envisaged the processing of up to 36,000 individuals annually in Shëngjin and 3,000 individuals in Gjadër. The legal challenges therefore prevented the scheme from operating at the scale initially envisioned by the Italian government.
Dario Belluccio, a lawyer representing one of the Bangladeshi asylum seekers involved in proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union, stated that the Albanian migrant camp model had effectively collapsed. Speaking to Reuters, he argued that:
“Continuing what the Italian government had planned before this decision will not be possible and, technically speaking, in my view, the government’s approach has completely failed[9].”
However, rather than abandoning the initiative entirely, the Italian government altered the practical purpose of the facilities. Through Decree-Law No. 37 of March 2025, the Gjadër centre was repurposed for the detention of individuals who were already being held in Italian detention facilities. In other words, rather than asylum seekers newly intercepted at sea and transferred directly to Albania, the centres began to accommodate men who were already subject to expulsion orders and had previously been detained within Italian territory before being transferred to an extraterritorial detention facility[10].
Therefore, although the agreement itself has not been formally terminated, its full implementation as originally designed has not materialised. By mid-2026, the scheme remained only partially operational and continued to face significant legal, administrative, and political obstacles.
Challenges and Responses
- The High Cost of the Scheme
One of the major challenges concerning the full implementation of this scheme by the Italian government has been its exceptionally high financial cost. Available assessments indicate that the implementation of the project requires approximately €653 million in expenditure. According to these estimates, €252 million of the total amount would be allocated to covering travel and logistical expenses for employees of the Italian Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Health who are required to move between Italy and Albania.
The investigative platform Openpolis revealed that, in addition to this amount, approximately €95 million would be allocated for boat rental expenses, while around €8 million would be spent on health insurance costs for Italian personnel stationed abroad[11].
Although the Italian government’s primary justification has been that the overall cost of the project would be distributed over a five-year period following its operationalisation, the Italian Parliament has argued that a more realistic assessment of the expenses suggests a figure closer to €1 billion. According to critics, this estimate better reflects the actual financial implications of maintaining facilities, personnel, transportation, and administrative structures outside Italian territory[12].
A joint assessment conducted by the non-governmental organisation ActionAid and the University of Bari concerning the two migrant centres in Albania up to March 2025 further highlighted the economic inefficiency of the scheme. According to their findings, while the establishment and operation of a single accommodation place in comparable facilities in Italy costs approximately €21,000, the equivalent cost in the Gjadër and Shëngjin centres reaches approximately €150,000 per bed[13].
This significant difference has been described as a major obstacle to the practical sustainability of the project. Furthermore, reports indicate that the cost associated with each individual migrant accommodated under this arrangement exceeds €18,000, a figure that has generated substantial criticism from opposition parties and civil society actors, who have accused the government of financial mismanagement and using the scheme primarily as a political instrument rather than an effective migration-management mechanism[14].
- Domestic Reactions
Italian judicial authorities became one of the primary sources of opposition to the implementation of the agreement. On Friday, 18 October 2024, Italian judges issued a decision rejecting the transfer and detention of asylum seekers from Italy to Albania under the government’s migrant centre scheme.
The ruling concerned the detention of 12 Bangladeshi and Egyptian men who had been intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea by the Italian Coast Guard and subsequently transferred to Albania on Monday aboard an Italian naval vessel. These asylum seekers arrived on Wednesday at one of the two migrant facilities operated by the Italian government in Albania.
The court, relying on the interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the concept of “safe countries of origin,” concluded that these individuals did not meet the legal requirements for detention in Albania and ordered their return to Italy. This represented the second major setback for the controversial scheme.
Previously, four out of the first sixteen asylum seekers transferred to Albania had also been returned to Italy after courts classified them as vulnerable persons. According to the interpretation of the CJEU, EU Member States must designate an entire country as safe and cannot classify only specific regions or segments of a country as safe[15].
In another case, on 1 February 2025, following judicial opposition to the detention and transfer of asylum seekers from Italy to Albania, a vessel carrying 43 migrants departed Albania and returned to the Italian port of Bari. Among these individuals, the majority were citizens of Bangladesh, alongside six Egyptian nationals, one person from Côte d’Ivoire, and one person from Gambia. All were subsequently transferred back to Italy[16].
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione) also raised serious concerns regarding the agreement from the perspective of constitutional law and Italy’s international obligations. Although the Court did not formally invalidate the agreement, it identified potential conflicts with the Italian Constitution, European Union law, and international legal standards.
In particular, the Court highlighted possible risks to fundamental rights, including:
- the right to personal liberty;
- the right to an effective defence;
- the right to health;
- and the right to seek asylum.
