Article Title: Analyzing the Concept of “Existential Threat” and Evaluating its Consequences in the Light of Carl Schmitt’s Views (Case Study of the Israel and United States Attacks on Iran)
Authors: Prof. Amir Maghami, Mohammad Ali Razavinejad, Fateme Esfandiarpour & Mehdi Barati Ahmadabadi
Journal: Legal Studies
Publication Year: 2026
Given the growing prominence of the concept of “existential threat” in political and security discourse, alongside the stringent constraints imposed by contemporary international law on the use of force, this notion has emerged as one of the most contentious issues at the intersection of political philosophy and international law. This is particularly significant insofar as, within the framework of the “state of exception,” the survival of the state may be posited as taking precedence over legal norms, whereas the Charter-based international legal order does not accommodate such an approach and instead confines the right of self-defense to the occurrence of an actual armed attack.
In the article entitled “Analyzing the Concept of “Existential Threat” and Evaluating its Consequences in the Light of Carl Schmitt’s Views (Case Study of the Israel and United States Attacks on Iran),” this fundamental tension between the logic of survival and the imperatives of legal order is examined through a rigorous analytical lens, with particular attention to contemporary security developments. The study critically explores the theoretical foundations of the concept, its operationalization in state practice, and its potential implications for the integrity of the international legal order. What follows is a structured summary of the principal findings of this research.
Introduction
The concept of an “existential threat,” in its broadest sense, refers to a threat that simultaneously endangers all constitutive elements of the state—namely territory, population, and national sovereignty—with destruction. In international armed conflicts, such a threat is almost always present; however, what distinguishes an existential threat is not merely an attempt to intervene in political sovereignty or to compel a state to adopt certain decisions, nor an effort to alter the political structure, political regime, or governing authority. Rather, it is an attempt to eradicate national sovereignty altogether and replace it with another sovereignty over the same territory and population.
In modern political philosophy—particularly in the thought of Carl Schmitt—the political life of the state is inherently linked to the possibility of annihilation. That is, the political is defined from the outset in opposition to the danger of non-existence. Schmitt conceptualizes the political on the basis of the distinction between “killing or being killed” and the real possibility of the “friend/enemy” dichotomy. When the enemy approaches the point of destroying the political existence of the state, society exits the normal condition and enters a “state of exception.” In such a condition, legal norms no longer function as determinants of decision-making, and the “sovereign” emerges as the ultimate authority—an authority whose decision to preserve survival is not derived from law but constitutes the precondition for the possibility of law itself. This theoretical foundation renders the notion of existential threat in Schmitt’s political philosophy as a priori, ontological, and prior to legal rules.
Within this intellectual framework, war is conceived as a political-spatial rule rather than a moral-universal one. The use of force is considered legitimate in response to threats against spatial order and spheres of influence—provided that it does not escalate into total war (a war of survival). Accordingly, war revolves around spatial order, influence, or conflicts between different nomoi. Thus, “Reichs”—loosely understood as empires or super-states—may resort to war with political objectives without necessarily pursuing the absolute destruction of the enemy. From this perspective, Schmitt defines the “recognized enemy” as the necessary point at which war must stop, since the legitimacy of war derives from the political equality of Reichs rather than from defense. Consequently, war remains permissible in principle—except for total war, which is prohibited unless justified by the right of self-defense.
War, therefore, represents the most intense manifestation of the friend/enemy distinction and is not only legitimate but also inevitable for preserving the political nature of order. In this way, Schmitt reverses the logic of the Versailles order, transforming war from an international crime into a necessary act for maintaining order, and provides the theoretical tools for justifying expansionist policies under the guise of defending an ideological sphere of influence. From this perspective, at the moment of existential threat or within a “state of exception,” norms are suspended, and the sovereign becomes the ultimate decision-maker regarding extraordinary measures. It is in this sense that the preservation of the political life of the state may be regarded as the cornerstone of any legal order. The implications of Schmitt’s perspective persist to this day. When Donald Trump speaks of restoring “peace through strength,” he reflects an approach influenced by Schmitt’s ideas, which stands in direct contrast to the normative approach of Hans Kelsen—namely, “peace through law.”
Components of an Existential Threat
Under a strict approach, an existential threat is realized only when all three fundamental elements of the state—territory, population, and national sovereignty—are simultaneously exposed to destruction, either within a single event or over a short sequence of events. This approach emphasizes a “grave situation” and requires complete and immediate criteria of annihilation. A prominent example is Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which placed territory, population, and sovereignty under direct occupation. This interpretation prevents political misuse and the labeling of minor threats as existential, raises the threshold for invoking a state of exception, and aligns more closely with the right of self-defense as provided in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Under this framework, the right of self-defense is activated only in the presence of a real and demonstrable threat to the destruction of the state. Furthermore, the strict approach, as reflected in the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, also enables the formulation of measurable and legally grounded indicators.
