{"id":32949,"date":"2026-08-26T17:42:24","date_gmt":"2026-08-26T14:12:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.hriui.com\/?p=32949"},"modified":"2026-08-26T17:44:08","modified_gmt":"2026-08-26T14:14:08","slug":"irans-cultural-heritage-in-the-fires-of-war-assessing-the-international-responsibility-of-the-united-states-and-israel-under-international-law","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.hriui.com\/en\/irans-cultural-heritage-in-the-fires-of-war-assessing-the-international-responsibility-of-the-united-states-and-israel-under-international-law\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Cultural Heritage in the Fires of War: Assessing the International Responsibility of the United States and Israel under International Law"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

The cultural heritage of every nation is not only a repository of its identity, history, and collective memory, but also an integral part of the common heritage of humanity, transcending geographical and temporal boundaries and forging an enduring connection between past, present, and future generations. The protection of such heritage during armed conflicts has long been a fundamental concern of international humanitarian law, with numerous customary and treaty-based rules emphasizing the collective obligation to respect and safeguard cultural property. In recent decades, however, cultural heritage has increasingly become a direct target in military conflicts, and its deliberate destruction has caused, in addition to material loss, irreparable harm to the collective identity, cultural diversity, and human dignity of affected communities. The recent attacks by the United States and Israel on Iran\u2019s historical sites and World Heritage properties in February\u2013March 2026, which damaged more than 130 historical sites, have heightened the need to assess these acts under international law and to determine the responsibility of those involved at both the level of international responsibility of States and individual criminal responsibility. Against this background, the present report examines the legal dimensions of these attacks by setting out the legal framework governing the protection of cultural property, assessing States\u2019 obligations and instances of their breach, and analyzing the available avenues for criminal prosecution and reparation.<\/p>\n

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Attacks on Cultural and Historical Sites and World Heritage Properties<\/strong><\/p>\n

In situations of armed conflict or disaster, culture is particularly at risk because of its inherent vulnerability and immense symbolic value. At the same time, culture can serve as a driver of recovery, strengthening the resilience of communities[1]<\/a>. In this context, cultural and historical sites, together with properties inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, serve as repositories of the culture and civilization of societies and constitute part of their collective memory, historical identity, and cultural continuity. Such sites preserve the connection between past, present, and future generations and play an important role in fostering a sense of belonging, historical awareness, and recognition of national and local identity. Museums, libraries, historical monuments, archaeological sites, religious sites, and World Heritage properties possess not only material value, but also symbolic, artistic, scientific, historical, and civilizational significance. Cultural property must therefore be respected in light of its character and the role it plays within society. Damage to cultural property constitutes damage to the cultural heritage of all humanity, since every people contributes to the culture of the world. In practical terms, this means that such property, its immediate surroundings, or the means employed for its protection must not be used for purposes likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict[2]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

According to UNESCO, cultural heritage and cultural expressions have in recent years increasingly become direct targets of systematic and deliberate attacks in numerous conflicts around the world[3]<\/a>. Their damage or destruction in the course of armed conflicts may therefore cause a rupture in historical memory and deprive future generations of part of humanity\u2019s common heritage. The consequences of such attacks generally extend well beyond the immediate site of the damage and may affect local communities, cultural institutions, education systems, and even relations between nations. The destruction of cultural heritage may also restrict public access to culture, undermine cultural tourism, result in the loss of historical records, and make the reconstruction of social identity after conflict more difficult. In addition, UNESCO considers the intentional destruction of cultural heritage to be associated with restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms and incompatible with the fundamental requirement of ensuring access to cultural heritage for all[4]<\/a>. The protection of cultural and historical sites during armed conflict is therefore an essential means of safeguarding cultural diversity, human dignity, and the common heritage of humanity. Notwithstanding these considerations, during the attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran in 2026, Iranian cultural heritage authorities reported that more than 130 historical sites had been damaged. UNESCO also confirmed that damage had occurred and warned that some of it might be irreversible[5]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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Legal Status of Iran\u2019s Historical Sites and World Heritage Properties<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iran is one of the countries with an extensive body of historical and cultural heritage at both the national and international levels, in terms of both diversity and number of sites. According to figures announced by Seyyed Reza Salehi Amiri, Minister of Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicrafts, approximately one million historical, cultural, and natural properties have been identified throughout Iran, of which more than 43,000 have been inscribed on the National Heritage List of Iran[6]<\/a>. Such national registration places these properties, as a matter of law, within the protective framework established by domestic legislation governing the preservation of historical and cultural heritage.<\/p>\n