According to the judges, ambiguity regarding the precise categories of individuals covered by the agreement and the extraterritorial nature of detention could create a legal vacuum and lead to unequal treatment between migrants transferred to Albania and those processed within Italian territory.
The Court further emphasised that, under European legal standards, detention should be used only as a measure of last resort. However, under the Italy–Albania mechanism, detention effectively becomes the default measure rather than an exceptional one, creating the risk of unjustified and prolonged deprivation of liberty.
Overall, the Supreme Court considered the legal foundation of the agreement fragile and potentially incompatible with fundamental legal guarantees[17].
Following the third suspension by Italian courts of the detention of migrants transferred to Albania, broad political reactions emerged within Italy concerning the future of the migration transfer scheme.
Opposition parties — including the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD), the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle – M5S), the Green and Left Alliance (Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra – AVS), and the pro-European liberal party +Europa — described the development as evidence of the “complete failure” of the government’s initiative and characterised the project as a significant waste of public resources.
Elly Schlein, Secretary of the Democratic Party, stated that nearly one billion euros had been allocated to facilities that had failed to produce tangible results. She accused the government of wasting public funds while disregarding European judicial decisions and existing legal obligations. According to Schlein, the government had pursued a politically symbolic project rather than an effective solution to migration management.
Opposition parties further accused the government of attempting to circumvent judicial scrutiny by transferring certain migration-related decisions from specialised migration courts to ordinary courts of appeal. They argued that the repeated return of migrants from Albania to Italy demonstrated the structural legal deficiencies of the agreement and called for government accountability before Parliament.
In contrast, governing parties — including the League (Lega), Forza Italia, and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) — defended the government’s policy and criticised judicial decisions as an inappropriate intervention into political decision-making. They portrayed the courts’ rulings as an obstacle to the implementation of democratically approved migration policies.
Government representatives argued that the classification of countries as “safe countries of origin” falls within the competence of the executive branch and reaffirmed that the government would continue pursuing legislative reforms aimed at ensuring the implementation of the Albania model.
Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni repeatedly defended the agreement, describing it as a necessary instrument to combat irregular migration and stating that her government would overcome legal and institutional obstacles preventing its full implementation. She argued that the initiative represented an innovative approach that could become a model for broader European migration management[18].
- International Reactions
The Master of Advanced Studies in European and International Governance (MEIG) at the University of Geneva examined the Italy–Albania agreement and raised significant concerns regarding its compatibility with human rights obligations and European legal standards.
According to the report, although the agreement formally maintains Italian jurisdiction and responsibility, it creates substantial human rights concerns. In particular, the automatic and potentially prolonged detention of migrants without sufficient individual assessment may constitute a risk to the right to liberty and the right to a fair procedure.
The physical and legal distance between the detention facilities and Italian territory may undermine effective access to legal assistance, meaningful participation in asylum procedures, and independent monitoring mechanisms. As a result, the arrangement may negatively affect migrants’ ability to effectively exercise their right to seek international protection.
The report further noted that the designation of distant ports for disembarkation increases the time migrants spend at sea and may create tensions with obligations under maritime law and human rights law concerning the prompt transfer of rescued individuals to a place of safety.
Italian courts also intervened by annulling several detention orders, citing insufficient legal guarantees and uncertainty regarding the applicable framework. Moreover, recent developments concerning the interpretation of the concept of a “safe country of origin” by the Court of Justice of the European Union imposed additional restrictions on broad and automatic classifications of countries as safe.
Overall, the report concluded that without effective safeguards, independent oversight, and full compliance with European and international legal standards, the implementation of the Italy–Albania model risks violating fundamental rights, including the right to liberty, the right to defence, and the principle of non-refoulement[19].
On 1 August 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the joined cases C-758/24 and C-759/24, a ruling that directly challenged Italy’s reliance on the concept of a “safe country of origin” within the framework of its migration agreement with Albania.
The Court clarified that the designation of a country as a “safe country of origin” must be based on a transparent, evidence-based, and accessible assessment that can be examined by both asylum applicants and national courts. Such classifications must remain subject to effective judicial review.
The CJEU further emphasised that a country may only be designated as “safe” where the relevant legal criteria are satisfied for the entire population. A state cannot be classified as safe merely because the majority of its citizens enjoy protection while specific groups or categories of individuals remain exposed to persecution, discrimination, or serious risks to their fundamental rights.
The Court also held that asylum applicants must have the possibility to effectively challenge the presumption of safety by relying on their individual circumstances. They must be able to demonstrate that, despite their country’s general classification, they personally face circumstances that justify international protection.
Furthermore, applicants must have access to effective judicial remedies and the possibility of challenging both the rejection of their asylum applications and the underlying classification of their country of origin as safe.