In contrast, a more flexible approach does not require the simultaneous destruction of all elements. It is sufficient that the threat possesses either the potential or actual capacity to annihilate the state as a whole, even if it initially targets only one or two elements and undermines the others over time or through indirect consequences. Carl Schmitt similarly argues that the state emerges from a shared human experience rather than merely an institutional structure, asserting that “understanding the concept of the state depends on understanding the concept of the political.” In Schmitt’s view, sovereignty holds such value that the state is, above all, an expression of a sovereign authority capable of ensuring the political survival of the community. This authority must be able, particularly in exceptional circumstances, to make decisions necessary for preserving the political existence of society without requiring the consent of other institutions or adherence to ordinary legal constraints.
It is for this reason that positive international law introduces objective criteria governing the use of force. As long as the survival of the state is not under actual threat and a crisis has not materialized, states are not permitted to violate legal norms on the basis of hypothetical risks. However, once the threat to the state becomes actual, law collapses and the right to decide for survival is activated. Nevertheless, both legal and philosophical frameworks emphasize that the state of exception is not a preemptive measure; rather, it may be justified only as a final, temporary, and reactive decision aimed at preserving survival. If, in such a genuine crisis, a decision is made to use nuclear weapons, that decision may be understood not as a violation of law, but as the restoration of law through its temporary suspension—since its purpose is to preserve the entity that constitutes the very source of legal validity. Beyond this, however, any preemptive decision taken prior to the realization of an actual crisis is not an expression of sovereignty, but rather a disruption of order and the genesis of chaos.
Assessment of the Potential Legal Implications of an Existential Threat
Three principal axes are typically invoked by states to justify actions that exceed the bounds of the ordinary legal order: the use of force, the expansion of collective self-defense, and the possibility of violating the rules of international humanitarian law.
- Legitimacy of the Use of Force
The “prohibition of the use of force” constitutes one of the most fundamental principles of contemporary international law, enshrined as a peremptory norm in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. This prohibition encompasses both the actual use of force and the threat thereof. The structure of the Charter is designed in such a way that even under the most extreme circumstances, priority is given to preserving the legal order and preventing the escalation of conflict. Within this framework, the right of self-defense under Article 51 is activated only when the occurrence of an “armed attack” can be demonstrably established.
Judicial practice and legal doctrine have interpreted the requirement of an armed attack in a restrictive manner. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice clarified that an armed attack must be both “grave” and “attributable” to the opposing party, and that mere threats or support for opposing armed groups are insufficient to trigger the right of self-defense. Accordingly, self-defense is realized only in response to an actual armed attack. In the Oil Platforms case and even in the Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the Court made clear that the threshold for invoking self-defense is based on an objective assessment of an attack, not on the subjective perceptions of states regarding the level of threat.
Based on this narrow understanding of self-defense established in the Court’s jurisprudence, an evaluation of Israel’s official report to the Security Council—wherein it attempts to frame a series of rocket attacks, proxy group activities, and declared threats by Iran as an existential threat—indicates that, from a legal standpoint, the necessary elements for establishing the occurrence of an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter are not satisfied. Israel portrays a set of dispersed, asymmetric, and largely non-attributable actions as a coordinated regime of hostility, whereas the criteria set by the Court for establishing an armed attack—namely intensity, frequency, operational coherence, and clear attribution to the target state—exceed the level demonstrated by such actions.
- Expansion of Collective Self-Defense
Collective self-defense is one of the exceptional institutions in international law, whose legitimacy derives directly from Article 51 of the Charter, which recognizes the “inherent right” of states to self-defense, exercised either individually or collectively. The concept of collective self-defense in the Charter traces its roots to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Legally, the right of self-defense may be exercised by a state that has not itself been attacked but shares common interests with the victim state or has concluded a mutual defense pact with it, acting in support and assistance of the state under attack.
Accordingly, if Israel’s use of force were to qualify as lawful self-defense, then U.S. attacks on various positions in Iran could be considered part of that same defensive framework and might even be justified under the obligation to cease serious breaches of peremptory norms pursuant to Article 41 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. However, if such justification is not established, then the United States would bear international responsibility—either as an independent aggressor or as a state assisting an aggressor—under Article 16 of the same Draft Articles.
The Court, in the Nicaragua case, further clarified that the exercise of collective self-defense is contingent upon the occurrence of an armed attack against the victim state, a formal request for assistance by that state, the necessity and proportionality of the assisting state’s actions, and immediate reporting to the Security Council. Therefore, collective self-defense does not possess a preemptive foundation; rather, it is a reactive mechanism grounded in preventing the collapse of the collective security order, not in circumventing it. Assistance by allies to prevent the disintegration of the essential structures of a state is not only permissible but is implicitly embedded within Article 51 as a natural mechanism for containing aggression and suppressing the aggressor in order to restore peace.