At the international level, Iran became a State Party to the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage on 26 February 1975. As of 3 August 2026, Iran had 30 properties inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, comprising 28 cultural properties and two natural properties\u2014the Hyrcanian Forests and the Lut Desert[7]<\/a>. Iran\u2019s most recent inscription is Alam\u016bt Castle and Related Fortifications, which was added to the World Heritage List in 2026 as a serial property comprising Alam\u016bt Castle and six associated fortifications[8]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Several of Iran\u2019s World Heritage properties\u2014including the Persian Garden, the Persian Qanat, the Persian Caravanserai, the Armenian Monastic Ensembles of Iran, and the Hyrcanian Forests\u2014are serial in nature and consist of multiple component parts located in different parts of the country. Accordingly, the actual number of monuments and sites enjoying World Heritage status exceeds the number of inscribed properties as formally recorded on the List. Iran has also placed 57 properties and sites on the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List[9]<\/a>, reflecting the State\u2019s intention to consider and potentially nominate them for inscription in future years.<\/p>\n

From a legal perspective, the inscription of such properties does not relieve the host State of responsibility or transfer the duty of preservation to international organizations such as UNESCO. Rather, the host State remains responsible for safeguarding these sites and properties in accordance with the procedures and standards established by relevant international bodies, while the wider responsibility to respect World Heritage values also extends to the States Parties to the Convention. According to UNESCO, when a State Party nominates a property, it must provide details on how that property is protected, together with a management plan for its preservation, and States Parties are expected to protect the World Heritage values of inscribed properties[10]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

A further legal point is that the absence of a site from the World Heritage List does not mean that it lacks cultural value or falls outside the general protections applicable to historical and cultural property. World Heritage inscription, in addition to recognizing the property\u2019s Outstanding Universal Value, entails obligations for Iran and other States Parties to ensure its protection, conservation, presentation, and transmission to future generations within the framework of the World Heritage Convention.<\/p>\n

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Direct Attack and Incidental Damage<\/strong><\/p>\n

Under international humanitarian law, an important distinction exists between a direct attack against a cultural or historical property or site and incidental damage caused to such property as a consequence of an attack directed against a military objective. Although Iran, the United States, and Israel are not, in their mutual relations, all bound as States Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, a substantial part of the rules concerning the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, proportionality, and precautions in attack, as codified in Articles 51, 52, and 57 of Additional Protocol I, reflects customary international humanitarian law and is therefore binding on the parties to the conflict.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, historical monuments, religious sites, museums, and other forms of cultural property are, in principle, civilian objects and must not be made the direct object of attack unless, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, they satisfy the conditions for classification as a military objective. This follows from the principle of distinction, which requires parties to an armed conflict to direct their attacks exclusively against military objectives.<\/p>\n

Under Rule 7 of Customary International Humanitarian Law, the parties to a conflict must distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives and may direct attacks only against military objectives[11]<\/a>. In addition, cultural property benefits from specific protection. Rule 38 of Customary International Humanitarian Law prohibits attacks against property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, unless such property has become a military objective[12]<\/a>. At the level of international criminal law, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court likewise classifies as a war crime the intentional directing of attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, as well as historic monuments, provided that they are not military objectives, in both international and non-international armed conflicts[13]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

By contrast, incidental damage occurs when the cultural property itself is not the object of attack but is nevertheless damaged during an operation against a nearby military objective, for example as a result of direct impact, fragmentation, fire, or blast effects. Paragraph 13(c) of the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea defines \u201cincidental casualties\u201d or \u201cincidental damage\u201d as including the death of, or injury to, civilians or other protected persons, as well as damage to or destruction of the natural environment or objects that are not in themselves military objectives[14]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Such damage does not, by itself, necessarily establish the unlawfulness of an attack. However, before launching the operation, the attacker must assess the foreseeable incidental harm in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. An attack that may be expected to cause excessive incidental damage in relation to that anticipated military advantage is prohibited.<\/p>\n