This judgment significantly weakened the operational basis of the Italy–Albania scheme, which relied heavily on the accelerated rejection of asylum claims based on migrants’ nationality and the assumption that individuals originating from designated “safe countries” were unlikely to qualify for international protection.
The ruling particularly affected Italy’s practice regarding countries such as Bangladesh and Egypt, whose nationals constituted a significant proportion of those transferred to Albania. The Italian government had relied on their inclusion in the national list of safe countries of origin to justify accelerated procedures and detention in Albanian facilities.
Beyond the immediate implications for Italy, the judgment carries broader significance for European migration governance. It establishes that any externalisation model involving accelerated asylum procedures must comply with the guarantees provided under European Union law, including the right to an individual assessment, effective judicial protection, and respect for the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Accordingly, any migration-management model based on outsourcing asylum procedures, limiting individual assessments, or restricting access to effective remedies may face serious compatibility issues with EU law[20].
On 22 November 2024, four Members of the European Parliament from Volt Europa visited the migrant detention and processing facilities established by Italy in Albania. The delegation included Damian Boeselager, Anna Strolenberg, Reinier Van Lanschot, and Kai Tegethoff. Following their visit, the Members of the European Parliament described the Italy–Albania scheme as a concerning example of the externalisation of European borders and migration control, raising serious concerns regarding its compatibility with European Union law and human rights standards.
The representatives argued that the agreement between Italy and Albania represented a broader trend towards shifting migration management responsibilities beyond European borders, rather than addressing migration challenges through sustainable and rights-based policies. They expressed particular concern that the model could undermine fundamental principles of European asylum law, including access to protection procedures, individual assessment of asylum claims, and effective judicial safeguards.
Referring to recent developments concerning the concept of “safe countries of origin,” the Volt Europa representatives questioned the legal basis of accelerated procedures and rapid returns based on broad national classifications. They argued that such mechanisms risk weakening individual examination of asylum applications and may prevent migrants from effectively presenting claims based on their personal circumstances.
The delegation also raised concerns regarding the lack of financial transparency surrounding the project. According to Volt Europa, the financial framework of the agreement was not sufficiently transparent, despite the allocation of substantial public resources. The representatives criticised the absence of adequate public disclosure regarding expenditure and questioned the justification for allocating such significant amounts of public funding to an external detention model.
Furthermore, they criticised the procedure through which certain contracts related to the construction and management of the facilities were awarded, arguing that the Italian government had bypassed ordinary public procurement procedures. According to Volt Europa, approximately €10 million in funding was allocated directly to construction companies without a fully transparent public tender process, raising concerns regarding accountability and oversight in the use of public funds.
The Members of the European Parliament also highlighted the significant financial burden associated with the initiative. They argued that the resources dedicated to establishing and maintaining detention facilities in Albania could have been invested instead in policies aimed at migrant integration, improving reception systems, and strengthening public services for both migrants and local communities.
In their assessment, the Italy–Albania agreement reflected a restrictive approach centred on detention and deterrence rather than inclusion and long-term migration governance. They therefore considered the scheme part of a wider European trend in which migration control is increasingly pursued through externalisation mechanisms that may place fundamental rights at risk[21].
Conclusion
The transfer of part of the asylum-processing procedure from Italy to Albania can be considered a symbol of Italy’s shift towards the externalisation of its responsibilities in relation to asylum seekers and migration management. Although the model was formally designed to preserve the jurisdiction and legal responsibility of the state of origin, its practical implementation has revealed profound legal and operational complexities.
The experience of the Italy–Albania agreement demonstrates that while states may seek to manage domestic pressures through innovative migration-control mechanisms, the physical relocation of procedures beyond national borders does not necessarily result in the transfer of legal responsibility. The interaction between extraterritorial jurisdiction, European Union law, international obligations, and constitutional guarantees has created a complex legal framework in which executive measures remain subject to continuous judicial scrutiny.
For this reason, a scheme initially designed to accelerate asylum procedures and strengthen migration control has, in practice, become an arena of confrontation between the executive branch and the judiciary, as well as between national migration policies and the broader European legal order.
From a broader perspective, this case — alongside other similar initiatives in countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden — demonstrates that the future of European migration policies increasingly depends on balancing administrative efficiency with legal legitimacy.
The substantial financial costs, repeated modifications to the implementation model, return of transferred migrants to Italy, and restrictive judgments issued by national and European courts all indicate that externalisation models may face structural instability unless they are accompanied by clear legal safeguards, effective oversight mechanisms, and full compliance with fundamental rights obligations.
Ultimately, the Italy–Albania experience should not be viewed merely as an experiment involving a bilateral agreement between two states. Rather, it represents a broader test of the limits and feasibility of emerging migration-management strategies within the framework of European Union law and international human rights law.
References
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