- Authorization of Violations of International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law is grounded in the independence and neutrality of its norms vis-à-vis the legality of the conflict itself. This principle, derived from the distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum, means that even if a war is justified at its outset, its conduct remains subject to binding humanitarian rules. In contrast to the Schmittian approach, the logic of contemporary international law holds that although the will of the sovereign plays a role in the creation of legal rules, the validity of those rules depends upon the sovereign’s adherence to them. Accordingly, international humanitarian law forms part of the legal regime governing the state of exception—it is designed precisely for application in such circumstances, and there is no alternative moment in which its observance would be more relevant.
Within this framework, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols oblige contracting states, under all circumstances, to comply with the principles of distinction, precaution, proportionality, the prohibition of excessive harm, and other relevant rules. These obligations, pursuant to Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, must be respected and ensured by states. Consequently, even claims of an existential threat to the survival of the state cannot justify the suspension of these normative guarantees.
In its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that, in the face of the most extreme humanitarian constraints, there exists a fundamental right of survival for states. In other words, when the survival of the state is at stake, the Court leaves open—or at least does not definitively resolve—the legality of extraordinary decisions. This reasoning echoes the Schmittian logic that a state must be able to decide when its survival is threatened. Nevertheless, the Court characterized nuclear deterrence policy and possession of nuclear weapons as non-legal issues and, while recognizing the difficulty of issuing an absolute judgment applicable to all circumstances, emphasized the centrality and supremacy of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law.
The Validity of Iran as an Existential Threat to Israel: Reassessing Israeli and U.S. Claims in Relation to the June 2025 Attack on Iran
Assessing Israel’s claim that Iran constitutes an existential threat requires distinguishing among three layers of threat: identity-based threat, power-enhancing threat, and technological threat. The first point to note is that, in its letter of 17 June 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, Israel explicitly characterized its operation as a response to an existential and imminent threat arising from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. This claim is grounded in the assertion that, since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has regarded the destruction of Israel as an official objective and as part of its political identity. This allegation is coupled with Tehran’s support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad, its structural opposition to the peace process, and the persistence of discourse calling for the elimination of Israel. Israel claims that, through this network, Iran gains the capacity to impose a multi-front encirclement on Israel and thereby upset the balance of power, a condition that, in Israel’s view, poses a threat to its identity-based and security-related survival. Put differently, the antagonism between Iran and Israel is presented as structural rather than merely behavioral. From an identity-based perspective, the June attacks occurred within a context that had been constructed for years beforehand by Israel and by parts of the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
At the second stage, Israel seeks to portray the Iranian threat not as a future danger, but as an immediate one. In the aforementioned letter, reference is made to the significant acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program in recent months, and it is even claimed that these developments represented the final available opportunity to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-capable. By emphasizing these data, Israel draws a connection between Iran’s nuclear capability and its missile capability, concluding that the survival and existence of the Jewish state are under direct threat. In its letter, Israel refers to missile systems and to the alleged Iranian capacity to produce 10,000 missiles over the next three years, purportedly based on intelligence reports and enrichment trends at high levels. The U.S. letter likewise emphasizes that Iran, by expanding its enrichment infrastructure, has undermined the credibility of its claim that its nuclear program is peaceful.
Similarly, in its letter of 27 June 2025 to the President of the Security Council following the attacks on the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites, the United States pursued the same narrative and justified its actions within the framework of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States claimed that it was pursuing three objectives: defending Israel, protecting U.S. interests and security, and neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program. Unlike Israel, which places greater emphasis on the existential threat allegedly directed against itself, the United States seeks to portray Iran’s threat as one directed against international peace and security. Accordingly, the United States justifies its intervention as support for both Israel’s survival and international peace and security, with the first justification carrying implications for the concept of collective self-defense. Taken together, these claims seek to construct a mental framework in which military actions are defined not as preventive or punitive measures, but as necessary responses aimed at preventing an imminent annihilation.
It should be noted that potential capability is distinct from an actual decision to build and use nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iran’s nuclear program had been under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency within the framework of the JCPOA. In international law, an existential threat—at least insofar as it relates to the law governing the use of force—must be imminent, unavoidable, and accompanied by clear intent. Iran’s drone and missile attacks in 2024 and 2025 were serious threats, but their nature was more that of limited retaliation than of an effort to annihilate Israel. Therefore, Israel must demonstrate that Iran intends to use military means against the life of the Israeli state and that this intent is capable of immediate realization. Israel must then further show that non-military means, such as negotiation and mediation, have exhausted their effectiveness.