In addition, the attacking party is required to exercise constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects and to take all feasible precautions in the choice of target, means and methods of attack, type of munition, timing, trajectory, and manner of execution. Under Rule 15 of Customary International Humanitarian Law, in the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must also be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects[15]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the mere presence of a military objective in the vicinity of a historical property does not, in itself, justify damage to that property. Rather, the lawfulness of the operation must be assessed in light of the principles of distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautions in attack.<\/p>\n

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also expressly emphasized in the Bla\u0161ki\u0107 case that the offence of destruction of cultural property requires that \u201cdamage or destruction be committed intentionally against institutions clearly identifiable as dedicated to religion or education.\u201d The Tribunal further stated that, at the time of the act, such institutions must not have been used for military purposes or situated in the immediate vicinity of military objectives[16]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the mere proximity of cultural property to a military objective cannot, as a general rule, be regarded as extinguishing its protected status. Each attack must instead be assessed on the basis of the actual status of the object concerned, the proportionality of the expected harm, and the precautions taken in the circumstances.<\/p>\n

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Attribution of Attacks and Standards for Establishing State Responsibility<\/strong><\/p>\n

Establishing that an attack against cultural property was unlawful is not, by itself, sufficient to engage the international responsibility of a State. It must also be determined to which State the conduct in question is attributable under international law. Pursuant to Article 2 of the International Law Commission\u2019s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), an internationally wrongful act of a State exists where two elements are present: first, the relevant act or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and second, that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation binding upon that State. Accordingly, any assessment of damage to Iran\u2019s cultural heritage requires two distinct questions to be addressed: first, which State or force carried out the specific attack; and second, whether the established conduct is legally attributable to that State and constitutes a breach of its international obligations concerning the protection of cultural property.<\/p>\n

Where an attack is carried out by the official armed forces of a State, legal attribution is generally straightforward. Under Article 4 of ARSIWA, the conduct of any State organ, irrespective of its position within the internal structure of the State or the nature of its functions, is considered an act of that State under international law. Official armed forces and military units are clear examples of State organs. Therefore, where reliable evidence establishes that a particular attack was carried out by the armed forces of the United States or Israel, that conduct will, in principle, be directly attributable to the State concerned. Even where a State official or organ exceeds its authority or acts contrary to internal instructions, attribution is not necessarily precluded, provided that the person or unit acted in an official capacity or under the appearance of official authority. Consequently, in such cases, the principal issue is not whether the State exercised \u201ceffective control\u201d over its own official forces, but rather whether it can be established which State force carried out the specific attack, followed by an assessment of whether that conduct complied with the international obligations binding upon that State[17]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

It is nevertheless important to distinguish the legal attribution of conduct by official armed forces from the evidentiary attribution of a particular attack. The mere fact that a State is participating in an armed conflict, taking part in a broader military operation, or even providing political and military support to another State is insufficient to attribute all damage occurring during the conflict to that State. For each damaged cultural site, it should, as far as possible, be established when the attack occurred, by what means it was carried out, which force possessed the capability and opportunity to conduct it, and whether direct evidence exists as to the actor responsible for the operation.<\/p>\n

Official claims of responsibility, reports issued by ministries of defence or armed forces, information concerning the type of aircraft or missile used, munition remnants and their technical characteristics, satellite imagery, geolocation and time-stamped data, verifiable photographs and videos, radar or flight data where available, witness testimony, and reports by independent bodies may all be used in combination to reconstruct the chain of events and identify the actor responsible for the attack. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that the attribution of the conduct of official forces to a State is a rule of law, whereas proving that a particular attack was in fact carried out by those forces is an evidentiary question requiring assessment of the body of evidence relating to that specific incident.<\/p>\n

This distinction becomes even more significant where the United States and Israel have participated simultaneously or in coordination in military operations against Iran. The mere existence of political or military coordination between two States, intelligence-sharing, logistical support, or participation in a single military campaign does not, by itself, mean that every attack carried out by one State is also attributable to the other. As a starting point, the conduct of the official units of each State is attributable, under the general rules of attribution, to that State itself. Accordingly, if a specific attack was carried out by the Israeli Air Force, the presumption is that the attack is attributable to Israel; likewise, if it was carried out by the United States Armed Forces, the conduct is directly attributable to the United States. Extending responsibility to the other State requires a separate legal and evidentiary basis; strategic cooperation or convergence of political objectives alone is insufficient.<\/p>\n

A State may, however, incur responsibility without itself being the direct perpetrator of the attack where it provides aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. Article 16 of ARSIWA provides that a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act may itself incur responsibility where the relevant conditions are satisfied, particularly where the assisting State has knowledge of the circumstances that render the conduct of the recipient State internationally wrongful and where the conduct would also constitute a breach of an international obligation of the assisting State if committed by that State itself. The International Law Commission\u2019s Commentaries further emphasize the need for a genuine connection between the assistance provided and the facilitation of the internationally wrongful act.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, where an attack against cultural property is carried out by one State, the possible role of another State in supplying targeting intelligence, providing operational support, furnishing specific weapons, conducting refuelling operations, supplying technical capabilities, or offering other forms of assistance may provide a basis for independent responsibility only where the legal elements of Article 16 and the connection between the assistance and the wrongful act in question are established on the basis of sufficient evidence. Responsibility arising from aid or assistance is analytically distinct from the direct attribution of the attack itself: in the former case, the assisting State incurs responsibility for its own conduct in facilitating the wrongful act of another State, and the entirety of the conduct of the principal State is not necessarily attributable to the assisting State.<\/p>\n

By contrast, standards such as \u201ceffective control\u201d become relevant primarily where the conduct in question is carried out by individuals or groups that do not constitute official organs of the State, yet it is alleged that their conduct is attributable to a State because they acted on its instructions, direction, or control. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that even extensive financing, training, equipping, organization, and support of a non-State armed group are insufficient to attribute all acts of that group to the supporting State unless the State exercised effective control over the specific operation in the course of which the alleged violation occurred[18]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Court reaffirmed this approach in its 2007 judgment in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), explaining that where private persons or non-State groups are concerned, a State\u2019s instructions or control must be established in relation to the specific operation during which the wrongful act was committed, rather than merely in relation to the group\u2019s activities in general[19]<\/a>. Therefore, where attacks are carried out directly by the official armed forces of the United States or Israel, recourse to the effective control test is unnecessary. That test becomes relevant only where the direct perpetrator is an individual or group outside the formal State apparatus and attribution of that conduct to a State is in question.<\/p>\n

On this basis, any assessment of the responsibility of the United States and Israel for damage caused to Iran\u2019s cultural heritage must be both incident-specific and State-specific. For each attack, the direct actor must first be identified on the basis of the available evidence. It must then be determined to which State the relevant conduct is attributable under the rules of international responsibility, followed by an assessment of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of that conduct in light of the rules governing the protection of cultural property, distinction, proportionality, and precautions.<\/p>\n

Where the evidence indicates the involvement of the other State, the nature and extent of that involvement must also be examined independently in order to determine whether it amounted merely to general military cooperation or whether it satisfied the elements required for responsibility arising from aid or assistance in an internationally wrongful act. Such an approach prevents mere alliance or military coordination from leading to automatic and collective attribution of all attacks, while at the same time allowing the independent responsibility of each State to be identified where its role in the planning, execution, or facilitation of a specific attack is established.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the determination of responsibility in relation to Iran\u2019s cultural heritage should not rest on a generalized assumption concerning the participation of the parties to the conflict. Rather, it must be based on an evidentiary and legal chain comprising the identification of the actor, attribution of conduct, establishment of a breach, and determination of the role played by each State in the specific incident.<\/p>\n

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Obligations and International Responsibility Concerning the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts<\/strong><\/p>\n

The international protection of cultural property in armed conflicts rests on a body of treaty-based and customary rules whose origins can be traced at least to the 1907 Hague Regulations. These rules recognized the need to spare buildings dedicated to art, science, charitable purposes, and historic monuments from damage and deliberate destruction. The principal framework of protection was subsequently developed through the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its 1954 and 1999 Protocols.<\/p>\n

The First Protocol of 1954 is primarily concerned with preventing the export of cultural property from occupied territories, safeguarding property removed from such territories, and ensuring its restitution following the end of hostilities. By contrast, the Second Protocol of 1999 addresses, in a more comprehensive manner, the strengthening of the legal regime for the protection of cultural property during armed conflicts. The 1999 Second Protocol, to which Iran is a party but the United States and Israel are not, established the system of \u201cenhanced protection.\u201d Accordingly, the provisions of this Protocol are directly relevant to the assessment of Iran\u2019s treaty obligations and may also be taken into account when examining the development of the international legal regime for the protection of cultural heritage. Its specific treaty obligations, however, cannot be treated as directly binding upon the United States and Israel merely by virtue of the existence of the armed conflict.<\/p>\n