The Reversed Claim: Assessing the Existential Threat Against Iran
In Carl Schmitt’s reading, an existential threat is one that targets the very being and political existence of a political unit. The June 2025 attacks were carried out with the aim of dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. However, in recent years—and even prior to the twelve-day war—Israel has repeatedly engaged in limited military strikes and acts of sabotage against Iranian military and industrial targets. Israeli officials have also, on numerous occasions, openly issued threats of military action against Iran with the declared objective of eliminating the country’s nuclear facilities.
Within the framework of Israel’s deterrence doctrine, the expansion of its conventional military capabilities, as well as its possession of nuclear weapons (as non-conventional capabilities), have consistently been perceived as a military threat within Iran’s security complex. Israeli military and intelligence operations against Iranian interests have also, at times, been accompanied by implicit support from certain international actors. Multi-layered sanctions imposed on Iran have been justified on the basis of the concept of a global threat. In addition, for more than three decades, U.S. policy toward Iran has emphasized political isolation, economic pressure, and overt support for regime change. The persistent policy of “Iranophobia” and the securitization of Iran at the international level have created conditions in which even a limited attack can evolve into a process affecting the balance of survival.
In this context, while the Iran–Israel confrontation is often framed as a matter of existence versus non-existence, the other side of the equation—namely, the perception of Israel as an existential threat to Iran—has largely been overlooked. In this regard, it is important to note that Israel’s threat to Iran has two distinct dimensions. One dimension relates to the containment and elimination of the political regime (the Islamic Republic), while the other concerns the fragmentation of Iran by exploiting latent ethnic and religious fault lines. From this latter perspective, planning for and advocating regime change serves not as an end in itself, but as a preliminary step toward eliminating a potential regional rival.
For this reason, Israel’s threat cannot be understood merely as an ordinary threat; rather, it possesses the potential to assume an “existential” character—particularly when manifested through hybrid strategies. These include the targeting of academic physicists, military and cyber attacks on infrastructure, covert operations, economic pressure, political and identity-based propaganda disseminated by a mono-religious state through social media networks and satellite television channels, and, ultimately, the securitization of Iran within international organizations. Accordingly, it may be concluded that the Iran–Israel confrontation is one based on a condition of “mutual existential threat.” However, it is precisely the first strike that determines the distinction between attack and defense, and consequently the legality of the use of force.
At this level, the existential threat against Iran is not limited to the destruction of physical infrastructure but also manifests in efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the state’s survival. In Schmittian terms, if a state is positioned within the discourse of major powers as an absolute potential enemy, the likelihood of invoking a state of exception against it increases. The June attacks occurred within such a context—a context that may facilitate subsequent measures such as follow-up strikes, crippling sanctions, or support for internal destabilization. All of these factors, if sustained, possess the capacity to evolve into an existential threat against Iran.
Conclusion
In summary, in contrast to Carl Schmitt’s doctrine—which presents the will of the sovereign, as the creator of law, as something that is neither suspendable nor subject to limitation, but rather as a perpetually living and constitutive force—modern international law insists upon the primacy of law over the sovereign will. This is because the validity of law depends on the sovereign’s adherence to its own prior will, as expressed through treaties and customary norms. Within this framework, the law governing the use of force and international humanitarian law have emerged with full awareness of the possibility of existential threats and the occurrence of states of exception; indeed, their applicability is inherently tied to such exceptional situations rather than to ordinary conditions. Accordingly, deferring compliance with the law on the use of force to the existence of normal circumstances is both meaningless and untenable.
Within the framework of Schmittian thought, Israel appears to have grounded its actions in June 2025 on precisely such a perspective. By characterizing Iran as an existential threat within a state of exception, Israel effectively positions itself beyond the restraining scope of international law. The result is that, under this approach—shaped by Schmittian reasoning—international law is conceived as a political instrument rather than a moral or normative order, thereby allowing the recognition of a right to use force.
Nevertheless, in the post-Charter era, international law has explicitly constrained the use of force to the framework of “self-defense,” thereby standing in opposition to this perspective. Even in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, it has been consistently emphasized that subjective assessments by states or perceived threats cannot serve as a basis for preemptive self-defense. Although the Court, in its 1996 advisory opinion, left a very narrow analytical space for situations of absolute survival, this space neither constitutes a formal exception nor legitimizes violations of international humanitarian law. Therefore, the positive international law embodied in the Charter system—upon which Israel, the United States, and Iran all rely—is fundamentally Kelsenian rather than Schmittian in nature.
Note
Maghami, Amir & Razavinejad, Mohammad Ali & Esfandiarpour, Fatemeh & Barati Ahmadabadi, Mehdi. (2026). Analyzing the Concept of “Existential Threat” and Evaluating its Consequences in the Light of Carl Schmitt’s Views (Case Study of the Israel and United States Attacks on Iran). Journal of Legal Studies, 17(4), 1–40.