The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also addresses the protection of cultural sites. Article 53 provides that it is prohibited to commit \u201cany acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples,\u201d to use such objects in support of the military effort, or to make such objects the object of reprisals[20]<\/a>. Article 16 of Additional Protocol II establishes comparable protection in non-international armed conflicts, providing that it is prohibited to commit acts of hostility directed against historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort[21]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, meanwhile, not only affirms the primary responsibility of the territorial State for the identification, protection, conservation, and transmission of heritage to future generations, but also imposes obligations upon other States Parties. Under Article 6(3), States Parties undertake not to take any deliberate measures that might directly or indirectly damage cultural and natural heritage situated within the territory of other States Parties to the Convention[22]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

At the level of individual criminal responsibility, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes the intentional directing of attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, and science, provided that they are not military objectives, as a war crime. Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute refers to \u201cintentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives[23]<\/a>.\u201d Accordingly, an issue of particular importance is the legal consequences arising from attacks against historical and cultural sites by individuals and States.<\/p>\n

An unlawful attack against historical sites and cultural heritage may violate both treaty-based and customary rules of international humanitarian law and may entail a range of legal consequences at different levels, including international responsibility of States and individual criminal responsibility. Although international law has traditionally focused primarily on State responsibility, the development of international criminal law has demonstrated that individuals may also incur criminal responsibility for intentionally attacking cultural property.<\/p>\n

The 2016 case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi represents a landmark in this respect. In that case, the International Criminal Court (ICC), for the first time, convicted an individual of a war crime for intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali[24]<\/a>. The status of some of those sites as UNESCO World Heritage properties was also taken into account by the Court in assessing their cultural significance and the gravity of the damage. In addition, at the reparations stage, the Court found Al Mahdi liable for EUR 2.7 million in reparations, demonstrating the capacity of the ICC\u2019s reparations regime to address harm resulting from the destruction of cultural heritage[25]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the mere characterization of conduct as a war crime is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Since Iran, the United States, and Israel are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, the Court\u2019s jurisdiction over acts committed on Iranian territory would require the existence of one of the specific jurisdictional bases provided for in the Statute, including Iran\u2019s acceptance of the Court\u2019s jurisdiction under Article 12(3), a relevant nationality nexus involving a State Party, or a referral of the situation by the United Nations Security Council. In parallel, the prosecution of alleged perpetrators before the domestic courts of certain States on the basis of universal jurisdiction may also be considered, subject to the domestic legislation of those States.<\/p>\n

At the level of State responsibility, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, held that Israel was required to return cultural property and assets taken from Palestinians and Palestinian institutions, including archives and documents, and stated that where restitution is materially impossible, compensation must be provided in accordance with the applicable rules of international law[26]<\/a>. The Court also emphasized the erga omnes character of certain breached obligations, particularly the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and identified legal consequences for other States and for the United Nations in relation to the situation resulting from those breaches.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, under Rule 40 of Customary International Humanitarian Law, the seizure, destruction, or wilful damage of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, the arts and sciences, as well as historic monuments, is prohibited, and States are required to respect and protect such property during armed conflict. This rule has been recognized as customary on the basis of State practice, including that of States not party to the 1954 Hague Convention[27]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Following the outbreak of the war, UNESCO provided Iran, the United States, and Israel with the geographic coordinates of sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, the Tentative List, and the International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection[28]<\/a>. Communication of the coordinates of these sites may be significant in assessing the degree of awareness of the parties to the conflict regarding their location and cultural character and, depending on the circumstances of each attack, may be relevant to the assessment of the obligation to take precautions, the foreseeability of damage, and the mental element of potential crimes. Knowledge of the coordinates of a cultural property, however, is not in itself sufficient to establish an intent to attack that property.<\/p>\n

From the perspective of international criminal law, the destruction of cultural heritage may also, in certain circumstances and where the requisite elements are established, be examined as part of persecution as a crime against humanity. Such destruction may also constitute one of the evidentiary factors used to infer the specific intent required for genocide, although cultural destruction, in itself, does not constitute an independent underlying act of the crime of genocide.<\/p>\n

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Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

The legal assessment developed in this report demonstrates that the damage inflicted on Iran\u2019s cultural heritage during military attacks by the United States and Israel cannot be treated merely as unintended or peripheral consequences of an armed conflict. The scale of the damage, the character of some of the affected sites, their historical and cultural significance, and the prior knowledge of the attacking parties regarding the geographical location of a number of these properties all reinforce the need for a more rigorous examination of the responsibility of the two States. Although, from the perspective of international humanitarian law, responsibility must ultimately be determined on an attack-by-attack basis, taking into account the nature of the target, the type of munition used, the anticipated military advantage, the foreseeability of harm, and the precautions taken, this requirement should not be allowed to operate as a means of diminishing the potential responsibility of the attacking parties. Where a cultural property retained its civilian character at the time of the attack and no identifiable military objective was present at the site, the direct targeting of that property may constitute a clear violation of the rules providing special protection to cultural property. Even where a military objective was located nearby, the United States and Israel were required to demonstrate full compliance with the principles of proportionality, distinction, and precautions in attack.<\/p>\n

The significance of this issue is further heightened by the fact that UNESCO had provided Iran, the United States, and Israel with the coordinates of a number of Iranian heritage sites. This fact does not, in itself, establish an intent to attack, but it may substantially weaken any claim that the attacking forces were unaware of the location or cultural character of the damaged sites. In such circumstances, if additional factors are established\u2014including the pattern of attacks, the type of weapons used, the absence of a clear military necessity, repeated damage to cultural sites, or inadequate precautionary measures\u2014the cumulative evidentiary weight of these circumstances may become highly significant in assessing responsibility. From this perspective, the central question is no longer simply whether a historic monument was directly targeted. It is also necessary to determine whether U.S. and Israeli forces, with knowledge of the location and significance of these sites, took all feasible precautions to avoid damage to them and whether the foreseeable harm was proportionate to the asserted military advantage.<\/p>\n

As regards attribution, the simultaneous and coordinated participation of the United States and Israel in military operations against Iran does not, in itself, result in the automatic attribution of all attacks to both States. It does, however, broaden the scope of the inquiry into responsibility. Any attack carried out by the official armed forces of the United States or Israel is, in principle, directly attributable to the State concerned and, where a breach of the rules protecting cultural property is established, may engage that State\u2019s international responsibility. At the same time, where the evidence demonstrates that the other State played a material role in targeting, intelligence provision, operational support, the supply of specific weapons, or the facilitation of the attack, its independent responsibility on the basis of aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act may also arise. Military coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv therefore neither provides a basis for unsupported collective attribution of responsibility nor precludes an examination of their complementary or joint roles in specific attacks.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the legal significance of the case concerning Iran\u2019s cultural heritage lies in its potential to move beyond abstract legal analysis and develop into a documented case concerning the international accountability of the United States and Israel. Achieving this requires the precise documentation of each damaged site, identification of the direct perpetrator of each attack, determination of the military or civilian character of the target, examination of operational and technical data, analysis of the type of munitions used and impact patterns, assessment of the attackers\u2019 prior knowledge, and evaluation of proportionality and precautions in each individual incident. The more coherent and comprehensive this evidentiary chain becomes, the greater the possibility of invoking State responsibility, seeking reparation, and, where the requisite conditions are met, pursuing individual criminal responsibility. Viewed in this way, the issue of Iran\u2019s cultural heritage is not merely one of protecting a number of historic monuments. It concerns the preservation of part of a nation\u2019s historical and cultural memory against military operations conducted by States that were obliged under international law to refrain from damaging that heritage and that, where violations are established, must be held legally accountable for the consequences of their conduct.<\/p>\n

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References<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> UNESCO. (n.d). Safeguarding Culture in Times of Crisis. UNESCO<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.unesco.org\/en\/emergencies\/culture<\/a><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> UNESCO. (n.d). Frequently asked questions on Armed Conflict and Heritage. UNESCO<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.unesco.org\/en\/heritage-armed-conflicts\/faq<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> UNESCO. (2023, May 11). The role of culture for resilience, peace and security: a new international agenda promoted by UNESCO. UNESCO<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.unesco.org\/en\/emergencies\/culture\/role-culture<\/a><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> UNESCO. (2022, June 29). The Tracker Culture & Public Policy | Special Issue n\u00b03 : Countdown to MONDIACULT. UNESCO<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.unesco.org\/en\/articles\/tracker-culture-public-policy-special-issue-ndeg3-countdown-mondiacult<\/a><\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> CCP Staff. (2026, May 5). Cultural Heritage Under Fire in the 2026 Iran War. Cultural Property News<\/em>. From: https:\/\/culturalpropertynews.org\/cultural-heritage-under-fire-in-the-2026-iran-war\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Mousavi, S. (2026, July 24). A New Chapter in Tehran\u2013Seoul Cultural Cooperation on the Eve of Alamut\u2019s World Heritage Inscription. IRNA<\/em>. From: https:\/\/irna.ir\/xjXRb2<\/a><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> UNESCO. (n.d). Iran (Islamic Republic of). UNESCO.<\/em> From: https:\/\/whc.unesco.org\/en\/statesparties\/ir<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> UNESCO. (2026). Alam\u016bt Castle and Related Fortifications. UNESCO.<\/em> From: https:\/\/whc.unesco.org\/en\/list\/1770<\/a><\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Tehran Times. (2025, November 21). Iran ranks among top 10 countries for UNESCO-listed heritage: minister. Tehran Times<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.tehrantimes.com\/news\/520679\/Iran-ranks-among-top-10-countries-for-UNESCO-listed-heritage<\/a><\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> UNESCO. (n.d). States Parties. UNESCO.<\/em> From: https:\/\/whc.unesco.org\/en\/statesparties\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> ICRC. (n.d). rule 7, The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects
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[12]<\/a> ICRC. (n.d). rule 38, Attacks Against Cultural
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[13]<\/a> ICC. (2021). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. ICC<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-05\/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> IIHL. (1994, June 12). San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. IIHL<\/em>. From: https:\/\/iihl.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/07\/SAN-REMO-MANUAL-on-INTERNATIONAL-LAW-APPLICABLE-TO-ARMED-CONFLICTS-AT-SEA-2.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> ICRC. (n.d). rule 15, Principle of Precautions in Attack. ICRC<\/em>. From: https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/customary-ihl\/v1\/rule15<\/a><\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Wolfrum, R. (2010, July). Cultural Property, Protection in Armed Conflict. Oxford Public International Law<\/em>. From: https:\/\/opil.ouplaw.com\/display\/10.1093\/law:epil\/9780199231690\/law-9780199231690-e278?rskey=FA5Toi&result=9&prd=OPIL<\/a><\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> International Law Commission. (2001). Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Articles 2, 4, 7 & 16. United Nations<\/em>. From: https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/commentaries\/9_6_2001.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> International Court of Justice. (1986, June 27). Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986. ICJ<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/case\/70<\/a><\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> International Court of Justice. (2007, February 26). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 2007. ICJ<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/case\/91<\/a><\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> ICRC. (1977, June 8). Article 53 – Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship. ICRC<\/em>. From: https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/ihl-treaties\/api-1977\/article-53<\/a><\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> ICRC. (1977, June 8). Article 16 – Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship. ICRC<\/em>. From: https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/ihl-treaties\/apii-1977\/article-16<\/a><\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> UNESCO. (1972, November 16). Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. UNESCO<\/em>. From: https:\/\/whc.unesco.org\/en\/conventiontext\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> ICC. (2021). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. ICC<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-05\/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> Harvard Law Review. (2017, May 17). Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. Harvard Law Review<\/em>. From: https:\/\/harvardlawreview.org\/print\/vol-130\/prosecutor-v-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> International Crimes Database. (2016, September 27). The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. International Crimes Database<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org\/Case\/3321\/#p1<\/a><\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> Filipa Vrdoljak, A. (2025, September 30). Rule of Law, International Law and Destruction of Culture. Australian Institute of International Affairs<\/em>. From: https:\/\/www.internationalaffairs.org.au\/australianoutlook\/rule-of-law-international-law-and-destruction-of-culture\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> ICRC. (n.d). rule 40, Respect for Cultural Property. ICRC<\/em>. From: https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/customary-ihl\/v1\/rule40#Fn_7420CB30_00003<\/a><\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> Liuliu, X. (2026, March 8). UNESCO confirms with GT: it urges protection of cultural heritage, shares sites’ coordinates with US, Israel and Iran. Global Times.<\/em> From: https:\/\/www.globaltimes.cn\/page\/202603\/1356591.shtml?id=11<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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